Khartoum Resolution

The Khartoum Resolution of September 1, 1967 was issued at the conclusion of a meeting between the leaders of eight Arab countries in the wake of the Six-Day War. The resolution, which formed a basis of the policies of these governments toward Israel until the Yom Kippur War of 1973, called for: A continued state of belligerency with Israel; ending the Arab oil boycott declared during the Six-Day War; an end to the war in Yemen; economic assistance for Egypt and Jordan. The resolution also contains in paragraph 3 what became known as "the three No's" of Arab-Israel relations at that time:
* No peace with Israel
* No recognition of Israel
* No negotiations with Israel.

Interpretations of the Resolution

The resolution has often been presented as a clear example of Arab rejectionism. For example, Benny Morris wrote that the Arab leaders showed "resolution—or obduracy and inflexibility" at the summit, and described the resolution as "a defiant, rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region for a decade." Still, he laid some of the blame with Israel, saying that " [i] n part [the Arab] stand was a response to Israel's unwillingness or inability to consider withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza as part of any peace settlement" [Benny Morris, "Righteous Victims", Vintage Books, 2001, p 346 ISBN 0-679-74475-4] - an interpretation echoed by UNTSO Chief of Staff General Odd Bull. [General Odd Bull, "War and Peace in the Middle East", Leo Cooper, 1976, p 126 ISBN 0-85052-226-9]

Some scholars however, see the issue as more complex. Revisionist historian Avi Shlaim, for example, argues that

quotation|The [Khartoum] conference ended with the adoption of the famous three noes...no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel. On the face of it these declarations showed no sign of readiness for compromise, and this is how Israel interpreted them. In fact, the conference was a victory for Arab moderates who argued for trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israel's forces by political rather than military means. Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no formal peace "treaty", but not a rejection of the state of peace; no "direct" negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no "de jure" recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state. [Egyptian] President Nasser and [Jordan's] King Hussein set the tone of the conference and made it clear...that they were prepared to go much further than ever before toward a settlement with Israel. At Khartoum, Nasser and Hussein reached a genuine understanding and formed a united front against the hardliners.

...The Khartoum summit thus marked a real turning point in Nasser's attitude to Israel. At Khartoum, Nasser advised, and indeed urged, King Hussein to explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement with Israel. This was, of course, not known to Israel at the time. As far as Israel was concerned, the Khartoum declarations closed every door and every window that might lead to a peaceful settlement. [Avi Shlaim, "The Iron Wall", Penguin Books, 2000, pp 258-59 ISBN 0-14-028870-8]

In the event, indirect negotiations between Israel, Jordan and Egypt were eventually opened through the auspices of the Jarring Mission, and direct talks were also held in secret between Israel and Jordan, but neither avenue succeeded in achieving a meaningful settlement, setting the stage for a new round of conflict.

Text of the Resolution

#The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by an implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.
#The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.
#The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.
#The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.
#The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.
#The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.
#The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.

Footnotes

ee also

Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

*Paris Peace Conference, 1919
*Faisal-Weizmann Agreement
*1949 Armistice Agreements
*Camp David Accords (1978)
*Madrid Conference of 1991
*Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace (1994)
*Oslo Accords (1993)
*Camp David 2000 Summit
*Peace Process in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
*Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs
*List of Middle East peace proposals
*International law and the Arab-Israeli conflict