Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc.

SCCInfoBox
case-name=Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc.
full-case-name=Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc.
heard-date=October 11, 2001
decided-date=March 28, 2002
history=
ruling=
ratio=
SCC=2000-2002
Majority=Binnie J.
JoinMajority=McLachlin C.J. Iacobucci and Major JJ.
Dissent=Gonthier J.
JoinDissent=L'Heureux-Dubé and LeBel JJ.
NotPresent=

"Théberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc." [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, canlii-scc|2002|34 is one of the Supreme Court of Canada's leading cases on copyright law. This case interprets the meaning of "reproduction" within the Copyright Act of Canada, as well as touches on the "moral rights" to copyrighted material.

Background

Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain bought the rights to make a limited number of paper copies of Mr. Théberge's paintings in order to create posters from them. Through a chemical process the gallery was able to lift the ink off the paper and put it onto a canvas, destroying the paper version.

The issue before the court was to what extent does an artist have control over the reproduction of their work.

Opinion of the Court

Binnie J., with McLachlin C.J. Iacobucci, and Major JJ. concurring, held that there was no reproduction involved as no new copies were made. There was only the transfer of ink which is considered a modification rather than a copy. They criticized the plaintiff for trying to make a moral argument where the issue is one of economics when there is a claim of copyright infringement as opposed to moral right infringement.

In a claim of moral rights the plaintiff could have sued on the modification of the art, but no argument was made by the party.

In the end the court felt that it should not put too much power in the hands of the artist over the purchaser of the art, as it would overly limit the ability of private property owners to do what they will with their possessions.

Purpose of Copyright

In reaching his conclusion Binnie made several statements regarding the purpose and nature of Copyright law in which he characterized it as a balance between interests. :"The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellectu and obtainning a just reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated)."

He characterizes the use of Copyright as a limited economic right::"The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them. Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it."

Significantly, as well, he acknowledges the need for a public domain::"Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright infringement enumerated in ss. 29 to 32.2, which seek to protect the public domain in traditional ways such as fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review and to add new protections to reflect new technology, such as limited computer program reproduction and "ephemeral recordings" in connection with live performances."

Dissent

L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ. (in dissent) took an artist-oriented approach. They interpreted the purpose of the copyright act as a means of protecting the rights of artists, and as such must take a broader interpretation of "reproduction". In their definition "reproduction" does not necessarily involve making additional copies, rather a "reproduction" was merely a "fixation". That is, a new physical structure or "production" of the work.

ee also

*List of Supreme Court of Canada cases (McLachlin Court)

External links

*lexum-scc|2002|34