Burali-Forti paradox

In set theory, a field of mathematics, the Burali-Forti paradox demonstrates that naively constructing "the set of all ordinal numbers" leads to a contradiction and therefore shows an antinomy in a system that allows its construction. It is named after Cesare Burali-Forti, who discovered it in 1897.

tated in terms of von Neumann ordinals

The reason is that the set of all ordinal numbers $Omega$ carries all properties of an ordinal number and would have to be considered an ordinal number itself. Then, we can construct its successor $Omega\; +\; 1$, which is strictly greater than $Omega$. However, this ordinal number must be an element of $Omega$ since $Omega$ contains all ordinal numbers, and we arrive at

:

tated more generally

The version of the paradox above is anachronistic, because it presupposes the definition ofthe ordinals due to von Neumann under which each ordinal is the set of all preceding ordinals, which was not known at the time the paradox was framed by Burali-Forti.Here is an account with fewer presuppositions: suppose that we associate with each well-orderingan object called its "order type" in an unspecified way (the order types are the ordinal numbers). The "order types" (ordinal numbers) themselves are well-ordered in a natural way,and this well-ordering must have an order type $Omega$. It is easily shown in
naïve set theory (and remains true in ZFC but not in New Foundations) that the ordertype of all ordinal numbers less than a fixed $alpha$ is $alpha$ itself.So the ordertype of all ordinal numbers less than $Omega$ is $Omega$ itself. Butthis means that $Omega$, being the order type of a proper initial segment of the ordinals, is strictly less than the order type of all the ordinals,but the latter is $Omega$ itself by definition. This is a contradiction.

If we use the von Neumann definition under which each ordinal is identifiedas the set of all preceding ordinals, the paradox is unavoidable: the offending proposition that the order type of all ordinal numbers less than a fixed $alpha$ is $alpha$ itself must be true. The collection of von Neumann ordinals, like the collection in the Russell paradox, cannot be a set in any set theory with classical logic. But the collection of order types in New Foundations (defined as equivalence classes of well-orderings under similarity) is actually a set, and the paradox is avoided because the order type of the ordinals less than $Omega$turns out not to be $Omega$.

Resolution of the paradox

Modern axiomatic set theory such as ZF and ZFC circumvents this antinomy by simply not allowing construction of sets with unrestricted comprehension terms like "all sets which have property $P$", as it was for example possible in Gottlob Frege's axiom system. New Foundations uses a different solution.

External links

*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradoxes-contemporary-logic/ Paradoxes and Contemporary Logic] " -- by Andrea Cantini.

References

*citation|first=Cesare|last=Burali-Forti|title= Una questione sui numeri transfiniti|journal=Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo|volume=11|pages=154-164|year=1897