Medici bank

Infobox Defunct Company
company_name = Medici bank
company_
fate = Shut down by authorities
successor =
foundation = "c." 1397
defunct = 1494
location = Various; home branch in Florence, Italy
industry = Banking
key_people = Giovanni di Bicci, Cosimo de' Medici, Piero di Cosimo, Lorenzo de' Medici, Francesco Sassetti, Piero di Lorenzo
products =Deposits, bills of exchange, luxury goods, and general commerce
num_employees = >50
parent = Vieri di Cambio's bank
subsid = The Roman branch

The Medici Bank (1397 – 1494) was the largest and most respected bank in Europe during the 15th century. [The qualifier "during the 15th century" is important, as the Bardi and Peruzzi banks of the 14th century are considered to have been considerably larger in their prime; the smaller size of the Medici bank is attributed to poor business conditions, which are sometimes one of the proffered causes for the Medici bank's ultimate decline and failure. The Medici's relative lack of ambition can be seen in how they never truly challenged the Hanseatic League, established no branches in the Middle East, and did not pursue the business in and around the Baltic Sea. See pgs 5-6, 8 of de Roover 1966] There are some estimates that the Medici family was for a period of time the wealthiest family in Europe. With this monetary wealth, the family acquired political power initially in Florence, and later in the wider spheres of Italy and Europe.

A notable contribution to the profession of accounting was the improvement of the general ledger system through the development of the double entry system of tracking credits and debits. ["A surviving fragment of the ledger of the Bruges branch shows that the books were carefully kept and that the double-entry system was in use." pg 24, De Roover 1948. In an attached footnote, de Roover identifies the erroneous belief that the Medicis did not use double-entry as stemming from Otto Meltzing's mistake in "Das Bankhaus der Medici und seine Vorläufer" (Jena, 1906) and repeated in Gutkind's "Cosimo".]

Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici was the first Medici to enter banking on his own, and while he became influential in Florentine government, it was not until his son Cosimo the Elder took over that in 1434 as gran maestro that the Medici became unofficial head of state of the Florentine republic.

History

Founding

The Medicis had long been involved in banking at a high level, maintaining their status as a respectably upper class and notably wealthy family who derived their money from land holdings in the Mugello region towards the Apennines, north of Florence.
The Medicis were the wealthiest family in Europe and perhaps the world. Estimating their wealth in today's money is difficult and imprecise, considering that they owned priceless art, land, gold and much more.
The Medicis were not only bankers but innovators in accounting. At one point the Medicis managed most of the great fortunes in the world, from royalty to merchants. There was even a time when the currency issued by the Medicis was accepted and used throughout Europe as the preferred currency.

While Giovanni's father Averardo (?-1363; known as "Bicci") was not a very successful businessman or banker, a distant cousin Vieri di Cambio (1323-1396) "was", and further was one of Florence's more prominent bankers (the first of the various modestly upper-class Medici lineages, numbering around 20 in 1364 [pg 11 of Goldthwaite 1987] ). His banking house trained and employed Giovanni and his elder brother Francesco ("c." 1350-1412), who eventually became partners in the firm. Francesco became a junior partner in 1382, while Giovanni rose to become general manager of the Rome branch in 1385, which was incorporated as a partnership, though it was not necessary to capitalize that branch (because the Church usually was depositing funds and not borrowing). [pg 35-36 of de Roover 1966] Vieri was long-lived, but his bank split into three sometime between 1391 and 1392: one failed quickly, another helmed by Francesco and then his son survived until 1443 (a little less than a decade after Averardo's death), and the third was controlled by Giovanni in partnership with Benedetto di Lippaccio de' Bardi (1373-1420 [pg 39 of de Roover 1966] ). [pg 37 of de Roover 1966]

The Medici bank's founding is usually dated to 1397, since it was this year that Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici separated his bank from his nephew Averardo's bank (which had effectively been acting as a branch in Rome) moved his small bank from Rome to Florence. The branch in Rome was entrusted to Benedetto, and Giovanni took on Gentile di Baldassare Buoni (1371-1427) as a partner. They pooled 10000 gold florins and began (though Gentile soon left the firm). This move had certain advantages for a bank, in as much that the predominant large banks of the 1300s which were based in Florence (the Bardi, Acciaioli, Peruzzi) had met with problems, and saw their places usurped by the Alberti, who were just large enough to capture the Catholic Church's business. But the Alberti firm split over internecine quarrels, and the clan was banished from Florence in 1382 (though they would be allowed to return in 1434), creating yet another void. Giovanni's choice proved to be prescient, especially since what Florence was lacking was a good port on the Mediterranean - which it would obtain in 1406 with the conquest of Pisa and its Porto Pisano. [pg 3 of de Roover 1966] A further advantage was that it was much easier to invest a bank's capital in Florence than in Rome, and because of the Holy See's deposits (obtained through Giovanni's long contacts with them), the bank had a fair amount in the way of deposits to invest with.

Rise

Quickly a factor was dispatched to Venice to seek out investment opportunities. He did well, so on 25 March 1402, the third branch of the Medici bank was opened. It suffered from some initial mismanagement (by the factor who had previously done so well - he made the fatal mistake of violating the partnership agreement and loaning money to Germans; on a more humane note, he would eventually become a pauper and be sent 20 florins by Giovanni, who felt that a past partner deserved some charity), but soon was prospering. It was this branch which established the practice of having a general manager's remuneration be paid through shares in the branch that he purchased with his investment. [pg 41-42 of de Roover 1966] Also in 1402 was the establishment of the first Medici factory, for the production of woolen cloth, and then another in 1408. By this point, the Rome branch had established some sort of branch in Naples (closed in 1425 and replaced with one in Geneva [pg 48, 50 of de Roover 1966] and Gaeta. This may seem a lot, but nevertheless there were perhaps only 17 employees in total in 1402, with a bare 5 at the central bank in Florence, although they were reasonably well-paid and promotions seem to have been rapid when warranted (such as in the case of Giuliano di Giovanni di ser Matteo, who went from being a clerk in 1401 to a junior partner in 1408). [pg 43-45 of de Roover 1966]

In 1420, Benedetto di' Bardi (the "ministro" or general manager of all the branches) died, and was succeeded by his younger brother Ilarione di' Bardi, who was the manager of the Rome branch. He dissolved one of the wool factories, among other reorganizations occasioned by partnerships coming to their designated end. This date is interesting because Ilarione's contract with his principal was done in the name of Cosimo and Lorenzo, and not their father Giovanni; this perhaps marks the beginnings of a transfer of responsibility and power. [pgs 48-49 of de Roover 1966] Two Portinaris were put in charge of the Florence and Venice branches as well.

Giovanni died in 1429; according to Lorenzo, his fortune upon his death was around 180,000 gold florins. His death affected little, and the transition to control by Cosimo went smoothly, aided by Ilarione, who was retained as ministro. [pg 52-53 of de Roover 1966] Fortunately for the bank, Lorenzo di Giovanni di Bicci was on excellent terms with Cosimo, and so did not insist on dissolving the partnerships so he could receive his share of the patrimony (primogeniture not being operative here); many Florentine banks and businesses lasted only a generation or two because some of the inheriting sons usually wished to strike out on their own. [pg 15 of Goldthwaite 1987] At this point in time, the branch was flourishing: besides the branches in Rome and Florence, the Venetian and Genevan branches had been founded [pg 15 of Goldthwaite 1987] . Ilarione would not last long, and is mentioned as dead in a letter written in February of 1433; an unfortunate timing as it was this period in which the Albizzi government was moving against the young Medici led resistance (galvanized by the Albizzi government's failure in a war against Lucca and Milan), culminating in Cosimo's exile to Venice. Despite the unfavorable politics, in this period of the bank's history the branches in Italy turned in bumper profits, with as much as 62% coming from Rome (in 1427, the Rome branch had approximately 100,000 florins on deposit from the Curia; in comparison, the total capitalization of the entire Medici bank was about 25,000 gold florins [pg 106 of de Roover 1966] ) and 13% from Venice between 1420 and 1435 (with the Bruges, London, Pisa, Avignon, Milan, and Lyon branches contributing nothing as they had not been founded yet). [pg 54-56 of de Roover 1966] At this time, there seems to have been some sort of office in Basel, and it seems to have lasted until 1443. de Roover speculates that it was a sub-branch of the Geneva branch serving the General Council of the Church, and was closed when the Council no longer made it worth their while to maintain it. [pg 58-59 of de Roover 1966]

Maturation

In 24 March 1439, the branch at Bruges was officially founded. The Medici had done business in Flanders through correspondents and agents since 1416, but only when the son of the Venice branch's manager (from 1417-1435) was sent to investigate in 1438 and favorably reported back was it incorporated as a limited liability partnership with that son (Bernardo di Giovanni d'Adoardo Portinari; 1407 - "c." 1457) assuming the position of manager and also the majority of the liability. When Angelo Tani (1415-1492) became junior partner in 1455, the branch was finally created as a full and equal partnership in the Medici bank. [pg 59-60 of de Roover 1966] A legally similar situation obtained for a "accomandita" established in Ancona, apparently to finance Francesco Sforza, an ally of Cosimo's.

As mentioned previously, Cosimo's uncle had begun a bank with his third of Vieri's bank, and it closed in 1443 with the death of the grandson of Averardo - taking with it their branch in Pisa. Formerly, any business that the Medici needed to transact in Pisa (such as Cosimo forwarding Donatello money to buy marble) had been done through them. In 26 December 1442, a limited liability partnership was formed with two outsiders. Over time, the Medici progressively reduced their investment in this partnership, until they seem to have withdrawn completely sometime shortly after 1457; one partner kept it running until 1476. [pg 62 of de Roover 1966]

1446 saw the start of two branches: the sub-branch of the Bruges branch was converted into a full partnership, and a limited liability partnership was established in Avignon (which was the largest center of trade in southern France despite the departure of the Papacy), and within 2 years converted into a full partnership. [pg 63 of De Roover 1966] The branch at Lyons was not actually founded as a separate branch, because it came about as a result of the gradual move of the Geneva branch, due to the reduction in traffic to the fairs at Geneva and the establishment of four major fairs in Lyons (which attracted around 140 other Florentine businesses ["In Lyons, for example, the Medici company was no larger than the Capponi, and there were almost a hundred and forty other Florentine firms that operated there at one time or another in the last third of the fifteenth century." pg 20-21 of Goldthwaite 1987] ). The move was completed in 1466. [pg 74 of de Roover 1966]

The structure and functions of the bank had largely settled into their final form by this point; a branch would be opened in Milan in late 1452 or early 1453, at the instigation of the grateful Sforza. Its first manager Pigello Portinari (1421 - October 1468) was very capable and it did well in loaning to the Sforza court and, like the Roman branch, selling luxuries such as jewels - until he died and was replaced by his feckless brother Accerrito (1427-"c." 1503) who could not manage the massive amounts lent to the court and Sforza (who didn't repay his debts of 179,000 ducats [pg 34 of Goldthwaite 1987] before his death in 1478). A similar problem would plague the Bruges branch when managed by the third Portinari brother, Tommaso.

Still, this period (1435-155) under Cosimo and his ministro Giovanni Benci was the bank's greatest period. With Cosimo's death on 1 August 1464, the decline of the bank began.

Decline

Failure in Lyons and London

An early sign of the decline was the near-failure of the Lyons branch because of its manager's venality, saved only by heroic efforts by Francesco Sassetti (9 March 1421-April 1490 [pg 69 of de Roover 1943] ); its troubles were followed by the troubled London branch, which got into trouble for much the same reason the Bruges branch would, which was unwisely loaning to secular rulers (a class notorious for their delinquencies) - in this case, Edward IV the Yorkist usurper; though in a sense that branch had no choice but to make the loans, since he faced domestic opposition from merchant and clothier interests in London and also from their representatives in Parliament [pg 328 of de Roover 1966] , was only granting the necessary export licenses if well-bribed with loans. It had already been dropped as a full partnership in 1465, and had been reincorporated as an "accomando". In 1467, Angelo Tani was dispatched to audit the books. Tani attempted to step up the collection of outstanding debt: the King owed 10,500 pounds sterling; the nobility 1,000; another 7,000 pounds were tied up in goods dispatched on consignment and not soon recoverable. Operating funds were (like previous failing branches had done) borrowed from Medici branches at high rates of interest. Edward IV did amortize a portion of his debt, but the reductions were soon reduced (but not negated) by fresh loans and sales of silk. By Spring 1469, Tani had finished the salvage to his own satisfaction, and returned to Italy. His work would be undone by the unhelpfulness of the other branch managers, the fecklessness of the London branch manager Canigiani; the fatal factor was possibly the Wars of the Roses which rendered Edward IV unable to repay the loans (the best he could do in way of repayment was to lift all tariffs on the Medici exporting English wool until such time as the debt was repaid), and the branch had loaned far too much to the Lancastrian rebels (and not to a number of Yorkist loyalists), who would never repay their loans after their deaths and defeats. [pg 330-340 of de Roover 1966] The branch finished its liquidation in 1478, with total losses of 51,533 gold florins. [pg 63 of de Roover 1948]

Failure in Bruges

After the London branch had failed, it was turned into a "accomando" and placed under the control of the Bruges branch, managed by the third of the Portinari brothers, Tommaso Portinari. This branch too would soon fail. Portinari had managed the Bruges branch for decades, and had steadily proven himself to be a poor manager: he engaged in business dealings on the side, ingratiated himself with the Burgundian court by excessive loans (first to secure the farming of the toll of Graveline - which was never very profitable - and then to mingle socially and elevate himself), made poor business deals like purchasing 2 galleys (which would be partially sold off at a loss; the rest would be lost to shipwreck and piracy). The debts from the London branch were assumed by the Bruges branch. After Piero's death, Portinari managed to get articles of partnership so favorable that he lived in Florence, only visiting the Low Countries for business. The end-period of the branch would be marked by chaos and possibly fraud: Portinari would refuse to return some deposits, claiming that the monies had really been invested in partnership; he would also claim Angelo Tani as a full partner (and thus liable in the losses), despite the fact that Tani never signed the articles or written with his approval. [pg 346 of de Roover 1966] The magnitude of the financial failures is hard to state: in a surviving memorandum, Lorenzo the Magnificent gives the bad debts to Charles the Bold alone as the sum of 16,150 pounds groat. The articles of partnership, incidentally, strictly forbade Portinari to lend more than the total of 6,000 pounds groat. [pg 348 of de Roover 1966] In another memorandum, Lorenzo faults Portinari for the clever ruse of shifting all the London branch's business to the Bruges branch - except for the profitable wool business. Portinari bought into the separate partnership to the tune of 45%, whereas his share in the Bruges branch was only 27.5%. The branch was liquidated 1478 with staggering losses: the failure of the Bruges branch meant that not only the debts of that branch had to be handled somehow, but "also" the outstanding debts of the former London branch. In total, somewhere upwards of 70,000 gold florins were lost. This figure is optimistic, since it assumes most book assets were worth the recorded value. As Lorenzo remarked, "Theses are the great profits which are accruing to us through the management of Tommaso Portinari." [pg 349 of de Roover 1966] Lorenzo refused to take this loss lying down, and dispatched a trusted agent to Bruges to audit the books and dissolve the partnership. Portinari ironically found himself hoist by his own petard: he could not refuse the dissolution, since the "maggiore" Lorenzo had given the proper notice, and he further had to accept his own cooked books because he claimed that the books were accurate and the rather doubtful assets listed were indeed worth what they were worth. The agent Ricasoli was aided in this task by Angelo Tani, who came all the way from Florence for settling the matter of his supposed partnership in the London branch through the Bruges branch. After the dissolution in 1478, Portinari fell on hard times. He eventually made a comeback of sorts as a diplomat (involved in, among other things, the Intercursus Magnus ["In 1496 Portinari was among the negotiators of the "Intercursus Magnus", the great treaty which for many years was to regulate commercial intercourse between England and the Low Countries." de Roover 1966.] ); although ironically the most useful part of being a diplomat was being able to return home to Florence without being thrown in debtor's prison. Poor, he died in the Hospital of Santa Maria Nuova which his ancestor Folco di Ricovero Portinari had founded, 15 February 1501. His estate was so meager and his business dealings so dubious that his inheriting son refused to inherit the estate, so as to avoid any possible overdue debts.

Decay

Upon Cosimo's death, his estate and control of the bank passed to his eldest son, Piero di Cosimo "the Gouty" ("Piero il Gottoso" [pg 9 of Goldthwaite 1987] ). Piero had been given a humanist education, unlike his only other and younger brother who was trained in business but had died in the Pazzi Conspiracy; again, the estate passed down intact and undivided, though in this case not as a result of good relations between brothers, but because one of the two heirs died before inheriting [pg 15 of Goldthwaite 1987] In theory, Lorenzo's son Pierfrancesco could have insisted on his share of the estate, but Pierfrancesco was raised by Cosimo and "his emotional ties to his uncle were sufficiently strong to preclude his withdrawal from the company." [pg 16 of Goldthwaite 1987] ; Pierfrancesco seems to have grown increasingly disaffected, but his death in 1476 prevented any separation; in retrospect, given how Cosimo would steal from Pierfrancesco's estate while raising his two sons, Pierfrancesco would have been wiser to effect such a separation. Piero was not Cosimo's equal, but given his training did perhaps better than one would expect, especially considering how he was rendered bedridden by severe gout. Piero recognized the approaching problems, and tried to begin a "policy of retrenchment" as de Roover phrases it [pg 358 of de Roover 1966] . This policy doesn't seem to have been fully carried out - Niccolò Machiavelli states in his history of Florence that Piero's policy involved calling in loans for repayment, which caused a number of Florentine businesses to collapse and sparking a plot against Piero and Medici rule.

Whether Machiavelli is overstating issues and Piero had merely ordered a thorough accounting is unknown; Machiavelli can probably be trusted here since there was a rash of bankruptcies and bank failures in Florence shortly after Cosimo's death which led to a small recession; de Roover mentions however the war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire and the relevant firms' connections to that area as a possible factor as well. [pg 360-361 of de Roover 1966] . It is certain however that Piero tried to wind up the London branch and recover as much of the loans to Edward as possible, ordered the Milan branch to loan less, instructed Tommaso Portinari of the Bruges branch to get rid of the galleys and not make any loans to secular rulers, and attempted to shut down the Venice branch which was no longer profitable. [The wars between Florence and Venice had brought down this high-flying branch. Part of the problems were largely loans to Venetian merchants which worried Piero and the merely mediocre performance of Alessandro Martelli's successor, Giovanni Altoviti. Sassetti eventually persuaded Piero to simply shut down the Venice branch rather than try to find a better manager, though in 1471 there was an abortive attempt to restart it, which only lasted a little over 8 years. See pgs 358-359, pgs 251-252 of de Roover 1966] From the perspective of carrying out his policies, Piero was in a bad place: it was politically costly to demand that loans be repaid, and such demands could cost Piero dearly close to home: the king of England had him over a barrel as the king could block any attempts to export English wool, and the English wool was desperately needed by the bank for two reasons. The first was that English wool was the finest in the world; if Florence did not have a supply of English wool to weave, it could not sell its wares and more importantly could not employ the lower classes which specialized in textiles. Flemish wool had once served in English wool's place, but after the 1350s, it no longer had a market in Italy and was essentially not imported after 1400 [pg 149 of de Roover 1966] . Unemployment generated considerable unrest and revolts, which would be aimed at Piero since he was seen as the true ruler of Florence. The second reason was that there was a systemic problem in the Medici bank in which currency flowed south to Italy from the northern countries, and the wool was necessary to provide a conduit for currency to flow north and balance the books. So when Edward demanded loans, the London branch had little choice but to oblige him. ["How to settle Italian claims on the Low Countries created a real problem that grew more acute as the century progressed. It eventually engendered a crisis which not only brought about a shrinkage in the volume of international trade, but also had an adverse effect upon the prosperity of the Italian banking houses. It was undoubtedly a potent factor in causing the downfall of the Medici branches operating in Bruges and London." pg 317; pgs 360-362 of De Roover 1966]

By 1494, the Milan branch too ceased to exist. The branches that did not die off on their own generally met their end with the Medicis in general in 1494, when Florence and the Pope struck against them. The Florence "banco" was burned by a mob, the Lyons one taken over by a rival firm, the Roman branch struck off on its own despite the branch being bankrupt in general (ironically, they would suffer still more debts when a certain cardinal became pope and inquired after the 11243 gold florins he had deposited with the bank back when it was with the Medici bank). Even at the time of its downfall, it was the biggest bank in Europe, with at least seven branches and over fifty factors, an astounding number. [According to Philippe de Commines in his "Mémoires", as mentioned in De Roover 1948]

de Roover attributes the beginning of the bank's decline to Cosimo. He spent the vast majority of his time politicking, and when he was not preoccupied with the intricate plotting and other characteristics of Florence; when he was not engaged in such activities, he was patronizing the many fine scholars and artists, or engaged in composing his own renowned poetry. This left minimal time for the careful selection of branch managers and alert watch against fraud within the bank which was needed. Most of the duties were placed on the shoulders of Francesco Sassetti, who had risen from being a mere factor in the Avignon branch to general manager, and then a post in Geneva eventually to end up in 1458 in Florence proper at Cosimo's side. [pg 10, de Roover 1948] Sassetti was increasingly left to handle much of the business himself; in the end, it turned out badly. Whether simply due to bad luck, old age, increasing laziness or diversion of his time to studying secular humanism like Cosimo, Sassetti failed to discover the fraud at the Lyons branch until it was too late for it to hope to remain solvent. The branch manager Lionetto de' Rossi had attempted to cover up his incompetence by being far too optimistic as to the number of bad loans the branch would have to cover, and by borrowing funds - thus artificially inflating his profits.

That is not the only factor he identifies. A long term trend of the devaluation of gold against silver (which held steady) between 1475 and 1485 [pg 83 of de Roover 1943; the studies referenced are Earl Hamilton's "Money, Prices and Wages, in Valencia, Aragon, and Navarre, 1351-1500 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936) and "Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1680", John U. Nef (volume XLIX of 1941, pages 575-591)] - possibly thanks to increased output by German silver mines - meant that as the debtors, the Medici bank was on the wrong side of the trend - their deposits were held in gold, and interest was paid in gold. This trend was in part attributable to Florence's reluctance to debase the gold florin, which was internationally esteemed for its value, prestige, and reliability. But Florence's dual coinage system only aggravated the problem. This shift in the monetary system perhaps reflected a systemic slowdown or recession in Europe in general: if the failure of the Medici bank were solely due to internal issues, then why do the Arte del Cambio's records of member banks record such a drastic decline in membership that the guild fell from 71 banks in 1399, to 33 in 1460, to fall so low that the guild itself fell into disuse and one must turn to an outside chronicler like Giovanni Cambi, who notes that of the 9 large banks left in Florence by 1516, one failed December 25? This decline does not appear to have been Florence specific, with similar declines seen in Bruges and Venice (although apparently not in Spain). [pg 16 of de Roover 1966] Similarly, the northern branches were squeezed by a general decline the supply of English wool. [pg 370-371 of de Roover 1966]

Agreement on these aggravating factors does not seem to be universal; Richard A. Goldthwaite writes in 1987 that "these economic conditions have never been adequately explained. It appears more likely that the contraction and decline of the Medici bank under Lorenzo - it was reduced to branches in only Florence, Rome and Lyons by the time he died in 1492 - were due simply to bad management." [pg 12 of Goldthwaite 1987] He also claims that guild memberships cannot be used as a proxy for general economic conditions, as the problem could be that "By this time, in fact, Florentine guilds had long lost much of an economic function in the areas of their formally defined activity, with the result that the quality of their internal administration deteriorated; but this institutional history cannot be taken as an indicator of the vitality of the respective sectors of the economy the guilds nominally represented." [pg 26 of Goldthwaite 1985]

Piero died on 2 December 1469. He was succeeded by his two sons, Lorenzo and Giuliano. The two had not attained their majority and so Lorenzo (Piero's brother, that is) took over Piero's fortune to hold it in trust (a poor choice as he would later raid Piero's estate when the financial situation grew more dire [Specifically, he appropriated about 53,643 gold florins and only repaid part of the sum. pg 366 of de Roover 1966] ). His interest in politics and art (which led to his appellation "the Magnificent") forced him to rely on his ministro Francesco Sassetti to handle most affairs of the bank. Sassetti can be faulted and inculpated in the decline of the bank for failing to prevent the disasters of Lyon and Bruges, and Lorenzo for relying too much on Sassetti and not listening to him when Sassetti did notice problems or tried to fix things. Indeed, Lorenzo once said when Angelo Tani (who had tried to prevent the failure of the Bruges branch) appealed to him to overrule Sassetti and restrict the lending of the London branch, that "he [Lorenzo] did not understand such matters." He would later admit that his lack of knowledge and understanding was the reason he approved Tommaso Portinari's disastrous schemes. [pg 365 of de Roover 1966] Goldthwaite faults Lorenzo in no uncertain terms:

"...Lorenzo il Magnifico, for whom politics always took priority over business. Service to the court and the aristocracy was probably the chief reason for establishing branches in both Milan in 1452 or 1453 and Naples in 1471, and over-extension of credit through personal loans created severe and ultimately insurmountable problems for both operations." [pg 33 of Goldthwaite 1987]

On Lorenzo's death on 8 April 1492, the succession passed to his 20 year old son Piero di Lorenzo (1472-1521). Piero had no talent for running the bank and depended on his secretary and his great-uncle Giovanni Tornabuoni to handle everything. Needless to say, the two mismanaged the bank and balked the new ministro (Sassetti having died of a stroke in March 1490) Giovambattista Bracci [pg 86 of De Roover 1966] . If the Medici family and its bank had not been overthrown in 1494, it would probably have shortly failed in a long-delayed bankruptcy.

Another factor was the spending habits of Lorenzo. According to Lorenzo, between 1434 and 1471, he spent an average of 17,467 gold florins a year.

Another misjudgement or failure by Sassetti was placing his trust in Tommaso Portinari instead of in more trustworthy managers like Angelo Tani; Portinari would eventually cause the collapse of the Bruges branch.

Niccolò Machiavelli gave a more contemporary viewpoint in his "Istorie fiorentine", asserting that the fall of the Medici was due to the loose rein on bank managers who began to act like princes and not sensible businessmen and merchants. [As summarized on pg 59 of de Roover, 1948]

The fall

When the crisis loomed, one way to try to avert it was to simply start reducing the interest paid on discretionary and demand deposits. But such a move would have hurt the Medici name, and so was undertaken too late. The bank's heavy leverage of their deposits meant that setbacks could be sudden indeed. [pg 371 of de Roover 1966] The fact that it seems to have been a common practice for Florentine banks to operate with as little as 5% of their deposits held in reserve lends further support to the idea that collapses could happen abruptly. [see pgs 292-293 and pg 228 of De Roover 1966. The Florence "tavola" operated with 5% reserves, and the Datini bank apparently did likewise. In its heyday, the Lyons branch was even more extreme: on deposits of approximately 108,000 écus, a reserve was kept of approximately 2,000, or not even 2%! While this reserve figures are drawn from unreliable "castato" records, Goldthwaite (pg 24, 1985) mentions that one "banchi a minuto" he studied frequently held less than 100% reserves and that the Strozzi bank frequently records less than 50% reserves.] In addition to all of that, Lorenzo "the Magnificent" Medici was not at all concerned for the bank. Instead, he was concentrating the family fortune on patronizing artists.

Eventually, the fiscal problems grew severe enough to force Lorenzo to begin raiding Florence's state treasuries - at one point defrauding the Monte delle Dote, a charitable fund for paying for dowries. [pg 62 of de Roover 1948; more confidently and detailed in pgs 366-367 of de Roover 1966] Shortly thereafter, the political pressure of Charles VIII of France's 1494 invasion of Italy caused Piero di Lorenzo de' Medici to concede to the dual forces of Charles and the impending insolvency of the Medici bank. The assets and records were seized and distributed to creditors and others, and all the branches were declared dissolved.

Bank heads

* Giovanni di Bicci, c. 1397-1429
* Cosimo de' Medici, 1428-1464
* Piero di Cosimo, 1464-1469
* Lorenzo de' Medici (the Magnificent), 1469-1492
* Piero di Lorenzo (1492-1494)

ources

Not much remains of the Medici Bank's records; mentions of it and its activities are rife in the writings of outsiders, but outsiders necessarily had little access to the balance books which could truly tell the story of the bank's rise and fall, and certainly not to the confidential business correspondence and the secret books. Some of the most copious documentation, derived from archived tax records such as the "castato" records, are largely useless since the various principals of the bank were not above flagrantly lying to the taxman [pg 74 of de Roover 1966] . The once voluminous internal documentation has been grievously reduced by the passage of time:

This study is based mainly on the business records of the Medici Bank: partnership agreements, correspondence, and account books. The extant material is unfortunately fragmentary; for example, no balance sheets have survived. Only a few pages of some of the account books have escaped destruction by a frenzied mob. [pg "xiii", de Roover 1948.]

Nevertheless, the sources are sufficiently numerous (exceeded only by the Datini's bank's archives, in Tuscany/Prato) [pg 4, De Roover 1966] that the Medici bank is well understood, especially as the remains of the Medici records were given to the city of Florence by a descendant of the Medici.

Organization and type

Banks in Renaissance Florence were generally divided into three or four kinds:
# "banchi di pegno": pawn shops, which catered to the lower classes, were excluded from the banking or more literally, the "money-changing" guild ("Arte del Cambio"), and were allowed to charge up to 20% annually on loans they made which were secured by the borrower property. The pawnbrokers (a mix of Christians and Jews; exclusively Jewish after 1437pg 15 of de Roover 1966] ) were socially ostracized since they openly violated the Catholic Church's ban on usury; as a consequence, they were actually illegal in Florence, but survived since the official penalty was a collective fine of 2000 florins each year, which when paid disallowed [Specifically, the statues stated that they were "to be free and absolved from any further censure, penalty, or exaction." pg 14 of de Roover 1966] the imposition of any further punishments on them for the sin of usury; this law is generally characterized as really being a license in disguise.
# "banchi a minuto" ("small" or retail "bank"): the most obscure of the three, they were sort of combinations of lenders and pawnbrokers. They dealt in, among other things, bullion, installment sales of jewels and loans secured by jewels, and currency exchange. None of the surviving records mention anything but time deposits (for the purposes of raising capital), so they generally did not offer demand accounts and maintain the interest by lending out a portion of the deposits.; though such banks did lend without security [pg 19-20 of Goldthwaite 1985] ; one example of a "banchi a minuto" (run by Bindaccio de' Cerchi) invested heavily in purchasing future interest payments from the Monte ("Monte delle doti"; "seven percent dowry fund" founded in the 1340s by the state of Florence) [pg 25 of Goldthwaite 1985] , loans to the Monte Comune, maritime insurance, and speculation in horse races [pg 25 of Goldthwaite 1985] . The Medici bank was not a "banchi a minuto", although between 1476 and 1491, Francesco di Giuliano de' Medici (1450-1528) was involved in two that dealt heavily in jewelry (one of which's partnership contracts explicitly state that as a goal, though the more successful one dealt in all sorts of luxuries like Spanish tuna). Such banks were members of the Arte del Cambio as they were not "manifest usurers".
# "banchi in mercato" or "banchi aperti": transfer and deposit banks, who did their business out in the open of a public square, recording all their transactions in a single journal visible on their table ("tavola"; hence their collective name as "tavoli"), which they were required by law to only transfer between accounts when the customers were observing. Similarly, transfers between "banchi aperti" were done outside, and verbally. Theirs was an extremely risky business; by 1520, bank failures had reduced the number of Florentine "banchi aperti" to only 2. Regardless, they were members of the Arte del Cambio.
# "banchi grossi" ("great banks"): the largest financial institutions in Florence, though not the most numerous (only 33 in 1469 according to Benedetto Dei). They were major movers and shakers in the European economy - vast accumulations of capital, multi-generational projects, and a mainstay of the Florentine economy, because not only did they deal in time deposits, demand deposits, and discretionary deposits ("deposits a discrezione"), they expended most of their efforts in funneling their capital into commerce and bills of exchange; such bills could be a hidden and legal method to create loans bearing interest ["...and since the bill of exchange could be exploited as a major instrument for the extension of credit - being one of the subterfuges by which capitalists could evade usury charges - this activity led merchants into the business of lending money. Banks' profits, therefore, came primarily from exchange operations, legitimate or otherwise, real or fictitious." pg 10 of Goldthwaite 1987] . The Medici Bank was such a bank; one Medici branch manager (Tommaso Portinari) said: "The foundation of the [Medici bank] firm's business rests on trade in which most of the capital is employed." [pg 3, de Roover 1948; Goldthwaite 1987 says on pg 10: "Like the others, it was not a bank in the modern sense of the term...The company's chief business was foreign exchange, an activity that was grafted on to international commerce...It effected exchange and transfer of credit for its clients..."] Similarly, the articles of association frequently said something along the lines of the purpose for the partnership being "to deal in exchange and in merchandise with the help of God and good fortune." [pg 31 of de Roover 1948] Under Cosimo, the Bank had interests in wool, silk, alum and merchant vessels - entirely aside from the many financial instruments and relations it managed. Despite their membership in the Arte del Cambio (assuming they bothered to run a local bank in Florence itself [pg 23 of Goldthwaite 1987] , these merchant banks' focus were determinedly international in scope - where profits could be found, local markets being very competitive.
Sometimes these banks were referred to as "gran tavoli" ("big table") or variants thereof, due to their origins as "banchi in mercato"; the difference between them and "banchi grossi" was more one of degree than kind.

Bank branches

Because of communication delays, the Medici Bank was forced to establish two groups [Administratively, they were split between branches beyond the Alps and branches within Italy (which did not exist as a discrete political unit at this time), all under a "ministro" ("general manager" of the banking units, but not the factories) who himself reported to the head of the firm. See the diagram on page 12 of de Roover, 1948] of relatively independent subsidiary units in important cities which communicated with the head bank via mail ["Correspondence was the only means by which the senior partners and the main office of the Medici bank kept in contact with the branches, since the slowness of transportation prevented frequent consultation with the branch managers. Only a small fraction has come down to us...This published material is made up exclusively of letters sent to Florence by the Bruges and London branches. There seem to have been two kinds of letters: the "lettere di compagnia" or business letters and the "lettere private" or confidential private letters. The "lettere di compagnia" were addressed to the firm or "banco" in Florence. They dealt chiefly with current business affairs: notices concerning bills drawn or remitted, information concerning shipments or the safe arrival of consignments, advices concerning debits and credits, and similar details...their details did not have to be concealed.....The "lettere private" were not addressed to the firm, but personally to Cosimo or other members of the Medici family. A few "lettere private" are congratulatory messages regarding family events or deal with purchase of tapestries for members of the Medici family...The same is not true of the other "lettere private" wherein the writers discuss business prospects, political events, important problems of management, and the financial condition of the branches." pg 22-23 of de Roover 1948] . Pisa, Milan, Venice, Geneva (moved to Lyons in 1466), Avignon, Bruges, London and an itinerant branch that followed the Pope around to tend to his needs - not for nothing have they been called "God's Bankers" [ [http://www.pbs.org/empires/medici/medici/bankers.html Medici: Godfathers of the Renaissance . Medici . God's Bankers | PBS ] ] - all hosted a Medici branch.pg 4, de Roover 1948] If the bank could not establish a branch somewhere, then usually they would contract with some Italian banker (preferably one of the Florentine banks) to honor drafts and accept bills of exchange:

So the Medici were represented by the firm of Filippo Strozzi and Co. in Naples, by Piero del Fede and Co. in Valencia, by Nicolaio d'Ameleto and Antonio Bonafe in Bologna, by Filippo and Federigo Centurioni in Genoa, by Gherardo Bueri [] - a close relative of Cosimo - in Lübeck, and so forth.pg 4, De Roover 1948]

Of course, if an Italian agent could not be procured, any trustworthy banker would do - in Cologne at one time their representative was the German Abel Kalthoff.

A crucial distinction between the Medici Bank and its older rivals (the Peruzzi, the Bardi, the Acciaioli etc.) was that its "decentralization" was not merely geographic: it was legal and financial. The Peruzzi bank was taken over by outsiders in 1331 because there was but one partnership, based in Florence and held largely by Peruzzi family members, which owned everything - the employees were only paid a salary for their service. So the nine original outsiders could slowly leverage their 21 1/4 shares to overwhelm the Peruzzi's collective 36 3/4 shares - although lack of clear leadership when the leading partner died has been suggested as another factor in the failure of the Bardi and Peruzzi banks.

Branch legal structure

Such a takeover was impossible in the Medici Bank: the essential structure was that of a single partnership based in Florence, which immutably held the lion's share of shares in each branch (and the three textile factories in Florence) - which were themselves incorporated as independent partnerships. At the end of the year on March 24 (by the then used calendar), each partnership would be dissolved, although the Medici could dissolve a partnership at any time with six months' notice [pg 86 of de Roover 1966] . The books were thoroughly gone through and checked, and a reckoning of profits would be made. Indeed, the structure of the Medici Bank resembles nothing so much as the modern holding company. [pg 7, de Roover, 1948]

The branch manager (the "governatore", or "governor", would have put up a portion of his own money at the start of the partnership) and the investing partners could take out their profits at this point, since salaries or dividends were not paid when the partnership agreement was in effect, but usually the Florentine partners ("maggiori", "seniors") and the branch manager would then incorporate a fresh partnership if the manager's performance had been satisfactory. Managers were not paid salaries, but were considered to have invested in the partnership a sum greater than they actually had (ex. in 1455 the Venice branch's partnership agreement was renewed and the manager Alessandro Martelli invested 2000 of the 14000 ducats. He would be paid of the total profits not his fair 1/7th, but rather 1/5th [pg 251 of de Roover 1966] ).

The manager could, if he wished, attempt to start a rival bank, but he could not legally claim to be part of the Medici Bank, since a right to use that trademarked name came with the partnership; this measure would turn out to be effective against ambitious dissident juniors like Tommaso Portinari. However, even before the shares' profits were paid out, any sums invested in the branch outside of an ownership of shares were repaid at a set interest rate - sometimes leading to one branch paying another for the latter's investment in the former. [pg 53 of de Roover 1948]

Governors were given wide latitude in daily operation [But not in their personal lives. Some partnership agreements were extremely restrictive of the junior partner's life: the standard 1456 partnership agreement for Tani to take over the Bruges branch forbade him to leave Bruges for anywhere except the fairs of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, and business trips to London, Calais, Middelburg were allowed only if they were truly necessary. Tani was not to entertain any women or boys, accept no gifts above one pound groat, spend no more than 20 pounds groat a year for living expenses, conduct no private business, engage in no insuring, trust only certain merchants, spend only up to 500 pounds groat for wool or cloth a year etc. Even after the partnership expired, he would have to remain in Bruges a full 6 months to tidy up affairs. pg 15-17 of De Roover 1948] and in the management of their seven or eight assistant managers, clerks, cashiers, accountants, couriers etc. who lived and boarded at the Medici-rented employee housing [pg 297 of de Roover 1966] (although the managers had little say in their selection, which was done by the Florence bank), but policy was set by the seniors, and often firmly - the Bruges branch was, when first incorporated, strictly forbidden by the terms of the partnership to lend money to temporal lords and kings. ["Giovanni also banned loans to princes and kings, who were notoriously bad investments." [http://www.pbs.org/empires/medici/medici/bankers.html] Also, "Under no conditions was the branch manager allowed to sell foreign exchange on credit to lords spiritual or temporal." pg 16 of de Roover 1948] Policy would generally be communicated to the branch managers during their biennial or triennial trips to Florence to report in person and discuss important issues, or in the private letters and reports their couriers carried.

Bills of exchange

Usury was still banned by the powerful Church in this period, with an interpretation concisely expressed as "Quidquid sorti accedit, usura est" ("Whatever exceeds the principle is usury"). So the Medici Bank could not openly adopt the modern formula of promising to pay interest on demand deposits and loaning out a fraction of the deposits at greater interest to pay for the interest on the deposit, since a depositer would gain revenue on the principal without any risk to the principal, which would have made both parties usurers and sinners; nor could they charge fees or other such devices.

Discretionary deposits were a partial way out, but the bank made most of its money by selling holographic "bills of exchange"; these bills certified that a particular person or company had paid a particular Medici branch a certain sum of money, as verified by the general or assistant manager of that branch (who were the only ones allowed to make out such bills). The bill instructed the recipient Medici branch to pay back that sum in local currency - but not at whatever the local exchange rate for the two currencies concerned happened to be at the moment the bill was presented to be cashed in, but rather at the exchange rate set when the presenting (or current owner; bills of exchange could be sold and traded freely) person bought the bill of exchange. That there was a difference in time was guaranteed by the terms of the bill - a specific date could be set, but generally the time between a bill was issued in one city and could be cashed in at another was set by long-standing custom, or at "usance". The usance between Florence and London was 3 months, for example.

A fictional but illustrative example: a merchant is travelling from Florence to London. He buys a bill of exchange for 10 florins, with the understanding that the London branch will cash that bill at half a pound to the florin, for a total of 5 pounds.

If he reaches London and discovers that the florin has become stronger against the pound, to the point where a florin buys a whole pound, he takes a loss: instead of the 10 pounds he could have gotten had he not bought the bill of exchange, he will instead receive only 5. Similarly, if the florin weakens greatly, he could well reap a windfall at the expense of the London branch.

Clearly the branches would want to try to maximize sales of bills of exchange in the former situation, where the rate of the issuing currency increases between the time of issuance and payment; this they attempted to do with frequent letters between branches and paying close attention to exchange rates. While close to loans, the element of risk meant that this practice did not actually become usury, except in the case of "dry exchange", where the moving around of money was fictitious. With appropriate issuances of bills, branches could move around money and actually make money. Similarly, they could be fairly certain of a profit when a bill was issued in one of the Italian branches because they could demand a premium of sorts for being asked to deliver money in a far away place at however far in the future usance set the maturation date. ["Moreover, exchange quotations applied to time bills payable at usance. Between Italy and London, usance was three months in either direction. As a result, the exchange rate was lower in London and higher in Florence or Venice. Of course, a London banker offered fewer sterlings for having to wait before receiving a ducat in Venice or a florin in Florence. For the same reason, the banker in Italy was unwilling to part with a ducat or a florin unless he received in London a greater quantity of sterlings. In other words, economic equilibrium required that the exchange rate for usance bills be higher in Florence (or Venice) than in London." pg 113 of de Roover 1966] de Roover offers this real example:

Factories

A controlling interest in a "bottega di sieta" (silk shop) and two "botteghe di lana" (cloth manufacturing establishment) were further possessions of the Medici (although run in partnership with men of the necessary technical expertise). They paid by the piece and ran on the putting out system; for the wool especially it was a very complex system, in which the early steps had to be done in the factories but then the spinning of the wool was done by women outside the factory, and the yarn collected to be brought to the weavers, who would then turn it over to the dyers and finishers in the factory. pg 26-28 of de Roover 1948] Legally, they were incorporated much the same as the branches although unlike the branches the managers apparently had complete latitude in managing employees. [169-170 of de Roover 1966]

The silk shop produced some of the finest silk wares, and were usually sold to Florentine exporters or shipped to the branch in Bruges as a consignment to feed the Burgundian court's strong appetite for such goods; or to the branch in Milan to sell to the Sforza court. The cloth manufacturers similarly produced very high-quality pieces and sold a good deal of their output to Milan and the Sforzas.

While lucrative, the revenues realized from the three factories should not be overemphasized: while the Medici often had invested more than 7,900 gold florins in the three "factories" in 1458 for example, the sum invested in "banks" in 1458 was more than 28,800 - and that figure is low, for it excludes the Rome branch serving the Pope, the Medici's interest-bearing deposits in their branches, and also omits any accounting of several years' profit which were inaccessible (since the relevant partnerships had not yet been dissolved; this may seem to be a flaw in the system, but it built up capital in a branch and allowed it to lend out more than it had been incorporated with). [pg 29-30 of de Roover 1948] Part of the reason for maintaining these factories when the funds could have been more profitably invested in the banks or trade could have been social: it seems to have a bit of a Florentine tradition to run such factories to provide employment for the poor - a social obligation, as it were. ["It was an old tradition among Florentine families, when they owned extensive landed estates, either to control or to manage a wool or silkshop in order to provide work for the 'poor'." pg 167 of de Roover 1966. "Like most Florentines of their class, the Medici invested in partnerships for the production of cloth, but the amount of capital they put in this sector of the economy was inconsequential." pg 21-22 of Goldthwaite 1987]

The first beginnings of the factories came in 1402. Giovanni di Bicci began a partnership to run a wool factory with an experienced manager, one Michele di Baldo di ser Michele. This first woolshop was followed by a second one in 1408, this time with Taddeo di Filippo. The first one was ended in 1420; de Roover speculates that it was poorly run and so not very profitable. Eventually another one was opened in 1439; the original eventually came to an end between 1458 and 1469 for unknown reasons ("probably because of the manager's death." [pg 167 of De Roover 1966] ). The last one was apparently being liquidated in 1480 amidst a general decline in the Florentine textile industry, and doesn't appear again in the tax records. The silkshop is known to have not existed before 1430; the "libro segreto" ("secret records"; the second set of books kept to record partners' profits, and generally more accurate than the public books, inasmuch as they state the real profits and losses and which depositers were real) mention that they entered into a short partnership with two silk manufacturers. When the partnership ended, one of the two manufacturers became the manager of the silk factory until his death in 1446 or 1447; the silkshop endured until 1480, when the last descendant of that partner died. [pg 168-169 of de Roover 1966]

Alum cartel

Alum was a vital commodity because of its many uses and relatively few sources: it was used in the wool preparing process to clean the wool of grease and other substances; as a mordant which fixed the dyes in the wool; in glassmaking; in tanning; and in a few other areas. [pg 152 of de Roover 1966]

The Roman branch of the bank was not merely charged with the normal deposit and bill of exchange business of the bank, nor with just the mechanics of being "fiscal agents of the Holy See" [pg 45 of De Roover 1948] (which entailed handling and moving the papal revenues, paying out designated subsidies to countries fighting the Islamic & heathen Turks and fees etc, but the Medici did not actually collect the monies from sales of indulgences or taxes due the Papacy) but also with managing a certain piece of Papal property: the Tolta alum mines, an interest they had acquired in 1473 in exchange for forgiving some of the Pope's long overdue debts to the Medici, although they had a previous interest in the "Societas Aluminum" (the company which farmed the mines after their discovery in 1460 in Tolta near Civitavecchia; the agreement forming this company had three partners, one of whom was the mines' discover Giovanni da Castro, and was ratified by the pope in 3 September 1462 [pg 153 of de Roover 1966] ) dating back to 1466, expecting that by breaking the Turkish monopoly of alum imported from the Middle East (from the mines in Asia Minor, at Phocea near Smyrna [pg 152 of de Roover 1966] ) they could reap far more than their investments in the form of never to be repaid loans. The Medicis immediately set about trying to eliminate the competition, of which there were three main sources of large amounts of decent quality alum: Turkey, the mines in Ischia, and the mines in Volterra.

The Pope's share of the revenue was to be used to finance campaigns against the Hussites as well as the Turks, so buying Turkish alum was declared by him to be utterly immoral in that it helped the infidel enemy and hurt the faithful. Turkish alum was to be seized where it was found.

They discouraged the alum mining near Volterra in Italy, apparently pushing its inhabitants to revolt against Florentine rule. At Lorenzo's directing, the insurrection was brutally oppressed and the mines reduced in output and safely under Florentine (and thus, Medici) control. The sad outcome of this episode was that the sack was entirely unnecessary: exploitation of this mine was abandoned in 1483 simply because the mine was so poor that it was unprofitable. [pg 157 of de Roover 1966]

Ischia was under the ownership and protection of the King of Naples, so the Medici and the company then exploiting the Ischia mines signed a 25 year cartel agreement to restrict output and boost prices by only selling at a fixed price. This cartel flagrantly violated the teachings of the church, which tried to justify it by pointing to the virtuous military campaigns it would finance. Regardless, the cartel was not particularly successful. Turkish alum was never satisfactorily suppressed (the Pazzi bank is known to have smuggled Turkish alum into the Low Countries, for example), and the cartel was not well organized with conflict between the Medici branches - the Bruges branch and its manager Tommaso Portinari were convinced that the papal mines were simply producing far too much alum and glutting the market. They would not accept more alum on consignment until the alum they then had had finally sold.

Between this internal dissension, the dissension between cartel partners, the constant flow of Turkish alum, the organized opposition of consumer groups, the alum interest never raised as much money as they banked on. But regardless of its success or lack there of, the alum interest ended after the Pazzi Conspiracy, in 1478, after which Pope Sixtus IV confiscated all the Medici property he could.

Roman branch

The Roman branch of the Medici was a fully incorporated partnership which technically did not reside in Rome: it was known internally as "ours who follow the Court of Rome" ("i nostri che seguono la Corte di Roma" [pg 194 of de Roover 1966] ), and only contingently resided in Rome at times; as it followed the Papal court around, odd situations could occur, such as when Pope Martin V resided in the Dominican friary of the Santa Maria Novella from February 1419 to September 1420, or when Pope Eugene IV stayed there: the Roman branch set up operations in Florence itself, even as the Florence branch was still operating.

This branch was always busy. The Papal court was attended upon by hundreds of minor officials, ecclesiastical and secular, along with their attendants, and their needs were such that there was a measurable rise in the frequency of money shortages where the court went - leading to a direct need for banking services that the Medici could provide. The various bishops and cardinals prelates and such often held Church or private estates in far-flung states in and beyond Italy, the revenues from which needed to be transferred to where they could use it - which was where they physically were in the Court. A more practical reason was that alternate investments generally took the form of real estate, and any cardinal or bishop who invested overly much in real estate (which they were not supposed to) or relied on income from Church lands might see his investments confiscated under a new Pope who might not favor him so much or even turned over to a replacement. Accounts with the Medici were kept secret ["As pointed out, the Medici promised their customers to keep secret the amount of deposits made with them." pg 199 of de Roover 1966] and generally free from prying ecclesiastical eyes, especially in the case of discretionary deposits.

Persons not already at the court made use of the branch for cashing letters of credit to make their pilgrimage or journey the safer. Tribute from the many dioceses and institutions the Church controlled needed to be consolidated (but not collected by the Medici) and safely then safely transmitted: that service too the Medici could provide to a degree, though not in all areas ["Often papal agents would have to rely on causal means such as traveling merchants, pilgrims, or students who would undertake to carry money or goods to the nearest banking center. Transfers from Poland sometimes took six months of more, whereas funds received in Bruges or London were made available in Rome within a month or less by a simple letter of advice. The bankers provided expeditious and efficient service." pg 195 of De Roover 1966] To carry out their services, the papal bankers were often given considerable power: if a banker could not collect the rents due the pope, they had but to complain and the offending cleric would be automatically excommunicated (a threat aired in 1441 against the slow Bishop of Nevers [pg 201 of de Roover 1966] ; or they could block appointments, as they threatened to do to John Kemp, whose nephew had just been appointed to the bishopric of London with their aid, if the proper payments were not soon made.

Officially, the branch could not make its money by lending at a profit to the Popes (who were lax in repaying the Medici ["As for the Pope, Martin V, it was hoped he would not ask for more, as he had already borrowed enough. On the contrary, he was expected to pay off some of his indebtedness, unless war broke out with the Kingdom of Napes." pg 204, de Roover 1966] ), and taking in many deposits at interest. It did, to a degree, but the principal means of profiting came from commercial transactions: "the Medici overcharged the pope on the silks and brocades, the jewels and other commodities they supplied..." [pg 199. See also: "The presence among the assets of silver plate for an amount of more than 4,000 florins reveals at any rate that the Rome branch dealt more or less extensively in this product for which there was a demand among the high churchmen of the Curia who did a great deal of entertaining and liked to display their magnificence." from pg 205 of de Roover 1966] These payments were entirely one way and not exchanges: Rome and Italy generally produced little to nothing of value and so the balance of trade was greatly unequal. It could be alleviated by the production from northern silver mines, but in general the main commodity Italy was willing to exchange "specie" for was English wool. The decline in availability of English wool to be imported, and the general concomitant economic problems have been identified as one of the contributing causes to the banks decline.

More consequently, the Popes in this period were frequently holding great councils and conferences. The meetings of eminent (and especially wealthy) individuals itself gave rise to a need for advanced banking services, to such a degree that the Medici were not the only Italian bank to open up temporary branches wherever such councils were convened.

The close relation between the papacy and the branch declined over the years, with the decline especially pronounced after 1464, with few to no branch managers being selected to be the "depositary-general" - the official who was essentially the fiscal agent for the Apostolic Chamber, or the Church's treasury [pg 32 of Goldthwaite 1987] . Pope Sixtus IV would repudiate the Medici's control of the alum trade and also his debts to them, as well seize Medici property in Rome after the Pazzi Conspiracy in 1478; the Pazzi's interlocked businesses and banks had captured the alum business after the Medici were removed from it, and were supplying the depositary-general from their ranks, indicating that they were trying to follow the Medici route of initially building up their empire through papal custom [pg 32 of Goldthwaite 1987] . The papacy would eventually agree to repay the debts, but did so extremely slowly; so slowly that the branch manager Giovanni Tornabouni agreed to take stocks of alum instead - despite the depressed market for alum. Tornabuoni would still be in charge when 1494 came and the edifice of the Medici came crashing down. Because the branch had been doing so poorly, it owed more than it was due, so the Roman government was satisfied to allow Tornabouni to assume the rest of the partnership's equity and debts. [pg 223-224 of de Roover 1966]

Diagram

Diagram of the organization of the Medici bank, "circa" 1460.

Head of the firm
* Silk manufacturing
** Manager
*** Sales: exporters and foreign branches
*** Purchases of raw silk
*** Production
**** "Throwing" the silk
***** Done in a "throwing mill"
**** Boiling the silk
***** Done by scourers
**** Weaving the silk
***** Warpers
***** Weavers
**** Dyeing the silk
***** "Tintori seta"; dyers
* Cloth manufacturing
** Manager
*** Sales: exporters and foreign branches
*** Purchases of wool from importers and other Medici branches
*** Production
**** Preparing
***** Wool-washing
***** "Capodieci"
****** Beaters (beating or "willeying")
****** Cleaners
***** "Fattire dipettine"
****** Combers
***** "Fattire du cardi"
****** Carders
**** Spinning
***** Lanino
***** Stamaiuoli
**** Weaving
***** Warpers
***** Weavers
**** Finishing
****** Stretchers
****** Burlers
****** Scourers
****** Fullers
****** Nappers
****** Shearers
****** Menders
**** Dyeing
***** Dyers
****** Dyed in the wool
****** Dyed in the cloth
* International banking and foreign trade
** General manager
*** Banking in Florence
**** Florence bank
***** manager
*** Branches beyond the Alps
**** Geneva
***** Branch manager
****** approximately 6 factors (a term usually used for employees abroad), 1469
**** Avignon
***** Branch manager
****** approximately 4 factors, 1469
**** Bruges
***** Branch manager
****** Assistant manager
******* approximately 6 factors (1466) handling the usual factor duties of:
******** Wool/Cloth
******** Silk
******** Banking and foreign trade
******** Clerical work
******** Bookkeeping
******** Letters, books, and errands
**** London
***** Branch manager
****** several factors
*** Branches in Italy
**** Venice
***** Branch manager
****** Factors
**** Rome
***** Branch managers
****** Foreign banking
****** Foreign trade
****** Papal banking
******* Alum mines in Tolta
******* Handling transfers and management of Papal revenues abroad
******* Remitting subsidies abroad
**** Milan
***** Branch manager
****** Factors
*** Home office
**** Assistant manager (2)
***** "Discepoli" (clerks)

References

* citation
last=de Roover
first=Raymond Adrien
authorlink=
year=1948
title=The Medici Bank: its organization, management, and decline
place=New York; London
publisher=New York University Press; Oxford University Press (respectively)
id= -(Largely a reprint of three articles de Roover published in "The Journal of Economic History".)
* citation
last=de Roover
first=Raymond Adrien
authorlink=
year=1966
title=The rise and decline of the Medici Bank: 1397-1494
place=New York City; Toronto |Publisher=W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.; George J. McLeod Limited (respectively)
id=LCCN: 63-11417 -(the product of three years research in the Florentine archives, to improve the author's previous work; it was previously released in 1963, not by the Norton Library but by Harvard University Press)
* cite journal
last = Goldthwaite
first = Richard A.
authorlink =
coauthors =
title = The Medici Bank and the World of Florentine Capitalism
journal = Past & Present
volume = 114
issue =
pages = 3–31
publisher = Oxford University Press for the Past and Present Society
date = February 1987
url =
doi =
id = ISSN 0031-2746
accessdate = October 2006
* cite journal
last = Goldthwaite
first = Richard A.
authorlink =
coauthors =
title = "Local banking in Renaissance Florence"
journal = The Journal of European economic history
volume = 14
issue =
pages = 5–55
publisher =
date = 1985
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doi =
id = ISSN 0391-5115
accessdate = October 2006
* cite journal
last = de Roover
first = Florence Edler
authorlink =
coauthors =
title = "Francesco Sassetti and the Downfall of the Medici Banking House"
journal = Bulletin of the Business Historical Society
volume = 17
issue =4
pages = 65–80
publisher = The President and Fellows of Harvard College
date = October, 1943
url = http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1065-9048%28194310%2917%3A4%3C65%2AFSATDO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
doi =
id =
accessdate = 2006-09-21

Further reading

* citation
last=Parks
first=Tim
date=2005
publisher=W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
title=Medici money: banking, metaphysics, and art in fifteenth-century Florence
isbn =0-393-05827-1
* Citation
last =Grunzwig
first =Armand
year =1931
title =Correspondance de la filiale de Bruges des Medici
publisher =
id=OCLC: 1973038
place=Brussels - (A compilation of correspondence between the Medici bank branch at Bruges and the home branch in Florence.)
* Citation
last =Sieveking
first =Heinrich Johann
year =1905
title =Auswärtige handelspolitik
place =Leipzig
publisher =
id=LCCN: 05-23618
* Citation
last =von Reumont
first =Alfred
last2=Harrison
first2=Robert
year =1876
title =Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent
place =London
publisher =
id= OCLC: 576516
* Citation
last=Holmes
first=George
contribution=How the Medici Became the Pope's Bankers
editor-last=Rubinstein
editor-first=Nicolai
title=Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence
place=London
publisher=Northwestern University Press
publication-date=1968
volume=1
pages=357-380
id=OCLC: 929397.
* Citation
last=Rubinstein
first=Nicolai
author-link=
year=1982
title=The Letters of Lorenzo de' Medici and of the Medici Bank: Problems of Authorship
periodical=Rinascimento
volume=xxii
pages=115-164.
* Citation
last=Brown
first=Alison
year=1979
title=Pierfrancesco de' Medici, 1430-1476: A Radical Alternative to Elder Medicean Supremacy?
periodical=Jl. Warburg and Courtauld Insts.
volume=xlii
issue=
pages=81-103.

External links

* [http://www.pbs.org/empires/medici/medici/bankers.html www.pbs.org]
* [http://economist.com/diversions/millennium/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=347333 economist.com]
* [http://economist.com/editorials_04/wang090104.html economist.com]