Battle of Pentemili beachhead (1974)

= General information =

Pentemili is the name of the beach of northern Cyprus where the Turkish troops landed on 20th July 1974. It is located 5 miles (8 km) west of Kyrenia, thus the name. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3] For 3 days (20th-22nd July 1974), heavy fighting took place around the beachhead of Pentemili, between Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces.

20th of July

The landing

The task force set sail from Mersin port at 11.30 on 19th of July. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3] At first, at about 05.00 of the 20th of July the fleet reached the northern coast of Cyprus. It initially missed the designated beach of Pentemili, and approached the unsuitable rocky beach of Glykiotissa, 3km west of Kyrenia. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3] The planned time for the beginning of the disembarkation was 05.30, but because of this mistake, the landing of the first crafts took place at 07.15. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3] The landing finished at about 13.00.

The landed forces were one infantry (marine) brigade, namely the "Cakmak" brigade, 12 M101 howitzers (105mm calibre) and some M113. The Cakmak brigade consisted of the 50th infantry regiment and the amphibious regiment, with a nominal strength of 3,500 men, 12 guns, 15 M47 MBTs and 20 M113 APC. The M47, on the decks of the LST Ertugrul (L401), were unable to disembark, as the small size of the beach didn't allow Ertugrul to approach. One unit of company size was also transported with helicopters to the hills south of the road. A total of roughly 3,000 men was unloaded in the Pentemili beachhead this day.

The landing occurred under no fire, as there were no units of the Cypriot National Guard in the area.Objective of the landed forces was the port-town of Kyrenia, some 8 km to the east of the beach. The Turkish forces, immediately after landing began expanding the beachhead, to give it a safe depth.

Greek resistance on the initial landing

The event of a such landing was predicted in the "Aphroditi 1973" plan. Realization of this plan was thus ordered by the National Guard High Command ("GEEF") at 07.00. The unit closest to the beach was the active 251st infantry battalion. The 1st company and the support company took position opposing the Turkish beachhead at about 09.30 [Kostas Hatziantoniou, Kypros 1954-1974, Athens 2007 ISBN 978-960-426-451-3] , while the 2nd and 3rd companies retained their positions against the Turkish Cypriot village of Templos. The 251st battalion was aided by a tank platoon of 5 T-34/85 tanks, of the 23rd tank battalion (based in Nicosia). The 1st company took positions immediately to the east of the Turkish beachhead, while the support company was positioned southwest of the beachhead.

At 10.00 the battalion was ordered to attack the beachhead. The numerical comparison forbid any serious success, however the attack seems to have initially have surprised the Turkish units and cause some casualties, but they were quickly able to answer the fire, and stop any further Greek advance. So, the beachhead was limited to about 300m south of the road, and 1-1.5 km east of the landing beach. With the initiation of the fire exchange, a number of National Guard's artillery batteries began sporadic and generally inaccurate fire. Since these artillery units had no orders, some of them did not act at all, and those that did, did so under their commanders' responsibility. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3]

At about 12.00 the Turkish forces attempted an advance to the east, with support from M113 APCs. The attack was repelled and two M113 were destroyed by the T-34/85, but the 251st bn had to give some ground retreating to the east. On the western side of the beachhead, the Turkish forces advanced to about 1km, facing no resistance, and they stopped, as their objective lied to the east.

Mobilization of the National Guard

Two reserve battalions were seated in the area, the 326th and the 306th. The 326th didn't mobilize at all, while the 306th did so, albeit very slowly. The National Guard High Command sent as reinforcements two battalions from Nicosia. Because the road from Nicosia to Kerynia was under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Gönyeli enclave, these units had to follow a longer route via the Panagra pass, west of the beachhead. These units were the 281st, minus a company, with the task of securing the Panagra pass, and the 286th mechanized infantry battalion, reinforced with 3 T-34/85, with the order of reaching the village Karavas, on the western flank of the Turkish beachhead.

Both units were attacked by the Turkish Air Force at the village Kontemenos, and suffered heavy casualties, including 6 BTR-152V1 APCs and the commander of the 286th, who died of his wounds later. As a result both units had a morale collapse, and both were ordered to simply move to Panagra pass protecting it and regrouping. One company sized unit, including the 3 tanks and the AT platoon (equipped with M40 recoilless rifles, calibre 106mm), was ordered to continue.

The 316th reserve battalion from Morphou (west of the beachhead) was ordered to send two companies to Kyrenia, without knowing of the Turkish beachhead. As a result, at about 13.00 the 1st company was ambushed by Turkish forces, and suffered losses. Realizing that the road to Kyrenia was cut, the battalion assumed defensive positions. At 16.30 the units from the 286th battalion arrived and united with the 316th. One tank was hit by Turkish AT fire, during a skirmish.

At about 20.00 a staff officer, of the National Guard High command, Lt. Colonel Konstantinos Boufas, arrived on the western sector, trying to coordinate the actions.

At 21.00 the 281st (at Panagra pass) was ordered to reinforce the units on the western flank of the beachhead. It arrived at about 23.00.

The reduced 281st, the two companies of the 316th, the company of the 286th and the AT and tank(s) platoons, totalling roughly the equivalent of a full composition battalion, was named "Boufas' battlegroup". A night attack was planned.

The night attack

The night attack was planned to begin at 02.30, with no artillery support. At 02.00 the commander of 316th was wounded by Turkish mortar fire.

The attack on the west commenced only with mortar support. After overthrowing the first Turkish lines, the attack stopped, under the heavy fire of the Turkish units, that had organized their defensive positions during the day.

On the eastern flank, the reserve 306th had not arrived yet. The 1st company of the 251st was ordered to attack, but under the dense Turkish fire it soon retreated to its initial position. The 306th arrived later and commenced its own attack, which did not succeed.

On the southern flank, a reserve battalion, formed during the civil fights after the coup, fighting on Makarios' side, called "Pantazis battalion" (after the name of its commander), arrived with no information and took heavy fire, and withdrew. It eventually disbanded. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3]

Colonel Karaoglanoglu's death

At about 03.00, the Turkish colonel Karaoglanoglu, commander of the 50th infantry regiment of the Turkish army was killed in a villa, some 300m east of the Pentemili beach. The reason of his death officially is Greek mortar or artillery fire. According however to general Bedrettin Demirel's memoirs, the projectiles (two were fired), were 3,5 inch rockets, apparently from a M20 Super Bazooka. The holes that the projectile made, vertically on a vertical wall, and Demirel's implies about "fire discipline", point to the incident being a case of friendly fire. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3]

21st of July

On the 21st of July little happened around the Pentemili beachhead. The Turkish forces took some limited ground on the east during the noon.On the southern flank, where no Greek units existed, the Turkish forces advanced 500m to the roots of Pentadaktylos mountains, but stopped due to the raging fires that were burning after the bombardment of the area by the Turkish air force.

Away from Pentemili, in Mersin port, the second wave of Turkish forces was being prepared. It consisted mainly of a tank company (17 tanks) of the 5th armoured brigade and a mechanized infantry company with M113 APCs. It left Mersin at 13.30 on 21st of July 1974, destination Pentemili. The second wave was named "Task force Bora".

22nd of July

Arrival of the second wave of Turkish forces

Task force Bora arrived at Pentemili beach at 09.00. Mj. General Bedrettin Demirel, commander of the 39th division, had appointed brigadier general Haki Boratas commander of Bora task force, while he assumed command of all the Turkish forces in the beachhead.

At arrival, Demirel, who knew of the cease-fire agreement, which would start at 17.00, sought to begin the attack against Kyrenia immediately. He noticed that the Turkish troops of the first wave were in poor shape and had low morale, being sleepless and disorganized, he however insisted that the attack start as soon as possible.

The attack, led by Bora task force followed by the 50th regiment, began at 11.00.

Changes on the Greek side

On the Greek side, the High Command had noticed the inability of the 3rd Tactical Group (responsible for Kyrenia sector) to coordinate a its forces and eliminate the Turkish beachhead, and gave the command of all Greek forces west and east of the beachhead to Special Forces' Colonel Kobokis. Additionally, a company of the 346th infantry battalion, mounted on improvised APCs (modified tracked artillery tractors, ATS-712) and a platoon with 4 3M6 (AT-1 Snapper) elements of the independent 120th weapons company were sent as reinforcements.

Most of 306th's men had retreated to Kerynia exposing the flank of the 251st bn. At 09.00 the 33rd commando battalion (with fewer than 150 men) arrived at the Agios Georgios village, where the 306th was supposed to be.

The attack on Kyrenia

At 11.00 the Turkish attack to the east, towards Kyrenia, began.The weight of the Turkish attack fell on the 33rd commando, which lacked sufficient AT capabilities. The Greek line broke at about 11.30. The 33rd commando was ordered to disband and retreat in groups to Kyrenia. The elements of 251st and 306th, being on the flank of the Turkish advance, with no ability however to change the outcome of the battle, also retreated to Kyrenia. After pleads from Kobokis towards the commander of the 241st, elements of the 241st rushed to Kerynia, trying to built a defence line, which however was quickly overcome by the Turkish forces. During the attack, the commander of Bora force, Haki Boratas, suffered a deep wound on his leg.The Turkish forces lost also 5 M47 tanks and one M113.After leaving about half the force in Kyrenia to clear the town of Greek forces, the rest of the force headed southwards to the direction of Boghazi, in order to unite the beachhead with Gönyeli enclave. At about 17.30 the armoured elements of Bora force united with the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish paratroopers at Boghazi. At 18.00 Demirel met with 6th Corps' commander, Lt. General Nuretin Ersin, who had been paradropped into Gönyeli enclave. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3]

Fighting continued after the cease fire, both in the town of Kyrenia and around the beachhead. [Savvas D. Vlassis, O Aporritos Attilas, Athens 2004 ISBN 960-630-211-3]

23rd of July

References