Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co.

Infobox SCOTUS case
Litigants= Catherine Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co
ArgueDate= January 18
ArgueDateB=21
ArgueYear= 1907
DecideDate= March 4
DecideYear= 1907
FullName=Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co.
USVol=205
USPage=1
Citation=
Prior=
Subsequent=
Holding=
SCOTUS=1906-1909
Majority=
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Concurrence=
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"Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co.", ussc|205|1|1907 was a cause of action for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, Adam M. Schlemmer, while trying to couple a shovel car to a caboose. [ [http://supreme.justia.com/us/205/1/ Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. R. Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1907)] "Justia.com" ]

The shovel car was part of a train on its way through Pennsylvania from a point in New York, and was not equipped with an automatic coupler in accordance with Federal law. Instead it had an iron drawbar fastened underneath the car by a pin and projecting about a foot beyond the car. The drawbar weighed about 80 pounds and its free and played up and down. On this end was an eye, and the coupling had to be done by lifting the free end possibly a foot, so that it should enter a slot in an automatic coupler on the caboose and allow a pin to drop through the eye. Due to the absence of buffers on the shovel car and to its being so high that it would pass over those on the caboose, the car and caboose would crush anyone between them if they came together and the coupling failed to be made. Schlemmer was ordered to make the coupling as the train was slowly approaching the caboose. To do so he had to get between the cars, and in endeavoring to obey the order and to guide the drawbar he rose a little too high, and, as he failed to hit the slot, the top of his head was crushed.

The plaintiff, in her declaration, alleged that the defendant was transporting the shovel car from state to state, and that the coupler was not such as was required by existing laws.

The main question to the supreme court was as follows: 'Whether the act of Congress [205 U.S. 1, 11] has any applicability at all in actions for negligence in the courts of Pennsylvania is a question that does not arise in this case, and we therefore express no opinion upon it. The learned judge below sustained the nonsuit on the ground of the deceased's contributory negligence, and the judgment is affirmed on his opinion on that subject.' It is said that the existence of contributory negligence is not a Federal question, and that, as the decision went off on that ground, there is nothing open to revision here.

The only grounds, if any, on which Schlemmer could have been charged with negligence is that when he was between the tracks he was twice warned by the yard conductor to keep his head down. Although he had a stick, which the rules of the company required to be used in coupling, it could not have been used in this case, instead he had to get between the rails and under the shovel car as he did, and his orders contemplated that he should do so.

The trial judge decided that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence but left uncertain what the negligence was.

It seemed to the Supreme Court that the final ruling was so implicated with the earlier errors that on that ground alone the judgment should not be allowed to stand. The Supreme court was of the opinion that Schlemmer's rights were in no way impaired by his getting between the rails and attempting to couple the cars. So far he was saved by the provision that he did not assume the risk. If a man not intent on suicide, but desiring to live, is said to be chargeable with negligence as matter of law when he miscalculates the height of the car behind him by an inch, while his duty requires him, is his crouching position, to direct a heavy drawbar moving about him into a small slot in front, and this in the dusk, at nearly nine of an August evening, it is utterly impossible for us to interpret this ruling as not, however unconsciously, introducing the notion that to some extent the man had taken the risk of the danger by being in the place at all. But whatever may have been the meaning of the local courts, we are of opinion that the possibility of such a minute miscalculation, under such circumstances, whatever it may be called, was so inevitably and clearly attached to the risk which Schlemmer did not assume, that to enforce the statute requires that the judgment should be reversed.

The judgment was reversed.

The court stated; '...he was not considered to have assumed the risks of the employment, but by this is certainly meant no more than such risks as he was exposed to thereby, and resulted in injury free from his own negligent act. It would hardly be argued that defendant would be liable, under such circumstances, were the employee to voluntarily inflict an injury upon himself by means of the use of the improperly equipped car. And yet it is but a step from contributory negligence to such an act.

That contributory negligence is a non-Federal question is not doubted, and that when a state court decides a case upon grounds which are non- Federal and sufficient to sustain the decision this court has no jurisdiction is conceded.

Evidence of negligence was found on the part of the decedent. The plaintiff's testimony showed that deceased was an experienced brakeman; that the link and pin coupling was in constant use on other than passenger coaches; that before the deceased went under the car the pin had already been set; that, as he was going under the car, he was twice notified to be careful and keep his head down, and yet, without any necessity therefore being shown, he lifted his head and it was crushed between the two cars; that all he had to do was to guide the free end of the drawbar into the slot, and while the drawbar weighed 75 to 80 pounds, it was fastened at one end, and the lifting and guiding was only of the other and loose end; that the drawheads were of the standard height and the body of the shovel car higher than that of the caboose. Immediately thereafter the coupling was made by another brakeman without difficulty. If an iron is dangerously hot, and one knows that it is hot and is warned not to touch it, and does touch it without any necessity therefor being shown, and is thereby burned, it is trifling to say that there is no evidence of negligence.

'In this discussion, however, we are not to forget that the servant is required to exercise 'Assumption of risk and contributory negligence approximate [205 U.S. 1, 20] where the danger is so obvious and imminent that no ordinarily prudent man would assume the risk of injury therefrom. But where the danger, though present and appreciated, is one which many men are in the habit of assuming, and which prudent men who must earn a living are willing to assume for extra compensation, one who assumes the risk cannot be said to be guilty of contributory negligence if, having in view the risk of danger assumed, he uses care reasonably commensurate with the risk to avoid injurious consequences. One who does not use such care, and who, by reason thereof, suffers injury, is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover, because he, and not the master, causes the injury, or because they jointly cause it.'

ee also

*List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 205

References