Battle of Abu-Ageila (1967)

Infobox Military Conflict
caption=Major General Sharon (left) and Gavish (center) at Abu-Ageila
conflict=Battle of Abu-Ageila
partof=the Six-Day War
date=5-6 June 1967
place=Abu-Ageila in the Sinai Desert, Egypt
casus=
territory=
result=Decisive Israeli victory
combatant1=flagicon|Israel Israel
combatant2=
commander1=Major General Ariel Sharon
commander2=Mohsen(?) (Field Army Commander)
strength1=~14,000,
150 tanks (AMX-13's with 90 mm guns, Centurions and Super Shermans with 105 mm guns)
strength2=~8,000,
66 tanks (T34/85 with 85 mm guns),
22 tank destroyers (SU-100's with 100 mm guns).
casualties1=33 KIA, 19 Tanks lost
casualties2=Unknown KIA, 40 Tanks lost

The 1967 Battle of Abu-Ageila was a military confrontation between the Israeli and Egyptian military which was part of the Six-Day War of June 1967. The Egyptian defeat here was an important factor in the loss of the entire Sinai peninsula to Israeli forces in the following days of the Six-Day War.

Background

The Israeli attack at Abu-Ageila was part of the Israeli offensive into the Sinai Desert. This attack was led by the Southern Command consisting of 3 Divisions under brigadier generals Israel Tal, Avraham Yoffe, and Ariel Sharon. As part of the Israeli plan of Southern Command, Sharon was ordered to capture the road junction at Abu-Ageila in order to gain access to the central route into the Sinai Desert. This explains the considerable preparations the Egyptians had taken to prevent a breach here. Egyptian defences had focused on the Um-Katef (or Umm-Qatef) plateau to the East of Abu-Ageila, roughly 25 Kilometers from the Israeli border. The defences were an important part of the overall defence plan called "Qahir" in preparations of the expected war, later known as the Six-Day War.

trength of Opposing Forces

Israeli troops numbered about 14,000, opposed to 16,000 for the Egyptians [Six Days of War, Michael B. Oren, p.181, Oxford University Press, 2002] . More importantly, the Israelis had significant advantage in armour: against 90 Egyptian World War II-era T34/85 and SU-100, with 85 mm and 100 mm guns respectively, the Israelis pitted 150 modern(ised) tanks: AMX-13's with 90 mm guns, as well as Centurions and Super Shermans, armed with 105 mm guns.

A list of units involved:

Israeli forces:
* 1 mechanised reconnaissance battalion
* the 14th Armoured Brigade (Israel) (with Super Sherman tanks)
* 1 independent tank battalion (with Centurion tanks)
* 1 infantry brigade
* 1 brigade of paratroopers
* 6 artillery units (105 mm & 155 mm Howitzers)
* 1 battalion of engineers

Egyptian forces:
* 2nd Infantry Division
** 12th Infantry Brigade
*** 37th, 38th, 39th Infantry Battalions
** 51st Artillery Brigade
*** 330th, 332nd, 334th Artillery Battalions
** 2 Antiaircraft Companies
** 1 Antitank Rocket Company

Attached to 12th Brigade
* 6th Tank Regiment (66 T34/85)
** 288 Tank Battalion
** ? Tank Battalion
* 1 Mechanised antitank battalion (22 SU-100)
* 352nd Infantry Battalion
* 299th Artillery Battalion
* 336th Medium Artillery Battalion

Notes
* Egyptian Tank Regiments were composed of two Tank Battalions.
* Egyptian artillery totalled 70 122mm & 152mm artillery pieces.

The Egyptian Defences

The Egyptian defence was constructed as follows: the 2nd infantry Division prepared defenses in the area between Abu-Ageila and Kusseima, with the center placed at the area Um-Katef Plateau - Ruafa Dam, with the 12th Infantry Brigade defending Um-Katef and the 10th Infantry Brigade Kusseima. Um-Katef made a good position, because it was bordered by an area of sand dunes to the north and rocky mountains to the south. On this plateau the Egyptians constructed three parallel trenches of about five kilometers each, reinforced by concrete bunkers. Every trench was defended by an infantry battalion, with the forward trench reinforced by a dug-in tank squadron. To the rear were two supporting artillery battalions (330th,334th), behind them the balance of 288th Tank Battalion ready to counterattack. To the north blocking the Batur Track at Position 181, were 38th Infantry Battlaion, 299th Artillery Battalion and an antitank company of ten SU-100. They were to protect the flank of the main position to the southeast.

Five kilometers to the West of the Um-Katef Plateau perimeter was the Ruafa Dam. Dug in here were the 352nd Infantry Battlion, and 332nd, 336th Artillery Battalions. Five kilometers to the northwest of Abu-Ageila at the well and logisic center at Awlad Ali, the balance of the 6th Tank Regiment (1 Tank battalion) was positioned to block enemy forces coming from the northeast or against the positions of the 12th Brigade to the east or southeast.

To the east in front of the 12th Brigade positions on the ridge at Umm Tarafa was an outpost manned by an infantry company of 38th Battalion, a squadron of tanks from 288th Battalion, and two B-10 recoilless guns. At Position 239, south of Umm Tafara was a platoon of 37th Infantry Battalion, with two B-10 recoilless guns and two antitank weapons. Further east at Tarat Umm Basis near the Israeli border was the 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion which was to give warning of any Israeli attack.

The Battle

The Israeli attack-plan was based on intelligence gathered two days before the war started, which indicated Um-Katef was defended by only one infantry battalion. Based on this information, the Israelis planned a frontal attack by their reinforced independent tank battalion. After aerial bombardments this tank battalion started its attack on Um-Katef on the 5th of June at 0815 hours. The attack came to a halt however, due to resistance from an unknown Egyptian formation and an unknown minefield, causing the loss of five Israeli tanks. New orders for the independent tank battalion were to break off the attack and to attack from the north, through the sand dunes. Now the 14th armoured brigade (two tank battalions Super Shermans and two armoured infantry battalions in halftracks) was ordered to attack frontally further south. After a short aerial bombardment this attack commenced at 1230 but was forced to a halt as well.

Now that strength and positions of the Egyptians were known, General Sharon changed his plans. The independent tank battalion was ordered to drive through the sand dunes following a camel-path and attack the Egyptian armour at the Ruafa Dam. At the same time, the 14th armoured brigade would attack from the East. However, before this could happen, Um-Katef would have to be taken, a task given to Sharon's infantry brigade held in reserve up till now. This infantry attack was to occur under the cover of darkness, following a secondary approach to Um-Katef through the sand dunes. Meanwhile the Israeli armour would provide support and all Israeli artillery would be used in support of this attack. This meant there would be no suppressing fire on the Egyptian artillery, making the Israeli infantry extremely vulnerable. It was decided that the Egyptian artillery would be taken out of action prior to the attack using the brigade of paratroopers. However. with only six helicopters available, this meant only limited units could be used. Meanwhile the independent tank battalion was engaged by the Egyptian defenders in the sand dunes by 1600 and were able to continue to their positions near Abu-Ageila and the Ruafa Dam at 1800. The infantry brigade was in place at around 2300, while the paratroopers, after being discovered and fired upon by Egyptian artillery, made it to their attack positions at 2300.

The attack started at June 5th 2400 hours, after the Israeli artillery had been firing from 2330 - 2400 hours with Israeli tanks moving into position under the noise of the artillery. After heavy fighting the Israeli infantry battalions broke through the trenches at Um-Katef, with one-third of them cleared by 0230. Now the engineers started clearing a way through the minefield which was completed at 0400, allowing the 14th armoured brigade to roll on to the Ruafa Dam. At 0700 this allowed the Israelis to attack the Egyptian tank battalions and antitank battalions from two sides, with the Centurion tanks of the 14th from the East and the Super Sherman tanks from the West. After three hours of fighting these Egyptian units were destroyed, after which remnants of the 12th Egyptian Brigade were cleared. At around 1200 the road junction at Abu-Ageila was in Israeli hands and the road to the Sinai was open. The battle ended with 33 KIA and 19 tanks lost for the Israelis, and an unknown number of KIA and 40 tanks lost on the Egyptian side.

Aftermath

The victory at Abu-Ageila meant the road to the Central Sinai was open for the Israelis, and Sharon and his forces in particular. Many of the Egyptian units remained intact however and could have tried to prevent the Israelis from reaching the Suez Canal. However, when the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the fall of Abu-Ageila, he panicked and ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of Egypt. By June 8 1967 most of the Sinai area had been captured by Israeli forces.

References

* "Infanterie", official organ of the Vereniging van Infanterie Officieren (VIO), no.1, March 2007. (A Dutch magazine of the Association of Infantry Officers).
* "Key to the Sinai, The Battles for Abu-Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars" In: Combat Studies Institute, Research Survey no.7 by G.W. Gawrych.

External links

* Key to the Sinai, The Battles for Abu-Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars
** [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych2/key_intro.pdf Contents and Introduction]
** [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych2/key_chap3.pdf Chapter 3: Toward the 1967 War] Maps of the battlefield, dispositions and listing of Egyptian units.
** [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych2/key_chap4.pdf Chapter 4: The Battle of Abu-Ageila]
** [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych2/key_chap5.pdf Chapter 5: Conclusions]
** [http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych2/key_notes.pdf Notes]