COSVN

COSVN, pronounced "CŎS-vĭn" and standing for Central Office for South Vietnam (Vietnamese: "Văn phòng Trung ương Cục miền Nam"), was a People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) political and military headquarters during the Vietnam War. It was in overall command of the communist effort in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), which included the efforts of both PAVN and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF or derogatively "Viet Cong"). Whether COSVN actually existed, and if so, where it was located at any one time, and how important it was, were contentious subjects, but in his memoirs the American commander in South Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland spoke of it as something whose existence and importance were not in doubt. All U.S. and South Vietnamese efforts to eliminate it during the conflict failed. [William C. Westmoreland, "A Soldier Reports". New York: Doubleday, 1976, pgs. 55,56,206, & 389.]

History

The headquarters was created in 1961 when the southern and central branches of the Lao Dong Party (the Vietnamese Communist Party) were merged as the Central Directorate for the South. An advance element of the Party's Central Committee, the headquarter's original purpose was to direct NLF guerrilla operations in South Vietnam. COSVN was established by Major General Tran Luong, who came south in May 1961 to reorganize the structure of the Directorate and its subordinate regions, Military Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 10, known collectively as the B-2 Front.

In October 1963, COSVN organized the Military Affairs Party Committee (MAPC) and the Regional Military Headquarters. COSVN first secretary Nguyen Van Linh served concurrently as the secretary of the MAPC, while General Tran Van Tra became commander of the Regional Military Headquarters. Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, a member of the northern politburo, arrived at COSVN in late 1963 or early 1964 to serve as southern regional political officer and became the dominant figure at the headquarters until his death during a visit to Hanoi in July 1967. This regional command structure reported through Thanh to the PAVN general staff in Hanoi. When Pham Hung replaced Thanh as the politburo's representative, he also became the first secretary of both COSVN and the MAPC.

Reputed locations

During the early 1960s, COSVN was located South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border. [Westmoreland, p. 55.] During the period 1965-1970, the headquarters was based in and around the Cambodian town of Mimot, in what was called the “Fishhook” area on the Vietnamese/Cambodian border north of Tay Ninh and west of Loc Ninh. During the Cambodian Campaign of 1970, COSVN moved westward to the area around Kratie.

ubdivisions

It was believed by U.S. intelligence that COSVN had several subdivisions, each of which dealt with the political, logistical, and military aspects of the struggle in South Vietnam. For tactical reasons U.S. Radio Research units were primarily concerned with the military divisions, which were known as “MAS-COSVN” (Military Affairs Section) and “MIS-COSVN” (Military Intelligence Section). The political and logistical sub-divisions were left to the Radio Research Field Station at Phu Bai. These two sub-divisions usually occupied a location removed from, but generally near, the headquarters itself, as determined by ARDF or airborne radio direction finding.

Operations to destroy COSVN

One of the central frustrations of the U.S. military during the conflict was the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (North Vietnam) use of Laos and Cambodia as logistical conduits and Base Areas. During the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the U.S. military was generally not allowed by its civilian commanders to widen the war by attacking the supply routes and sanctuaries in both neutral countries. An attempt was made to capture or destroy the headquarters during Operation Junction City, a massive search and destroy operation launched in the border region in February and March 1967.

Later, President Richard M. Nixon authorized such attacks, first in 1969 in the form of the covert bombing campaign known as Operation Menu, wherein the suspected site of COSVN in Cambodia was repeatedly and heavily bombed. In the spring of 1970, an overt ground incursion (the Cambodian Campaign) was launched by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and U.S. ground forces, which attempted to "clean out the sanctuaries." [Westmoreland, p. 389.] PAVN/NLF forces, however, had ample forewarning of the incursion and most had withdrawan from the border region two days prior to its launching. COSVN and its sub-divisions had already withdrawan to the Kratie area and successfully eluded destruction. A marked reduction in radio traffic and transmitter power also made them difficult to place accurately at their new location, despite close 24-hour monitoring.

The military benefits and tragic repercussions of such bombing and invasion have been contentious subjects. Westmoreland thought that it was "unfortunate" that Nixon had announced the capture of COSVN as one of the primary objectives of the Cambodian operations. [Westmoreland, p. 389.] This left Nixon open to critics, who were already scornful of Nixon, to mock the notion of the president obsessing over COSVN as if it were a "holy grail".

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