Electronic voting in Ireland

In the year 2004, the Irish government undertook plans to introduce a nationwide electronic voting system for the local and European Parliament elections. The proposed change was under the supervision of Martin Cullen, the former Minister for the Environment & Local Government in Ireland. The system that was created for the Irish Voters lacked Voter Verified Paper Audit Trailas specified by the government, and after a campaign by the Irish Citizens for Trustworthy EVoting (ICTE) and opposition parties in Dáil Éireann, the government set up the Commission on Electronic Voting (http://www.cev.ie/) to examine the proposed system.

The Commission's report stated that it was unable to verify the accuracy and secrecy of the proposed system in the available time frame. Due to this statement the government was forced to postpone the introduction of the electronic voting system. Since the system was not used, many members of the public felt that the whole system was a waste of money.
However in July 2006, the CEV in their second and final report concluded that the use of the voting machines would be continued and used again on another date. [ [http://www.cev.ie/htm/report/download_second.htm Second Report of the Commission on Electronic Voting on the Secrecy, Accuracy and Testing of the Chosen Electronic Voting System, 2004] ] :

The Commission can recommend the voting and counting equipment as follows:
• The voting machine and related hardware components are of good quality and their design,which is based on voting systems that have been reliable in use elsewhere for some years, hasalso remained stable since their adaptation for use in Ireland. Subject to some minor securityand usability enhancements, followed by extended and rigorous testing once they have been somodified, the voting machine and related components can be confidently recommended for use.
• The embedded software of the voting machine is also of adequate quality, requiring only minormodifications followed by further analysis to confirm its reliability.

The government has spent €52 million on electronic voting machines and spends €800,000 per annum to store the machines. Not only do the machines not work reliably [http://www.cev.ie/htm/report/download_second.htm] , they can be interfered with to affect the outcome of an election. Also, the software proposed is inadequate for the task [http://www.cev.ie/htm/report/second_report/pdf/Part%200%20Index.pdf] . The prime issue is the lack of verifiability by the absence of an audit mechanism or paper trail. The Taoiseach Bertie Ahern has defended the flawed system in the Dáil, bemoaning the use of "stupid old pencils" [ [http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0625/D.0625.200610170016.html Dáil Éireann - Volume 625 - 17 October, 2006] ] .

The voting machines bought by the Government from Dutch firm Nedap are in storage as the cabinet ponders what to do after the Commission on Electronic Voting said it could not recommend the system. Approximately €0.5m is expected to be spent improving the software. Ahern has defended the system despite public scepticism and opposition from within his own party [ [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-2416486,00.html Scrap €52m e-voting system, says councillor.] ] on the basis that having spent the money, it would cause loss of national pride if the system were scrapped.

In October 2006, a group of Dutch hackers, including Rop Gonggrijp, showed how similar machines to the ones purchased in Ireland could be modified by replacing the E-proms with Nedap -Firmware with E-proms with their own firmware. [ [http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer, a security analysis] ] [ [http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/79106 Dutch citizens group cracks Nedap's voting computer] ] This is contentious as in the Netherlands, 10% of voting machines from the touch screen type manufactured by another vendor named SDU http://www.newvote.nl/ are abandoned in the November 2006 and March 2007 Dutch elections and the Dutch Government is to reintroduce paper ballots in those locations and to review the system in the other 90% of cases after the elections in November 2006. [ [http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/30/europe/EU_GEN_Netherlands_Voting_Machines.php Dutch government scraps plans to use voting computers in 35 cities including Amsterdam] ]
Revelations under the Freedom of Information acts in the Netherlands, reveal extraordinary actions by Nedap interests after the Gonggrijp revelations of faulty Nedap systems, to suppress bad publicity about their system. [ [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/03/17/foi_dutch/ Dutch FOI disclosures reveal the odd business of evoting] ]

References

ee also

*Voting machine
*Electronic voting

External links

* [http://www.cev.ie/ CEV homepage]
* [http://evoting.cs.may.ie/ ICTE homepage]
* [http://www.electronicvoting.ie The Government's site to provide information on evoting]
* [http://www.ics.ie/article-027.shtml Irish Computer Society submission calling for VVAT]