Battle of Vyazma

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of Vyazma
partof=French invasion of Russia (1812)


caption="Battle of Vyazma", by Piter von Hess
date=November 3, 1812
place=Vyazma, Russia
result=Russian victory
combatant1=
combatant2=
commander1=General Mikhail Miloradovich
commander2=Louis Nicolas Davout, Eugene de Beauharnais, Józef Antoni Poniatowski, and Michel Ney
strength1=26,500 troops
strength2=37,000, of whom 24,000 took part in the battle
casualties1=1,800 killed and wounded
casualties2=8,000, including 4,000 taken prisoner

The Battle of Vyazma (November 3, 1812), occurred at the beginning of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow. In this encounter the rear guard of the Grande Armee was defeated by the Russians commanded by General Mikhail Andreyevich Miloradovich. Although the French repelled Miloradovich’s attempt to encircle and destroy the corps of Louis Nicolas Davout, they withdrew in a partial state of disorder after suffering heavy casualties from continued Russian attacks.

The French reversal at Vyazma was indecisive, but it was noteworthy because of its disruptive impact on the Grande Armee's retreat. [Caulaincourt, page 197; Segur, page 168]

Background

Two weeks before the Battle of Vyazma, Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow because this city was [http://www.dean.usma.edu/HISTORY/web03/atlases/napoleon/napoleon%20pages/napoleon%20map%2050.htm isolated deep in enemy territory] , and was thus unsuitable as the Grande Armee’s winter quarters. [See Riehn, pages 300-302, for a discussion of the severe logistical problems facing the French army in Moscow. The lengthy road connecting Moscow to the closest French supply depot, Smolensk, was 270 miles long and impossible to defend. The road was choked by partisan activity and Cossack raiding parties. French supply trains were routinely wiped out and 15,000 French troops were captured along this road in September and October alone.]

Napoleon’s objective at this stage of the retreat was to lead the Grande Armee to his closest major supply depot, Smolensk, which was 270 miles west of Moscow. The campaign was then to be recommenced in the following spring.

The French departed Moscow on October 18, and after having a southern route to Smolensk denied them as a result of the Battle of Maloyaroslavets (October 24), they were compelled to backtrack and retreat along the same road used in their earlier advance on Moscow. Because the territory alongside this road had been economically ravaged by earlier campaigning, the retreat imposed on the Grande Armee extreme conditions of privation and attrition. [The deterioration of the French army’s combat ability and discipline in the first two weeks of its retreat is well documented. For a discussion of this situation, see Chandler, page 823, Riehn, pages 335-337, Cate, pages 343-347, Zamoyski, page 377-385. In the 17 days between the evacuation of Moscow and the Battle of Vyazma, half of the troops of Ney, Davout, Eugene and Poniatowski had deteriorated to the status of stragglers.] Lack of foodstuffs soon led to demoralization and disorder in the French ranks. [Zamoyski, page 385; Riehn, page 322, describes the beginning of the breakdown in troop discipline in Moscow; on page 341, how starvation during the retreat accelerated the deterioration in discipline.]

By November 3, the day of the action at Vyazma, the retreating Grande Armee was stretched out in a column 60 miles long. [Esposito and Elting, map 120] The helm of the column, Junot’s VIII Corps, was at Dorogobuzh, with Davout’s I Corps, serving as the army’s rearguard, located at the tail of the army just east of Vyazma. Between these two endpoints were, running west to east, the Imperial Guard, Murat’s troops, Ney’s III Corps, Poniatowski’s V Corps, and Eugene’s IV Corps. [See Riehn, pages 338-339 for more details regarding the arrangement of this retreating train of troops]

The French retreat at this point was harassed by Cossack attacks at every juncture, Davout’s corps in particular being beleaguered by Russian attacks. [Riehn, pages 338-339] By November 2, Napoleon had grown dissatisfied with Davout’s management of rearguard activities, and ordered Ney to remain in Vyazma, to allow Eugene, Poniatowski and Davout to bypass him, and to assume rearguard duties himself.Cate, page 348]

The Russians, meanwhile, organized themselves into three groups while pursuing the French.

First, following Davout closely were 5,000 Cossacks commanded by Ataman Platov. This group was supported by General Ivan Paskevich’s 26th Division, comprised of 4,000 troops. Marching slightly to the south was General Miloradovich with the II and IV Infantry Corps, some 14,000 troops in all, and the II and III Cavalry Corps, which amounted to 3,500 soldiers. Miloradovich coordinated the activity of all of these troops, including those of Platov and Paskevich. [This data is derived from Cate, page 348, and Riehn, pages 337 and 345-346. Miloradovich’s seniority is presumed.]

The main Russian army led by Mikhail Kutuzov, some 70,000 troops in all, marched further to the south. [See Riehn’s table and notes, pages 345-348. Kutuzov’s full strength is presumed]

On the evening of November 2, while conducting reconnaissance south of the Smolensk-Moscow road, Miloradovich, together with his cavalry commanders General Korff and General Sievers, noticed a gap between Davout’s troops, situated to the east at Fedorovskoye, and the troops of Eugene and Poniatowski, located to the west just outside of Vyazma. Recognizing an opportunity to isolate and destroy Davout’s corps, the aggressive Miloradovich decided to attack early the next morning. [Cate, page 348-349. Wilson, page 242, writes that Miloradovich sent a message to Kutusov, 30 miles away at Dubrova, requesting the main army’s support in the upcoming action.]

Action

The Russian cavalry attacks

At 8 AM on the morning of November 3, Miloradovich’s cavalry attacked the disorganized French column holding the length of road which separated Davout from Eugene and Poniatowski. Miloradovich also ordered his artillery, positioned on nearby heights, to begin a cannonade. [Wilson, page 242] The attack was a complete success, as it captured the French IV Corps baggage train and sent the French troops fleeing in disarray.Cate, page 349] Miloradovich then placed infantrymen and horse batteries astraddle the road, thereby severing Davout’s connection with the rest of the French army.

Simultaneous to Miloradovich’s attack to the west of Davout, Platov’s Cossacks attacked Davout from the east, supported by Paskevich’s troops.Riehn, page 339] Davout’s infantrymen formed squares to meet the attack from Platov and Paskevich, and his artillerymen set-up their pieces to return Miloradovich’s fire. The 14,000 exhausted, hunger-weakened soldiers of Davout’s Corps were now at risk of being overwhelmed and destroyed by the Russians.

Eugene's counterattack

Fortunately for Davout, there was a weakness in the Russian plan of attack, in that the Russian cavalry had attacked the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road that morning without the full support of the II and IV Infantry Corps (led by Eugene of Württemberg and General Ostermann-Tolstoy respectively), which were located to the south and would not be able to reach the battlefield until 10 am, two hours after the action commenced. Miloradovich, fearing that the gap between Davout and the rest of the French army would close before he could exploit it, felt it expedient to launch his cavalry attack without having the balance of his infantry on hand. Lacking sufficient numbers of infantrymen to consolidate their hold on the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road, Miloradovich’s cavalry was vulnerable to a determined French counterattack.

At this juncture, Davout’s fortunes changed for the better. His infantrymen to the east repulsed Platov and Paskevich with steady, disciplined musketfire. [Wilson, Beskrovny, and Zhilin describe Platov's and Paskevich's attack as being successful, but their words are unconvincing in light of the accounts provided by Riehn, Tarle, and Cate.] More importantly, Eugene heard the cannonfire engulfing Davout’s position to the rear, and immediately ordered his troops to counterattack Miloradovich and regain possession of the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road.

Eugene’s counterattack fell on the rear of the troops Miloradovich had positioned on the road facing Davout. This counterattack was conducted by two of Eugene’s Italian divisions, one division of Poles from Poniatowski’s V Corps, and a single regiment of troops sent to the scene by Ney, whose III Corps was positioned in the heights near Vyazma.Wilson, page 243] Davout, upon seeing these troops advancing to rescue him, sent his infantrymen to attack as well. Miloradovich’s cavalry and his small body of infantrymen were now attacked from the east and the west, including being enveloped in French artillery shot, and were compelled to retreat from the road.

Thanks to Eugene’s counterattack, a passageway had been created on the Vyazma-Fedorovskoye road for Davout to continue his retreat.

Miloradovich repositions his troops

The Russians at this point had been repulsed at all points, but they were hardly finished with the battle.

Having pulled back from Eugene's attack, Miloradovich ordered his troops to reposition themselves parallel to the road. A heavy cannonade was then commenced against Davout’s troops as they retreated toward Vyazma. [Beskrovny L.G, Zhilin, and Tarle] Davout’s artillery was unable to respond effectively to the Russian fire, and panic broke out among his troops.

Louis Philippe, comte de Ségur, an observer of the action on the French side, describes this moment in the battle thusly:

:“…"disorder reigned in the I Corps – the one commanded by Davout. The sudden maneuver, the surprise, and particularly the tragic example of the crow of unhorsed, unarmed cavalrymen running up and down in blind fright, threw this corps into utter confusion. This spectacle encouraged the enemy, who credited themselves with a victory. Their artillery, superior in strength, galloped into position and, opening an oblique fire on our lines, began mowing our men down, while our own guns were coming back to us at a snail’s pace from Vyazma".”Segur, page 167]

The damage wrought by the Russian artillery on Davout’s troops was such that many of them were compelled to abandon the road, and to retreat across an open field in their desperation to reach safety behind Eugene’s position. By 10 am, when the rest of Miloradovich's infantry arrived, Davout's battered corps had taken shelter behind Eugene.

Eugene’s troops, too, came under pressure from the Russians and were obliged to fall back. [Riehn, on page 339, states that “…when the Russian infantry approached from the south at 10 am, Davout had already passed behind Eugene’s receiving position. Eugene made a right turn and faced the Russians, but he was pressed back via Myasoyedova.” Note that Wilson's description of this juncture of the battle compliments Riehn's.] General Sir Robert Wilson, an Englishman who observed the action from the Russian side, describes the combat at this moment as follows:

:“"On the remainder of the Russian infantry coming up (Eugene of Württemberg and Ostermann-Tolstoy), Miloradovich renewed the attack under protection of a superior and admirably served artillery. The enemy fell back on a second position, between Rjavets and the farm of Rieaupiere, and thence, when menaced on both flanks, to some heights in front of Vyazma, where they were reinforced by the two Italian divisions, the Italian guards, and the corps of Ney".” [Wilson, page 244]

According to Segur, the Russian cannonshot and musketry at this point were "frighteningly effective"."

At 2:00 PM, Davout, Eugene, and Poniatowski conferred, and they concluded that victory was not possible given the disorganization in the French units caused by the Russian aggression. [Segur, pages 167-168] Soon, the three French corps had retreated into Vyazma. [Riehn, page 339. Many of Davout's troops are acknowledged by all sources to have broken ranks and fled at this juncture. Noteworthy is that even Eugene's and Poniatowski's troops were in some degree of disorder due to the Russian pressure.]

At some point prior to the three French corps falling back to a position on the heights protected by Ney, Miloradovich urgently requested reinforcements from Kutusov, as he recognized that the French were vulnerable and the opportunity for a great victory may have presented itself. Kutusov, who was now within earshot of the battle with his main army (just 20 miles away), sent only the 3000 cuirassiers of General Uvarov and nothing more. [Wilson, page 245; Segur, page 167. Perhaps Kutusov at this moment was thinking of his experience at Durrenstein, in 1805, when his forces in overwhelming numbers attacked Mortier’s corps, intending to destroy Mortier before the rest of the Grande Armee arrived. In the ensuing battle, Mortier was severely mauled, but held his position just long enough for the Grande Armee to appear distantly on the horizon. Kutusov, lacking the resources to fight Napoleon’s entire army, was obliged to retire and to let Mortier survive. At Vyazma in 1812, a heavy attack by Kutusov’s main army on Eugene, Poniatowksi, Davout and Ney might have destroyed the numerically inferior enemy in one sweeping blow, but it’s also possible that Napoleon’s Imperial Guard and Junot would have arrived on the scene had the battle stretched into a second day of combat.]

Final Russian assault on Vyazma

At 4 pm, the fighting spread into the town of Vyazma itself, which at this point was consumed by flames. By now the infantry of General Choglokov (from Ostermann-Tolstoy’s corps), as well as detachments of Platov’s Cossacks were engaging the French in torrid, close quarters combat on the streets of Vyazma. [Beskrovny L.G, Zhilin, and Tarle. As to whether the Russians pressed a successful offensive into Vyazma or if the French were holding the Russians at bay while executing a staged withdrawal, the sources yield conflicting information. Tarle, page 341, states that Choglokov's troops accidentally outpaced the main Russian force. Tarle claims also that Miloradovich and Platov remained outside of Vyazma until the French had withdrawn.] The French were hard pressed, and had to fight desperately to hold the Russians off while evacuating the town. [Segur, page 168, describes how General Morand and General Compans fended off the Russians during the French evacuation of the town; they were ambushed unexpectedly by Russian infantry.]

By 8 pm, the fighting was over. The corps of Davout, Eugene, and Poniatowski had retreated west of Vyazma, bruised but safe. Ney’s rearguard was last to withdraw from the town, suffering heavy losses in a final bayonet fight with a force of Russian grenadiers. [Wilson, page 247]

In order to cover their retreat, the French had set large sections of Vyazma on fire, resulting in many wounded from both sides burning to death. Worse yet, the French are reported to have locked civilians and Russian prisoners in buildings before setting them aflame. Russian troops pouring into the town were able to save some of these victims. [Wilson, page 247; Beskrovny L.G, Zhilin, and Tarle ]

That evening, Ney's corps remained on the western outskirts of Vyazma to block the Russians. However, given the Russians' aggression, great danger remained, and according to Caulaincourt, even Ney had to "continue his retreating movement before dawn in order not to risk the loss of his troops"." [Caulaincourt, page 198]

The next day, withdrawing along a road heaped for miles with burning, overturned wagons, and blown-up ammunition caches, Ney dispatched an entire series of grim reports to Napoleon detailing the lost battle. [Caulaincourt, page 198-199]

The consequences

The Battle of Vyazma represented a defeat of the Grande Armee’s rearguard, as French losses in this battle, 6,000 to 8,000 casualties, including 4,000 lost as prisoners to the Russians, were prohibitive. The shock of the Russian attack reduced many French units to a state of disarray, and owing to the speed with which their retreat had to be resumed, order was never restored within them. These disorganized units became easy targets for Cossack raids in the following days.

General Armand de Caulaincourt, the famed memoirist who participated in the events of 1812 from the French side, perhaps best summarized the effects of Vyazma on his army with the following rueful words:

:“"Until then – as long, that is, as it had to withstand alone the attacks of the enemy – the First Corps had maintained its honor and reputation, although it was fiercely attacked and its formation broken by the artillery. This momentary disorder was conspicuous because it was the first time that these gallant infantry broke ranks and compelled their dogged commander to give ground. I have related these painful details because from this incident must be dated our disorganization and misfortunes. The First Corps, which on taking the field was the largest and finest, a rival to the Guard, was thenceforward the hardest hit; and the evil spread".” [Caulaincourt, page 197]

Russian casualties at Vyazma were no more than 1800 killed and wounded, out of 26,500 troops involved.

Notes

References

*"Napoleon In Russia: A Concise History of 1812", 2004, Digby Smith, Pen & Sword Military, ISBN 978-1-84415-089-2
*"The War of the Two Emperors", Curtis Cate, Random House, New York, ISBN 978-0-394-53670-5
*"The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Source", 1998, Digby Smith, Greenhill Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-276-7
*"1812 Napoleon’s Russian Campaign", Richard K. Riehn, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., ISBN 978-0-471-54302-2
*"With Napoleon In Russia", Armand de Caulaincourt, William Morrow & Co., ISBN 978-0-486-44013-2
*"Narrative of Events during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Retreat of the French Army, 1812", Sir Robert Wilson, Elibron Classics, ISBN 978-1-4021-9825-0
*"Napoleon's Russian Campaign", Philippe-Paul de Segur, Greenwood Press, ISBN 978-0-8371-8443-2
*"Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars", Vincent J. Esposito and John R. Elting, Greenhill Books, ISBN 978-1-85367-346-7
*"Moscow 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March", Adam Zamoyski, Harper Collins, ISBN 978-0-06-107558-2
*"The Campaigns of Napoleon", David Chandler, The MacMillan Company, ISBN 978-0-02-523660-8

External links

* [http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Invasion_of_Russia_1812.htm Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812 + color maps]