- Siping Campaign
Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Siping Campaign
partof=theChinese Civil War
place=Siping,Jilin ,China
date=June 11 ,1948 -March 13 ,1948
result=Communist victory
combatant1=
combatant2=
commander1=
commander2=
strength1= 55,000
strength2= 60,000
casualties1= 35,000
casualties2= 20,000|Siping Campaign (四平战役) was a nine month long struggle between the
communist and the nationalist for Siping inJilin ,China during theChinese Civil War in the postWorld War II era, and resulted incommunist victory.Prelude
By the early June of 1947, the
communist s had successfully isolatedSiping (city) in theirSummer Offensive of 1947 in Northeast China , thecommunist s decided to take the city despite the fact that they had totally lacked the experience of taking strongly defended cities that are heavily fortified, and it was obvious to both sides that the isolated city would be the next battlefield.Siping (city) was defended by three divisions belong to two separate armies and the commander of the nationalist 71st Army, Chen Mingren (陈明仁) was named as the nationalist commander-in-chief of the urban defense. All three nationalist divisions suffered greatly in earlier battles and none of them was fully manned. However, thecommunist s had eradicated nationalists in the region fromTieling in the south andChangchun in the north, and most of these nationalist forces had retreated toSiping (city) . Chen Mingren (陈明仁) successfully recruited and incorporated these forces into his force, and every able bodied-man who had a governmental job was also recruited into the local garrison. Construction for additional fortifications and strengthening the current ones was also completed in very short span of time, and in a devoted effort, many bunkers were built by sacks full of wheat and starch of American aid. OnJune 3 ,1947 ,Chiang Kai-shek flew toShenyang and personally wrote to Chen Mingren (陈明仁) stating thatSiping (city) was a very important location inNortheast China and if lost, the nationalists would not only loseNortheast China , but also endangering the rest ofChina , so the city must be defended at all cost, and Chen Mingren (陈明仁) was determined to hold the city, and the nationalist reporters claimed the city as Chen Mingren (陈明仁)’s fortress after witnessing the extensive defensive complex built.On
June 9 ,1947 , the enemy had completed its regroup outside the city for the upcoming attack. However, thecommunist made a serious intelligence blunder in underestimating the defenders’ strength by only assessing the total nationalist strength as 18,000, and evenLin Biao had erroneously believed that there were only four fully combat capable nationalistregiment s with full strength in the city. The enemy had missed the significant intelligence including the defenders receiving airdrop of 400 tons of supplies and weaponry in more than 200 sorties fromShenyang , and the rapid new construction of the fortifications. The defenders’ recruitment of previously defeated nationalist forces into the local garrison was completely undetected by the enemy, and enemy did not expect the nationalistair force would actively participate in the first stage in support of the ground troops defending the city either. This serious intelligence blunder would have to be paid with an extremely heavy price later in the first stage of the campaign.Order of battle Defenders: nationalist
order of battle :
*First stage (more than 35,000 troops total):
**The 87th Division of the 71st Army
**The 88th Division of the 71st Army
**The 54th Division of the 13th Army
*Second stage:
nationalist units with more than 19,000 troopsAttackers:
communist order of battle :
*The 1st Column
*The 7th Column
*The 6th Column (First stage)
*The 3rd Column (Second Stage)First stage
On
June 11 ,1947 , thecommunist s begun their assault on the nationalist positions outside the city, and on the same night, the airport at the western suburb of the city was taken by thecommunist 7th Column. OnJune 13 ,1947 , thecommunist 1st Column tookXinlitun , and the nationalistair force begun to attack enemy ground positions at a rate of near twenty sorties per day in order to support the defenders of the city. OnJune 14 ,1947 ,Lin Biao ordered the 11th Division and the 12th Division of thecommunist 4th Column to strike south towardShenyang andFushun to distract nationalist forces stationed in those cities from reinforcingSiping (city) , and to takeFushun if possible. At 8:00 PM onJune 14 ,1947 , the assault on the city itself had begun with fivecommunist artillery battalion s with near a hundred large caliberartillery pieces starting to bombard the city, even the 12 anti-aircraft artilleries in thecommunist inventory were deployed to shell the city. The shelling shocked the nationalist defenders since merely a year ago,artillery was still an extremely rare commodity for thecommunist s, yet a year later thecommunist artillery firepower was greater than that of Japanese duringWorld War II . Under the cover of intenseartillery shelling, thecommunist 1st Column and 7th Column attacked the defenders from multiple directions.Forty minutes after the assault begun, the 2nd Division of the
communist 1st Column breached the defense in the southwest, and by 2:00 AM onJune 15 ,1947 , the 1st Division of thecommunist 1st Column also penetrated into the city from Haifeng Village (Haifeng Tun, 海丰屯). However, thecommunist 7th Column and the 3rd Division of thecommunist 1st Column failed to breach the defense, and nationalist reserve launched multiple counterattacks on the enemy under the air cover, which had increased into more than twenty sorties per day. ByJune 16 ,1947 , thecommunist s 1st Division and the 2nd Division inside the city had beaten back defenders’ counterattacks for more than a dozen times, but in doing so, each suffered more than 1,500 casualties. The regions inside the city taken by the enemy was relatively small and only a thousand or so defenders were captured alive by the enemy, but situation for the defenders worsened onJune 18 ,1947 when thecommunist 7th Column breached the defense in northwest. The nationalists had underestimated the enemy’s resolution to take the city, and defenders’ stubborn resistance was equally out of expectation of the attackingcommunist s as battle raged on with heavy casualties on both sides. ByJune 19 ,1947 ,Lin Biao was forced to send the 17th Division and the 18th Division of thecommunist 6th Column to reinforce thecommunist s fighting inside the city. With the newly arrived help, the enemy was able to take nationalist strongholds at the Telecommunication Building, the Municipal Building, and the Central Bank Building, and the nationalist headquarter of the 71st Army that was also the headquarter of the urban defense was besieged.There were many brick buildings in
Siping (city) and bricks made from black earth were extremely tough that when hit by 60 mm mortar rounds, there was only a dent left. The defenders capitalized on these strong buildings and turned them into formidable fortifications, and the nationalist 71st Army headquarter was located in one of such bunkers, with the entrance sealed by a jeep. In addition to wide field of view, there were also dozens bunkers and pillboxes protected by minefields around the buildings to strengthen the defense. OnJune 20 ,1947 , the 17th Division of thecommunist 6th Column unleashed its assault on the nationalist headquarter, and by the evening, the enemy was dangerously close. Chen Mingren (陈明仁), the nationalist commander-in-chief inside the headquarter was forced to evacuate into another alternate headquarter in a different bunker in the eastern half of the city, while his brother, Chen Mingxin (陈明信), the regimental commander of the Specialized DutiesRegiment of the nationalist 71st Army, was left to defend the original headquarter. After three hours of fierce fighting, the headquarter fell and its defenders were annihilated. Chen Mingxin (陈明信), the regimental commander of the Specialized DutiesRegiment of the nationalist 71st Army, was captured alive by the enemy, and the stronghold that the nationalists claimed to withstand enemy attack for more than a month fell in just three short hours. The fall of the nationalist 71st Army headquarter had signaled the fall of the western half of the city into the enemy hands, but the enemy had paid a very heavy price: the 1st Division and the 2nd Division of thecommunist 1st Column, and the Independent 1st Division and the Independent 2nd Division ofcommunist 7th Column suffered heavy casualties that they were forced out of action, and Ma Renxing (马仁兴), the divisional commander of the 1st Independent Division of thecommunist 7th Column, became the highest rankedcommunist killed in the campaign.After more than a week of fierce fighting, the enemy finally took western half of the city with heavy loss. Only then did the enemy realize the serious blunder of the underestimation of the defenders: the nationalists defending the city was not 18,000 like previously thought, but almost twice, totaling more than 35,000. On
June 21 ,1947 , the enemy was forced to send their reserves to join the fight: the 16th Division of thecommunist 6th Column and the Independent 3rd Division of thecommunist 7th Column join the assault on the eastern half of city, and Hong Xuezhi, (洪学智), the commander-in-chief of thecommunist 6th Column succeeded Li Tianyou 李天佑, the commander-in-chief of thecommunist 1st Column in the last part of the fighting as thecommunist commander in charge of taking the city. Chen Mingren (陈明仁), the nationalist commander-in-chief of the urban defense, concentrated his remaining 20,000 strong force in the eastern half of the city, and by the evening ofJune 21 ,1947 , had successfully beaten back all enemy attacks. For thecommunist s, it was impossible to achieve numerical superiority after sending in two divisions following the withdraw of four divisions, and the Independent 1st Division of thecommunist 7th Column withdrawn earlier was forced to be back in action again. The highest point in theSiping (city) was a water tower, and the nationalists turned it into a formidable bunker manned by veterans of the Chinese Expeditionary Army inBurma ] andIndia duringWorld War II , and these sharpshooters armed withlight machine gun s had successfully beaten back attacks by an entire enemyregiment for four times. After concentrating over a dozenmachine gun s suppressing the nationalist fire from the loopholes of the bunker to cover sappers setting up the explosives, the enemy finally neutralized the bunker in its fifth attempt.At the railroad crossing bridge, the defenders used an ingenious tactic by deploying beans: as three attacks by the
communist 8thRegiment of the 1st Column were beaten back, the enemy launched their fourth attack personally lead by the regimental politicalcommissar Jin Ke (金可), and it appeared that the fourth attack might be successful. However, the defenders unleashed their secret weapon by opening two large sacks of beans which suddenly filled the ground. Everyone in the unsuspecting enemy assault team slid down and had very difficult time of getting up, and with beans on the ground, it was impossible to advance, retreat or reinforce, thus the enemy assault team was completely wiped out. Jin Ke (金可), the regimental politicalcommissar of thecommunist 8thRegiment of the 1st Column leading the fourth charge, was cut in half at the chest by a string of defenders’machine gun fire in front of the regimental commander of thecommunist 8thRegiment of the 1st Column, Guan Shanlin (关山林), and thus became the second highest rankedcommunist officer killed in action during the campaign. The streets ofSiping (city) was covered with blood and soldiers of both sides frequently slid down, and the situation became desperate for the defenders that Chen Mingren (陈明仁), the nationalist commander-in-chief of the urban defense, was preparing to commit suicide and had his Browningpistol ready. Chen Mingren (陈明仁) also ordered the defenders to burn every building after it was abandoned so that the attacking enemy would not be able to use it. After fierce battles, the last counterattack of the nationalist 71st Army was beaten back with heavy loss in the morning ofJune 23 ,1947 , but thecommunist 1st Independent Division of the 7th Column suffered equally and was forced out of action once again for the second time. Although the defenders could no longer launch anymore counterattacks to the smallest scale, they were still able to put up a good defensive fight in their fortifications, but as time dragged on, even the defenders themselves begun to have serious doubts how long before the city would fall into the enemy hands.The
communist s were overconfident that the city would fall for sure, and their New China News Agency had already issued a press release at the time, claiming that “…After 12 days of fierce fighting, the enemy (nationalists) had suffered over 16,000 casualties and remaining survivors had nowhere to flee. The majority of the Siping had been under our (communist ) control, and Chiang’s army had been annihilated, and our troops (communist s) were expanding the military success…”. OnJune 28 ,1947 , thecommunist commander [Chen Yi (communist )] even sent a telegraph congratulatingLin Biao for taking the city. Nothing could be further from the truth as the situation suddenly turned drastically in nationalist favor: onJune 29 ,1947 , the nationalist reinforcement rapidly approached the city thanks to their mechanization, the nationalist 93rd Army approached the city on the same dayLin Biao received the telegraph from [Chen Yi (communist )] , while onJune 29 ,1947 , the nationalist New 6th Army tookBenxi and from there pushed towardSiping (city) , while the nationalist 53rd Army on the left of the New 6th Army also pushed towardSiping (city) in unison. The highly mechanized nationalist armies was able to bypass the enemy and thus not only the nationalist reinforcement had avoided been ambushed by the enemy, now the enemy force attacking the city was threatened. The table had turned for the enemy.Lin Biao ’s choice was clear, onJune 30 ,1947 , he ordered a general withdraw that concluded the first stage of Siping Campaign. The exhausted defenders had no strength left to give any chase and the nationalist reinforcement did not pursuit the enemy either after reaching the city, and thus did not see any action, just like the five enemy armies to the south of the city originally planned to ambush them. The nationalists suffered over 19,000 casualties while thecommunist suffered over 13,000 casualties. The nationalists had successfully beaten back the enemy and held the city. In addition to the enemy’s grave underestimation of the defenders’ strength, the associating indecisiveness ofLin Biao also contributed to the nationalist success at the first stage of the campaign:Lin Biao was trying to increase the gain of thecommunist Summer Offensive of 1947 in Northeast China by deploying seventeen divisions to the south ofSiping (city) in the hope of ambush nationalist reinforcement, but this had not materialized. The seven remainingcommunist divisions were simply not enough to take on the five technically superior nationalist Divisions defending the city. Furthermore, only after suffering heavy losses, did the two more divisions were redeployed to join the fight, but by then thecommunist s were unable to achieve any numerical superiority at all, following the withdraw of four divisions and earlier heavy losses. However, thecommunist s would not forget their goal and they would be back with vengeance, as well as the valuable experience learned from this first attempt. For the nationalists, the city was still in their hands, but the nationalist original plan to fight a decisive battle to annihilate the enemy at the gate ofSiping (city) was equally spoiled byLin Biao ’s wise and timely retreat, and thus the first stage of the campaign ended in a stalemate.econd stage
After their victory of the
Autumn Offensive of 1947 in Northeast China , thecommunist s set their sights on theSiping (city) again in theirWinter Offensive of 1947 in Northeast China , and this time they were ready and much better prepared. By this time, the nationalists inNortheast China had suffered greatly andSiping (city) was only garrisoned by a mere 19,000 troops, without any hope of reinforcement. The first sign of trouble appeared when a transportationbattalion of the nationalist 88th Division was ambushed onJanuary 26 ,1948 at Guo Family’s Hotel (Guo Jia Dian, 郭家店) as the 500-men strongbattalion attempted to transport grains to the city. Though the enemy attack was considered unlikely, the nationalists nonetheless doubled the strength of thebattalion and assigned over a dozen trucks and over 100 horse drawn carts to ensure the safe completion of the job. Learning the news, Luo Jie (罗杰), the deputy commander-in-chief of thecommunist base at the border area ofLiaoning andJilin , personally lead the units of thecommunist 18thRegiment and the MongolianCavalry Regiment launched a long distance surprise attack before dawn on the unsuspecting nationalist transportationbattalion . In a short period of 40 minutes, over 70 nationalist soldiers were killed and more than 200 were captured alive by the enemy. The rest of the nationalists were able to successfully escape by trucks, but a truck and all of the 100+ horse-drawn carts full of grains had to be abandoned and left intact for the enemy in the hasty retreat. OnFebruary 27 ,1948 , the order was formally given to take the city and the commander-in-chief of thecommunist 1st Column, Li Tianyou (李天佑), thecommunist commander in charge of last assault on the city nearly nine month ago, was put in charge again for the second time. Similarly, twocommunist columns particiapated in the assault on the city nearly nine months ago, the 1st Column and the 7th Column, were tasked to take the city, with the help of thecommunist 3rd Column, while thecommunist 2nd Column, 6th Column, 8th Column, and 10th Column were deployed to stop any possible nationalist reinforcement that never came, because the nationalist strength was greatly reduced by this time.On
March 4 ,1948 , the enemy assault on the nationalist positions outside the city begun, and thecommunist 1st Division of the 1st Column took Haifeng Village (Hai Feng Tun, 海丰屯) and Xu Family’sYaodong (Xu Jia Yao, 徐家窑), while the 3rd Division of thecommunist 1st Column tookXinlitun . The enemy had made significant gains onMarch 8 ,1948 when most of the nationalist positions outside the city wall fell in a domino effect: the 7th Division of thecommunist 3rd Column took the bunkers outside the eastern gate, while the 8th Division of thecommunist 3rd Column took the region of Red Mouth (Hong Zui Zi, 红嘴子). Meanwhile, the 19th Division of thecommunist 7th Column took the Third Line of Grove (San Dao Lin Zi, 三道林子). In order to find better positions for the artilleries to shell the defenders, the enemy took Shidao (师道) School, the airport and the Liu Family’s Village (Liu Jia Tun, 刘家屯). At 7:40 PM onMarch 12 ,1948 , the final assault on the city begun. The nationalist defense was soon breached in five fronts in the north, the east, and the west, and defenders had to resort to street fights for their last stand. By the next day, the nationalist defeat was complete when the entire nationalist garrison of more than 19,000 was totally annihilated by the attacking enemy, who declared the victory on 7:00 PM onMarch 13 ,1948 , after the mopping up operation was completed.Outcome
The important strategic stronghold had fallen into the enemy hands with the nationalist defeat, and the defenders lost over 35,000 troops, with more than 16,000 in the first major battle, and over 19,000 in the second battle. In addition to capturing the city, the enemy also captured enormous supplies from the nationalists, including 491
machine gun s, over 9,000repeating rifle s, over 779,000 rounds of ammunitions, over 200artillery pieces, and over 11,000 rounds ofartillery rounds.ee also
*List of battles of the Chinese Civil War
*National Revolutionary Army
*History of the People's Liberation Army
*Chinese Civil War References
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