Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation


caption=
partof=the Eastern Front of World War II
place=Kharkov
date=12 August 1943 - 23 August 1943
result=Soviet victory
combatant1=flag|Nazi Germany
combatant2=flag|Soviet Union|1923
commander1=
commander2=
strength1=Army Group South, Armeeabteilung "Kempf", subsequently 8th Army, XI Armeecorps
strength2=Steppe Front, 5th Guards Tank Army, 57th Army, 69th Army, 7th Guards Army, 800 Tanks [Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 pp 322-327]
casualties1=
casualties2=450 Tanks|

The Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation (12 August 1943 - 23 August 1943) was an operation conducted as part of Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev between the Red Army and Wehrmacht forces. It was one of the operations that followed the Battle of Kursk.

Prelude

Following the culmination of Battle of Kursk and the subsequent withdrawal from the salient, the Red Army launched Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev on the 3rd of August 1943 its Objectives the recovery the cities of Belgorod & Kharkov. On the first day of the offensive Soviet armies of the Voronezh Front quickly penetrated the German front-line defences on the boundary of the 4th Panzerarmee & the Armeeabteilung "Kempf", between Tomarovka & Belgorod to a depth of 100 kilometres sector reaching a line Akhtyrka-Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev along the banks of the Merla river by 12th August 1943 where they were finally halted by German armoured units of the III Panzercorps. On the night of 5/6th of August 1943 XI Armeecorps finally evacuated the city of Belgorod. (see Belgorod-Bogodukhov Offensive Operation) [Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 pp213-215 ]

Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation

Following its withdrawal from Belgorod on the night of the 5th/6th of August 1943 the XI Armeecorps (Raus) now held defensive positions south of the city between the Donets & Lopan Rivers north of Kharkov. The XI Armeecorps consisted of a kampfgruppe of the 167th Infantry Division, the 168th, 106th, 198th, 320th Infantry Divisions, the 6th Panzer Division was the corps reserve. [Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003 pp213-216 ] note label|Note1|a|a This constituted a deep salient east into Soviet lines and was subject to outflanking attempts on the corps left flank, indeed Soviet armoured units had already appeared 20 miles behind the corps front line. XI Armeecorps now made a series of phased withdrawals toward Kharkov to prevent encirclement. Only reaching the final defenses North of the city on 12th August 1943, following breakthroughs by the 57th & 69th armies in several sectors of the front-line, the disintegration of the 168th Infantry Division & after an intervention by the corps reserve. [Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 pp213-215 ] When its attempts to force a breakthrough in the Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev met with frustration along the Merla River, the Steppe Front directed its assaults towards Korotich a sector held by 2nd SS Panzer Division 'Das Reich' to cut the Poltava-Kharkov rail link. Fierce fighting ensued in which Korotich was captured by the 5th Guards Mechanised Corps & subsequently recaptured by Grenadiers from "Das Reich" then to remain under German control, but the 5th Guards Tank Army (Rotmistrov) did cut the rail link finally on the 22nd of August 1943. [Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 Page 324] The loss of this vital line of communication while not fatal in itself, was a serious blow to the ability of Armeeabteilung Kempf, to defend the city from Russian attacks. This meant delays in supplying artillery shells & that reinforcements had to take the longer more roundabout southern route to enter the city which was also under threat from the South-East. The way to Poltava now remained open, but Vatutin hesitated to push through while the Germans flanking the gap held firm. Instead, he turned his left flank armies the 5th Guards Tank Army & 5th Guards Army, against the west front of Armeeabteilung Kempf where the 'SS' divisions fought to keep the front angled south westward away from Kharkov. On the weaker east front of Armeeabteilung Kempf the Soviet 57th Army cleared the right bank of the Donets between Chuguyev & Zmiyev, but the army command somehow could not quite bring itself to try for a full scale breakthrough. [Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 154] These threats had led to a request by General Kempf to abandon the city on 12th August 1943, Manstein did not object, but Hitler countered with an order that the city had to be held "under all circumstances".note label|Note2|b|b After a prediction that the order to hold Kharkov would produce "another Stalingrad" on 14th August 1943 Manstein relieved Kempf and appointed General Otto Wöhler in his place. A few days Later Armeeabteilung Kempf was renamed 8th Army. [Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 153] Kharkov now constituted a deep German salient to the east, which prevented the red army from making use of this vital traffic and supply centre. Following boastful reports made by Soviet radio that Russian troops had entered the city, when in fact it was still held by XI Armeecorps, Stalin personally ordered its immediate capture. [Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 Page 242] General Raus the officer commanding the city takes up the story: quotation| " It was clear that the Russians would not make a frontal assault on the projecting Kharkov salient but would attempt to breakthrough the narrowest part of XI Armeecorps defensive arc West of the city in order to encircle the town. We deployed all available anti-tank guns on the Northern edge of the bottleneck, which rose like a bastion, and emplaced numerous 88mm flak guns in depth on the high ground. This antitank defence alone would not have been sufficient to repulse the expected Soviet mass tank attack, but at the last moment reinforcements in the form of the "Das Reich" panzer regiment arrived with a strong Panzer component; I immediately dispatched it to the most endangered sector. The ninety-six Panther tanks, thirty-five Tiger tanks, note label|Note3|c|cand twenty-five Sturmgeschütz III self propelled assault guns had hardly taken their positions on 20 August 1943 when the first large scale attack got underway. However the Russian tanks had been recognized while they were still assembling in the villages and flood plains of a brook valley. Within a few minutes heavily laden "Stuka's" came on in wedge formation and unloaded their cargoes of destruction in well timed dives on the enemy tanks caught in this congested area. Dark fountains of earth erupted skyward and were followed by heavy thunderclaps and shocks that resembled an earthquake. These were the heaviest, two-ton bombs, designed for use against battleships, which were all that Luftflotte 4 had left to counter the russian attack. Soon all the villages occupied by Soviet tanks lay in flames. A sea of dust and smoke clouds illuminated by the setting sun hung over the brook valley, while dark mushrooms of smoke from burning tanks stood out in stark contrast. This gruesome picture bore witness to an undertaking that left death & destruction in its wake, hitting the russians so hard that they could no longer launch their projected attack that day, regardless of Stalins order. Such a severe blow inflicted on the Soviets had purchased badly needed time for XI Armeecorps to reorganize. " [Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 pp 242-243] The supply situation in Kharkov was now catastrophic, artillerymen after firing their last rounds, were abandoning their guns to fight as infantrymen. The army's supply depot had five trainloads of spare tank tracks leftover from "Zitadelle" but very little else. The high consumption of ammunition in the last month and a half had cut into supplies put aside for the last two weeks of August and the first two weeks of September; until the turn of the month the army would have to get along with fifty percent of its daily average requirements in artillery & tank ammunition. XI Armeecorps now had a combat strength of only 4,000 Infantrymen, one man for every ten yards of front. [Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 156] General Raus explains the intensity of the constant Russian attacks: quotation| "On 20th August the Russians avoided mass groupings of tanks, crossed the brook valley simultaneously in a number of places, and disappeared into the broad cornfields that were located ahead of our lines, ending at the east-west rollbahn several hundred metres in front of our main battle line. Throughout the morning Soviet tanks worked their way forward in the hollows up to the southern edges of the cornfields, then made a mass dash across the road in full sight. "Das Reich"'s Panthers caught the leading waves of T-34's with fierce defensive fire before they could reach our main battle line. Yet wave after wave followed, until Russian tanks flowed across in the protecting hollows and pushed forward into our battle positions. Here a net of anti-tank and flak guns, Hornet 88mm tank destroyers, and Wasp self-propelled 105mm field howitzers trapped the T-34's, split them into small groups, and put large numbers out of action. The final waves were still attempting to force a breakthrough in concentrated masses when the Tiger's and Stg III self-propelled assault guns, which represented our mobile reserve s behind the front, attacked the Russian armour and repulsed it with heavy losses. The price paid by the 5th Guards Tank Army for this mass assault amounted to 184 knocked out T-34's. [Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 Page 244] Wöhler recognizing the hopelessness of the situation, did not prove anymore resolute, in view of the harsh realities facing the defenders of Kharkov, he knew that the depleted Infantry regiments could not hold their positions without copious artillery support. Two days after taking command of 8th Army, Wöhler also asked Manstein's permission to abandon the city. Regardless of Hitler's demand that the city be held, Wöhler & Manstein agreed that the city could not be defended for long, given the diminishing German strength and the overwhelming size of Soviet reserves. On 21st August 1943, Manstein gave his consent to withdraw from Kharkov. The largely destroyed Soviet city, which changed hands several times during the war, was about to be recaptured by the Russians for the last time. During the night of 22nd August 1943, the Germans began their exodus from the city under great pressure from the Russians. The 57th & 69th Soviet Armies pushed in from three sides with the coming of daylight. The Soviets sensed that the Germans were evacuating Kharkov, due to the lessening of artillery fire and diminishing resistance in the front lines. Later in the day, thunderous explosions were heard as ammo dumps were blown. Large German columns were then observed leaving the city and the Russian troops pushed into the town itself. Moving out of Kharkov to the South, the Germans desperately fought to hold open a corridor through which a withdrawal could be made. All along the corridor through which the German divisions evacuated Kharkov, Soviet artillery and mortars pounded the withdrawal. Russian planes gathered for the kill and attacked the German columns leaving the city, strafing & bombing the men & vehicles. After dark, the 89th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions broke into the interior of the city, driving the last German rearguard detachments before them. Enormous fires were set by the Germans in hope of delaying the Russian advance. The city became a hellish place of fire and smoke, artillery fire & desperate combat, punctuated by the explosions of supply dumps. By 0200 hours on 23rd August 1943, elements of the 183rd Rifle Division pushed into the city centre, reached the huge "Dzerzhinsky Square" & met men from the 89th Rifle Division. The victorious Soviet troops hoisted a red banner over the city once again. By 1100 hours on 23rd August 1943 Kharkov was in the hands of the Russians. The fourth & final battle for the city was over. [The Road to Berlin John Erickson Westview Press 1983 Page 121]

Aftermath

By re-establishing a continuous front on the Army Group South left flank the 4th Panzerarmee & 8th Army had for the moment blunted a deadly thrust, but to the north & south fresh blows had already been dealt or were in the making. The constant fighting never allowed Hitler to build up a reserve large enough to regain the upper hand in the east. Employing the peculiar rippling effect that marked their offensives, the Russians, thwarted in one place, had shifted to others. For the first time in the war they had the full strategic initiative, and they grasped it jealously without regard for economy of effort, tactical sophistication, or the danger of overreaching themselves. [Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 158] The failure of "Zitadel" doomed the Germans to the loss of operational initiative on the Eastern Front without any hope of regaining it, although Hitler seems to have been unaware or unwilling to recognizing this reality. The terrible losses in manpower that the Germans suffered in July & August were ultimately fatal & left the armies of Army Group South & Centre too weak to do anything but delay the inevitable. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer months and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative. [Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 Page 330]

Footnotes

*note label|Note1|a|a The 905th Assault Gun Battalion, & the 7th & 48th flak regiments armed with the legendary '88' guns were also part of the Reserve.
*note label|Note2|b|b Hitler claimed the loss of Kharkov would damage German prestige, particularly in Turkey. In the spring the Turkish Commander in Chief had inspected the defences as a guest of Armeeabteilung Kempf & prounounced them "Impregnable".
*note label|Note3|c|c 1st Battalion, the 2 SS Das Reich Panzer Regiment left for France in May 1943, before the Battle of Kursk to receive its 'Panther' Tanks only returning in late August 1943.

Citations and notes

References

* " Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps", George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 ISBN 0-921991-35-5

* " Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945" by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003 ISBN 0-306-81247-9

* " Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East " by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968

* " The Road to Berlin by John Erickson Westview Press 1983

ources

* " Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps", George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 ISBN 0-921991-35-5

* " Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus 1941-1945" by Steven H Newton Da Capo Press edition 2003 ISBN 0-306-81247-9

* " Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East " by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968

* " The Road to Berlin by John Erickson Westview Press 1983