Huddleston v. United States

SCOTUSCase
Litigants=Huddleston v. United States
ArgueDate=March 23
ArgueYear=1988
DecideDate=May 2
DecideYear=1988
FullName=Guy Rufus Huddleston v. United States of America
USVol=485
USPage=681
Citation=
Prior=Conviction affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, 811 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1987).
Subsequent=
Holding=Evidence of other acts is admissible in federal court to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity, and without a threshold determination that the acts have been proven.
SCOTUS=1988-1990
Majority=Rehnquist
JoinMajority=Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
LawsApplied=Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

"Huddleston v. United States", 485 U.S. 681 (1988), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court removed a procedural obstacle to admitting evidence of a witness's motive, plan, or knowledge that had been imposed by some courts of appeals after reading Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court reaffirmed that there are adequate other mechanisms present in the Rules to ensure that overly prejudicial evidence does not reach the jury.

Facts

Huddleston was being tried for selling stolen goods and possessing stolen goods, related to two portions of a shipment of Memorex videocassettes that had been stolen from the Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. Huddleston later sold the missing videocassettes to the owner of Magic Rent-to-Own in Ypsilanti, Michigan. At the trial, he did not dispute that the cassettes had been stolen. He contested a crucial element of the charged crimes — whether he knew that the cassettes had been stolen.

To prove this element, the government sought to introduce two pieces of "similar acts" evidence that was relevant to Huddleston's knowledge that the videocassettes were stolen. First, the government called Paul Toney, a record store owner, to testify that Huddleston had offered to sell him some 12" black-and-white television sets for $28 each. Toney testified that Huddleston told him he could obtain several thousand of these televisions. Toney eventually accompanied Huddleston to the Magic Rent-to-Own store on two occasions, and bought a total of 38 televisions.

Second, the government called Robert Nelson, an undercover FBI agent posing as an appliance dealer, to testify that Huddleston had offered to sell him a large quantity of Amana appliances. Nelson agreed to pay $8,000 for the appliances. At the time appointed to make the delivery, Nelson arrested Huddleston, and found that he had brought part of a shipment of appliances that had been stolen.

Huddleston testified at the trial that he had obtained the videocassettes legitimately. The prosecution explained in closing arguments that Huddleston was being tried only for the videocassettes, and that the evidence about the televisions and the appliances was intended to help the jury determine whether Huddleston knew that the videotapes had been stolen. The jury convicted Huddleston on the possession charge but not on the sale charge.

Huddleston appealed his conviction to the Sixth Circuit. That court initially reversed the conviction because the government had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Huddleston had known that either the televisions or the appliances had been stolen, and thus that those incidents were not admissible against Huddleston in his trial on the videocassette charges. After the Sixth Circuit decided in a different case that courts should prove similar acts evidence by a preponderance of the evidence, it upheld Huddleston's conviction because it concluded that the evidence regarding the televisions had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to decide whether courts should decide if similar acts evidence has been proven before allowing juries to factor it in to their decisions.

Decision of the Court

Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. Frequently, in a trial, it is necessary to establish the truth of certain disputed issues by drawing inferences from a person's conduct. For example, in this case, Huddleston was on trial for selling stolen property, and the other acts to which Toney and Nelson had testified were similar to the one that Huddleston was accused of committing in this case. The law needs a mechanism to allow the jury to infer that if Huddleston knew in other similar circumstances that the goods in question were stolen, then it is more likely that on this occasion he knew the videocassettes were stolen. The danger associated with presenting this other act evidence is that the jury will convict the defendant because of his past actions, not because of his actions in this case.

The balance struck by Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is this: Evidence of a person's prior actions that might adversely reflect on the actor's character is generally forbidden, but evidence that might relate to a relevant issue in the case, such as motive, opportunity, or knowledge. In this case, the evidence that Huddleston knew that the televisions were stolen was "probative" of whether he knew that the videocassettes were stolen. Thus, it was properly admitted.

Huddleston argued that the mere fact that the evidence was probative was not sufficient to protect him from the danger that the jury might convict him because of the similar act or because it believed him to be an evil person having heard of the similar act. This danger is called "prejudice". Because prejudice might result from introducing similar acts evidence, Huddleston aruged that the Rules should require the judge to determine that the similar acts evidence was more likely than not true. The Court rejected this argument as inconsistent with the text and structure of the rules.

The rules on admissibility of evidence are meant to be the only standards for admitting evidence. All relevant evidence is admissible, unless the danger of prejudice outweighs its probative value. The other rules, including the rule about similar acts evidence, is intended to limit the purpose for which otherwise probative evidence may be admitted. The text of these rules does not require any other preliminary showing before admitting the evidence. Congress did not intend to superimpose another level of judicial oversight onto the admissibility rules; rather, it intended to ensure that no artificial barriers stood in the way of admitting probative evidence. The rules require the trial court to make threshold determinations on admissibility, including whether evidence is relevant, and whether it is not unfairly prejudicial. The court's power to make these determinations is sufficient to guard against the danger of prejudice that might result from admitting similar acts evidence.

ee also

* List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 485

External links

* [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=485&invol=681 Text of the opinion, findlaw.com]