Lazy argument

Argument

The lazy argument (ἀργὸς λόγος) is an attempt at undermining doctrines of fate.

The argument relies on a deterministic system (such as of the Stoics). It runs as such: why should we bother making decisions if the outcome is already fixed? For instance, when we feel sick, why should we call the doctor or do anything at all? The outcome is already fated. We will either recover or die and in a deterministic system one of these options has already been "chosen." We can subsequently conclude that we ought not do anything. For, whether we act in one way or another will do little to undermine the force of fate.

Refutation

The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus' refutation of the lazy argument is given in Cicero's On Fate ("De fato"). The argument presented by Cicero calls upon the idea that an event is "co-fated" with other events. As in the example above, if it is fated to recover from an illness, then the necessary steps to reach recovery are fated as well, and can be said to be co-fated along with this final event. So while recovery will occur, the steps to reach recovery must also occur (and will occur if it truly is one's fate).

The lazy argument seems to hold only if one neglects to consider the necessity of the occurrence of intermediate events related to a final and fated event. Yet this is unsound and the lazy argument must be rejected.

Consider this hypothetical argument. Say at a time T₁ it is fated that I will pass my test at a time T₂. The lazy argument would suggest that I would be just as justified to not study as I would be to study because I will pass the test at T₂ "no matter what" (after all, it is fated). But while my passing of the test "is" fated, it is also dependent on my completion of a series of events between T₁ and T₂. If I do not complete these intermediate events, then I will not pass my test at T₂.