Hard problem of consciousness

The term hard problem of consciousness, coined by David Chalmers ["The Place of Mind," ed. Brian Cooney] , refers to the "hard problem" of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomenon. Hard problems are distinct from this set because they "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained". [ [http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness"] , David Chalmers, "Journal of Consciousness Studies" 2 (3), 1995, pp. 200-219.]

Various formulations of the "hard problem":
*"Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
*"How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
*"Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
*"Why do qualia exist?"
*"Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
*"Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"
*"Phenomenal Natures are categorically different than behavior"

It has been argued that the hard problem has had other scholarly inquiries considerably earlier than Chalmers. For instance, Gottfried Leibniz wrote:

"Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception." [Leibniz, "Monadology," 17, quoted by [http://www.personal.ceu.hu/students/03/Istvan_Aranyosi/Chapter%20IV.pdf Istvan Aranyosi] ]

And as Isaac Newton wrote in a letter to Henry Oldenburg: "to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour is not so easie"." [ [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Panpsychism] ]

Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, [ [http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmers.htm "Commentary on Chalmers: Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness"] by Daniel Dennett] oppose the idea that there is a hard problem.

References

ee also

*David Chalmers
*Consciousness causes collapse
*Explanatory gap
*Mind-body dichotomy
*Philosophy of mind
*Qualia
*Two dimensionalism

External links

* [http://consc.net/responses.html#jcs "Journal of Consciousness Studies" Symposium on the Hard Problem]
* [http://consc.net/online/1.2d "Online papers on the hard and easy problem of consciousness"]
* [http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/23 Open survey seeking a concise statement and quantitative consensus measure of all theories and beliefs about the hard problem at canonizer.com]
* [http://consc.net/online/1.4a "Online papers on Higher-Order Thought approaches to the hard problem of consciousness"]
* [http://www.cgjungpage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=532&Itemid=40 "The Objective Consciousness Revisited - Understanding the Nature of Consciousness"] by Robert G. Heyward
* [http://users.california.com/~mcmf/hardproblem.html "The Hard Problem Is Dead"] by Teed Rockwell
* [http://www.davidchess.com/words/poc/lanier_zombie.html "You can't argue with a Zombie"] by Jaron Lanier
* Pharoah, M.C. (online). [http://homepage.ntlworld.com/m.pharoah/ Looking to systems theory for a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience and evolutionary foundations for higher order thought] Retrieved Jan.03 2008.