Red Army's tactics in World War II

Development of Red Army tactics begun during the Russian Civil War, and are still a subject of study in the post-Cold War defence studies of the Russian Federation. They were an important source of development in military theory, and in particular of Armoured Warfare before, during and after the Second World War, in the process influencing the outcome of World War II, the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli wars and the Vietnam War.
Specifically during the pre-World War II and during World War II these tactics both shaped and were shaped by the events and technology used by the USSR and the Third Reich.

Beginnings

The Red Army's tactical doctrine has its roots in the Russian experience of the First World War, and in particular the Brusilov Offensive. Looking at the theoretical writings on tactical doctrine in the late 1920s, the Soviet military organisation realised that the appearance of the motor transport and armoured vehicles were going to dramatically change conduct of warfare from the predominantly infantry affair to a doctrine based more on manoeuvre. As it happens many of the popular Civil War leaders were cavalry officers, and there was significant if not wholeheartedly approval for development of Soviet tactical doctrine to keep pace with that of the other European powers, which were perceived as a future threat to the spread of the Socialist and Communist ideals.
In the late 1920s the Soviet Union's Military Commissariat, in addition to establishing a regular armed force known as the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, established several directorates responsible for development of doctrines of the various Combat Arms and Support Services. Part of the effort included purchasing equipment from overseas to gain understanding of recent developments. This included purchases of armoured vehicles from France and Britain, and importantly several chassis from an inspired American designer that later became the basis of a family of Soviet produced tanks.

Theoretical development

The basic tactical principles of the Red Army remained same as those used during World War I (warfare)until emergence of such outstanding theoreticians as Uborevich, Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov who transformed the tactical, operational and strategic conduct of war in Soviet military philosophy.The core premise of the new thinking became a maintenance of the offensive, increase of tempo in the conduct of combat, use of overwhelming firepower, and penetration in depth of enemy territory. In a sense it was building on the Brusilov operation as the most successful conducted by the Russian Army during World War I, but recognised that the ultimate failure to reach its objectives was related to several inherent failings of the Russian Army such as lack of armoured vehicles to provide close support to assaulting infantry, interaction with the air units, and above all good small unit leadership.
While developing their theoretic work, the Soviet military command invited German officers to participate in, and contribute to exercises held in the then Belorussian Special Military District. That mission was headed by General von Kleist who would later take part in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 as part of Operation Barbarossa.

Development and application before World War II

The doctrine, described in Triandafillov's work "The Character of the Operations of Modern Armies", and later formally in the PU-36 (1936 Field Service Regulations) authored by Tukhachevskii in the early 1930s, spelled out the tactical and operational doctrines and led to a complete reorganisation of the Red Army to include large numbers of motor transport and armoured vehicles. The infantry would now work with heavy artillery to break through the enemy's possibly fortified forward positions, thus allowing the mobile troops to exploit the breach to penetrate enemy's defensive positions and destroy rear support and service units and ultimately lines of communications. Infantry units received substantial increase in the number of automatic weapons and supporting artillery, and there was a concerted effort to improve leadership qualities of the officer corps, including teaching and encouraging use of initiative. The many cavalry formations that still existed in the Red Army changed their tactics from the usual cavalry role to that of mobile mounted infantry to support the tanks, but less reliant on fuel and support, thereby reducing the logistic tail of the operational formation. Significant attention was paid to development of close air support (CAS) although there was a serious impediment in the industrial capability to provide enough radios to the military units.
Nevertheless the new regulations were used during the Soviet-Japanese clashes on the Manchurian border with overwhelming success. The theory had been applied against the conventional Japanese infantry tactics and was proven to work.

World War II experience

Development during the Cold War

Sources and further reading

* Gordon L. Rottman 2005: "World War II Infantry Anti-Tank Tactics", ISBN 1841768421
* Sally W. Stoecker 1998: "Forging Stalin's Army. Marshal Tuklzaclevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation", ISBN 0813337356
* James D. Morrow 1993: "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security", published in International Organization, vol. 47, no. 2 (spring 1993), pages 207–233
* Tim Ripley 2004: "The Waffen-SS at War: Hitler's Praetorians 1925–1945", ISBN 0760320683
* Robert Kirchubel 2003: "Operation Barbarossa 1941" ISBN 1841766976

Footnotes

1) Catherine Merridale (2006): "Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army." pg. 3