- Ahmed Diraige
Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige is the former governor of the
Sudan ese province ofDarfur and current head of theNational Redemption Front alliance of rebel groups in theDarfur conflict .Governorship
Diraige is a Fur, born to a "shartai" (paramount chief). In December 1963, as a young politician, he created the
Darfur Development Front (DDF) to create a common agenda to advocate for the region's interests. However, he proved unable to bring all the provincial interests into a common front. [Alex de Waal , [http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/dewaal.html "Tragedy in Darfur"] , "Boston Review ", October/November 2004] Although, the Front was popular from its creation with Fur because of its founder's ethnic connections, it was open to all Darfuris; its name suggesting that "development" should be the primary concern of political action. By the time of the February 1968 election, the politics had become ethnically polarized between rival factions of the Umma Party.Sadiq al-Mahdi , calculating that the province's demographics favored the "African" tribes, successfully courted the DDF, leavingImam al-Hadi to mobilize the "Arab" vote. Sadiq's faction won 13 of 24 seats, while the faction led by al-Hadi received seven. The factions were reconciled only when the parliamentary government was overthrown by the military coup of Col.Gaafar Nimeiry in May 1969. Both Diraige and al-Sadiq were arrested, while al-Hadi was executed. [Gérard Prunier , "Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide", Cornell University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-8014-4450-0, p. 741-42]In 1979, Darfuris rioted after their province became the only one in which the governor,
al-Tayeb al-Mardi , was not locally chosen. Nimeiry had chosen al-Tayeb al-Mardi to oversee the support to theChad ian guerilla force led byHissène Habré , but grew concerned that he was losing control of the situation. In January 1980, he dismissed al-Tayeb al-Mardi and appointed Diraige. The appointment of the DDR leader resulted in an immediate lessening of tensions. Diraige refused to accept a salary and quickly concentrated on replacing posts filled due to political patronage with largely apolitical civil servants from across the ethnic spectrum who had all been affiliated with the DDF since 1964. The many problems facing the provincial government, including rising racial tensions, the accumulated administrative neglect and spillover from the conflict in Chad, was soon superseded by steadily diminishing rains. [Prunier, pp. 49] In the 1981 provincial elections, ethnicity had become a dominant political factor and Diraige, with his large Fur base of support and long out of jail, easily won the governorship. His election, in turn sparked plans by Darfuri Arabs to join with theZaghawa and Fellata and form an "Arab Alliance." [Flint, Julie and Alex de Waal, "Darfur: A Short History of a Long War", Zed Books, London March 2006, ISBN 1-84277-697-5, p. 51]The Diraige government soon realized that they could not dig water boreholes quickly enough to make up for the lowered amount of rainfall. In November 1983, Diraige wrote a letter to Nimeiry warning him that, unless foreign food aid was requested, Darfur faced a serious
famine . This letter would come to be known as the "famine letter." Since 1977, Nimeiry had been creating an image of Sudan as the "future breadbasket of the Arab world", was furious with Diraige for sending this inconvenient letter and refused to respond. On23 December 1983 , Diraige flew toKhartoum to present his case in person. Nimeiry made his displeasure clear and stated that he would not ask for aid. An arrest warrant for Diraige was issued about 48 hours later, which he escaped by flying toSaudi Arabia . By August 1984, the existence of the famine was obvious and Nimeiry was forced to declare Darfur a "disaster zone". [Prunier, pp. 50-51] The story of Diraige, the first locally accountable governor who had been forced into exile for warning of a preventable famine, became widely known, further aggravating tensions between Darfur and the northerner-dominated government.Exile
By 1987, the situation had worsened. The
Libya-Chad War overflowed into the province, resulting in widespread violence. Many Fur military conscripts fighting theSecond Sudanese Civil War deserted to the side of theSudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Sudanese Brig.Fadlallah Burma Nasir and Chief of Staff Brig.Fawzi Ahmed el-Fadl visited Diraige at his home inLondon , asking if he would come back and support the government to stop the desertion of Fur soldiers. Diraige refused. [Prunier, p. 62] In the late 1980s, Darfuri politicianDaud Bolad sought help from the SPLA in extending the rebellion to Darfur. Other leftist leaders, such as Diraige, believed that the SPLA would use them for its own purpose and intentionally did not associate themselves with the southern rebels. Bolad's capture in 1991 and the destruction of his resistance network was seen as confirmation that this was the correct stance. [Flint and de Waal, p. 22, and Alex de Waal, [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap"] ,London Review of Books ,5 August 2004 ]Diraige created the
Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), a member organization of the oppositionNational Democratic Alliance . From 1996, SFDA deputySharif Harir set up an office inAsmara ,Eritrea , from which it actively recruited armed fighters from migrant Darfuris. [Alex de Waal, [http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=8408 "As they sign a peace, is this the face of yet another tragedy"] , parliamentary brief (hosted bySudan Tribune ), February 2005] On23 January 2004 , Sudanese Vice PresidentAli Osman Taha met Diraige inNairobi , while obstensibly onhajj break from talks inNaivasha ending the war in the south. Diraige used his personal credibility to get the Darfuri rebels to agree to talks on humanitarian maters inGeneva to be mediated by theHenri Dunant Foundation , as a trust-building first step. The government then broke Diraige's trust by publicly demanding a meeting on "national reconciliation" in Khartoum. This had been the last line of communication that the government still had with the Fur rebels. [Prunier, p. 112] In 2003, theDarfur Liberation Front , a new rebel group fighting a steadily escalating conflict asked the SFDA for political and logistical support. Harir agreed and declared that the DLF fighters were the military wing of the SFDA. However, Diraige disagreed that this was the time for armed rebellion and the DLF got no substantive support. [Flint and de Waal, p. 81]This position apparently changed. In June 2006, Diraige was named the head of the
National Redemption Front , a coalition of the SFDA,Justice and Equality Movement and the faction of theSudan Liberation Army (SLA) that had not signed the May deal taken by the faction of the SLA lead byMinni Minnawi . [Martin Plaut , [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5311998.stm "Darfur - on the brink of new conflict"] , "BBC News ",4 September 2006 ] [ [http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16198 "Joint Statement of Darfur Leaders Abstaining from Signing on Abuja"] , hosted by Sudan Tribune,15 June 2006 ]Notes and references
External links
* Tim Sebastian, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/3536596.stm "Sudan: The suffering continues"] ,
HARDtalk interview of Diraige -BBC News ,4 August 2004
* [http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75170 SUDAN: Veteran Darfur leader blames conflict on marginalisation]IRIN , November 2007
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