Operation Rösselsprung (Naval)

Rösselsprung was the largest operation of its type mounted by the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) during the Second World War, and arguably the most successful, resulting as it did in the near destruction of arctic convoy PQ-17.Ironically, this success was entirely indirect, as no "Rösselsprung" ship caught sight of the convoy, or fired a shot at it, all PQ 17s losses being due to U-boat and aircraft attacks.Also, a number of the "Rösselsprung" ships were damaged in the course of the operation, while only 5 aircraft were shot down, and no U-boats lost or damaged in the attack on PQ 17.

Background

The name "Rösselsprung" refers to the Knight’s Move in Chess. It was an attempt to intercept the arctic convoy expected in late June 1942; this would be PQ-17. Two naval forces were assembled and held in readiness:The first, at Trondheim, comprised the "Tirpitz", "Admiral Hipper" and six destroyers under the command of Adm Otto Schniewind.The second, at Narvik, was composed of "Lützow", "Admiral Scheer" and six destroyers under the command of V Adm Oskar Kummetz.

A patrol line of U-boats was established in the Norwegian Sea north-east of Jan Mayen Island; code-named "Eisteufel" (Ice Devil), this group comprised six boats, increasing later to eight.

An advance line of three boats was also established in the Denmark Strait, east of Iceland, to give early warning of the convoys departure.

The plan was that when the convoy was sighted, the two battle groups would move north, concentrating at Altenfjord; there they would re-fuel, and await the order to attack, aiming to intercept the convoy in the region of Bear Island.

However, "Rösselsprung" was handicapped by a complex command process, with authority to go at each stage resting with Hitler himself, and a contradictory mission statement; the forces were instructed not only to attack and destroy the convoy, but also to avoid any action that would lead to damage to the capital ships, particularly "Tirpitz".This would prove fatal to the success of the mission.

Action

PQ-17 left Hvalfjord on 27 June 1942 but it was not detected by the advance patrol.No warning of PQ.17 was raised until 1 July, when it was spotted by "U-456" of "Eisteufel"; by this time the convoy was already past Jan Mayen Island, and was closing with PQ-13.

With the complex decision-making process binding "Rösselsprung" no move was made until 2 July; "Tirpitz", "Hipper" and 4 destroyers left Trondheim at 8 PM on 2 July,while "Lutzow" and "Scheer" with their 5 destroyers left Narvik at 12.30 PM on the 3rd. These journeys were taken through the Leads, the channels between the Norwegian Islands and the main coastline. The Leads are sheltered and hidden, but tricky to navigate, and the battle groups encountered trouble almost immediately;3 of "Tirpitz's" escorting destroyers ran onto rocks and were forced to return to port. "Tirpitz" and "Hipper" with one remaining destroyer arrived at Vestfjord, off Narvik, on 3 July and at Altenfjord at 10 Am on 4 July.Kummetz’s battle group also had trouble. "Lutzow" ran aground in Tjel Sund and was also forced to retire, Kummetz shifting his flag to "Scheer" ; they also arrived at Altenfjord on the 4th.

Meanwhile the movement by "Tirpitz" and "Hipper" northward had been detected by Allied Intelligence, and in response to this threat the Admiralty took the controversial decision to scatter the convoy, which commenced at 10.15 PM on 4 July.Without the mutual protection provided by sailing in convoy, the ships would be easy prey to the aircraft and U-boats that would beset them; Over the next six days twenty ships would be lost, totalling twenty four from the convoy altogether.

German Intelligence (B-Dienst) quickly realized that the convoy was scattering, and Schniewind requested permission to sortie.Again the extended chain of command hindered movement, permission not being received until 3pm on 5 July, and then only with the caveat to avoid any action with the Allied capital ships; the U-boats of "Eisteufel" were instructed to leave the attack on the convoy ships to concentrate on finding and attacking the Home Fleet, particularly the carrier "Victorious".

At 3pm the fleet, now consisting of "Tirpitz"," Hipper" and "Scheer", with 7 destroyers and 2 torpedo-boats as escort,left Altenfjord and headed north-west towards the ships of PQ-17.

Almost immediately they were sighted by soviet submarine K-21, commanded by Cdr N A Lunin.Lunin sent a sighting report, and attacked the fleet, claiming a hit on "Tirpitz"; however this is not confirmed by Western sources.

An hour later, the fleet was sighted by a British Catalina, and again after another two hours by British submarine "Unshaken".

Both these sighting reports were detected by B-dienst and at 9.30 PM Gr Adm Raeder, concerned that the fleet was steaming into a trap, ordered a recall, just 6 hours after they had set out.

Conclusion

Despite indirectly causing the catastrophic losses to PQ-17, the "Rösselsprung" operation was a disappointing performance by the German capital ships. Also, "Tirpitz", "Lutzow" and the three destroyers spent a considerable time in dock for repairs. Following this, the "Kriegsmarine" were unable to mount such an extensive operation again in the Arctic campaign, and never saw a comparable naval success.

References

*Paul Kemp : "Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters" (1993) ISBN 1-85409-130-1

*B B Schofield : "The Russian Convoys" (1964) ISBN (none)