Reconstruction of Iraq

Reconstruction of Iraq describes attempts by the international community to improve and repair the infrastructure of Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, when much was destroyed. Iraq was governed, after the 2003 invasion, by the Coalition Provisional Authority and, after June 28, 2004 by a series of Iraq-led governments (see Politics of Iraq). During this period efforts were made to repair and replace damaged Iraqi infrastructure, including: water supply systems, sewage treatment plants, electricity production, hospitals and health clinics, schools, housing, and transportation systems. Reconstruction efforts have also encompassed the promotion of economic development and government institutions such as the criminal justice system.

Much reconstruction work in Iraq has been carried out by the Iraqi people in their own communities using local resources. International assistance for Iraq's reconstruction is the focus of this article. A major benchmark for international assistance was the Madrid Conference on Reconstruction held in Spain October 23-24, 2003 and attended by representatives from over 25 nations. Funds assembled at this conference and from other sources have been administered by the United Nations and the World Bank. This assistance has primarily funded large-scale projects.

While reconstruction efforts have produced some successes, problems have arisen with the implementation of internationally funded Iraq reconstruction efforts. These include inadequate security, pervasive corruption, insufficient funding and poor coordination among international agencies and local communities. Many suggest that the efforts were hampered by a poor understanding of Iraq on the part of the occupiers.

Funding for Iraq reconstruction

Funding of reconstruction efforts began with the creation of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) in April 2003. The IRRF is administered and funded by the United States. An initial allocation of $2.5 billion was made for immediate food, medicine and water relief.

The “Madrid Conference on Reconstruction” held in Spain October 23-24, 2003 was organized by the United States to solicit donor pledges from the international community. About $33 billion in grants and loans were pledged. Of this, $18.4 billion was from the U.S. with another $5 billion from Japan, $812 million from the EU, $500 million from Kuwait and offers of loans from World Bank and the IMF amounting from $5.5 to $9.25 billion. Some countries pledged to reduce the debt that Iraq owed to them and to provide direct donations in forms such as food and fuel. The pledge by the United States was fulfilled in November 2003 by adding $18.4 billion to the IRRF.

Much of the non-U.S. pledged money is managed through two additional funds that have been created under the facilitation of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq. [ [http://www.irffi.org IRFFI ] ] The funds are managed by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and by the World Bank. Twenty-six donor nations participate in this effort with total pledges, as of June, 30 2006, of $1.4 billion. The United States donates a small amount to these funds but does not control their disbursement.

As of December 30, 2005 the UNDG and World Bank Funds had expended about $0.51 billion and $0.39 billion, respectively. The United States managed IRRF had expended about $11.4 billion as of March 2006.

Assessing reconstruction needs

In preparation for the October 2003 Madrid Donor Conference, the joint United Nations/World Bank team conducted an assessment of funding needs for reconstruction in Iraq during the period 2004-2007. The resulting report [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/Joint+Needs+Assessment.pdf UN/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment October 2003] ] identified 14 sectors and associated funding needs as shown in the Table below. In addition to this US$36 billion, the Coalition Provisional Authority estimated an additional US$20 billion in need including US$5 billion for security and police and US$8 billion for oil industry infrastructure.

Corruption

It has been alleged that large amounts of American tax dollars and seized Iraqi revenues were lost by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). One audit put the total number as high as $8.8 billion. [ [http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/30/iraq.audit/ CNN.com - Audit: U.S. lost track of $9 billion in Iraq funds - Jan 30, 2005 ] ] Fraudulent contractors such as Philip Bloom often bribed CPA officials in exchange for contracts that were never performed. An article in the "New York Times" describes "irregularities including millions of reconstruction dollars stuffed casually into footlockers and filing cabinets, an American soldier in the Philippines who gambled away cash belonging to Iraq, and three Iraqis who plunged to their deaths in a rebuilt hospital elevator that had been improperly certified as safe." [ [http://www.warprofiteers.com/article.php?id=13161 CorpWatch : IRAQ: Audit Describes Misuse of Funds in Iraq Projects ] ] While the US government has begun the process of prosecuting contractors that stole American tax dollars, the Iraqi government currently has no means of reacquiring Iraqi assets that were stolen by US contractors. This is partially due to a decree passed by the CPA that gives civilian contractors in Iraq immunity from all Iraqi jurisdiction. [ [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0416-02.htm US Firms Suspected of Bilking Iraq Funds ] ]

There was also much controversy surrounding the granting of no-bid contracts to large American corporations like Halliburton and Bechtel, both of which have made generous donations to President George W. Bush and the Republican Party. [ [http://www.opensecrets.org/news/rebuilding_iraq/index.asp Rebuilding Iraq ] ] Halliburton in particular has been singled out for receiving what is perceived to be government favoritism for doing a shoddy job of rebuilding Iraq's oil infrastructure. [ [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/25/world/middleeast/25pipeline.html?incamp=article_popular Rebuilding of Iraqi Pipeline as Disaster Waiting to Happen - New York Times ] ] When the Pentagon's own auditors determined that about $263 million of a Halliburton subsidiary's costs were potentially excessive, the Army still paid the company all but $10.1 million of the disputed costs. [ [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/international/middleeast/27contract.html?ex=1298696400&en=075a4c9d410f6860&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss Army to Pay Halliburton Unit Most Costs Disputed by Audit - New York Times ] ] Bechtel Corp. became the first major U.S. contractor to announce that it was pulling out of Iraq in Fall 2006. [ [http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/111406G.shtml t r u t h o u t | Bechtel Bails on Iraq ] ]

Some say that the reconstruction would have been both much more efficient and inexpensive if more contracts were granted to local Iraqi firms, many of whom were shut out of the process due to the fact that they were state-owned. [ [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10640-2004Feb26 Iraqi Experts Tossed With The Water (washingtonpost.com) ] ] Congressman Henry Waxman was once told by members of the Iraqi governing council that paying Iraqi companies to rebuild Iraq instead of American ones would save American tax payers 90% of the costs. [ [http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Sept2004/cannon0904.html The Ruse of Reconstruction ] ]

By Summer of 2008, oil and electricity levels returned to pre-invasion (i.e. pre-March, 2003) levels.

Current status of reconstruction

Electricity

General Petraeus noted in May, 2008 that electricity levels have exceeded pre-war production.Current electricity levels of about 4000 MW have not yet reached the stated goal of nationwide production of 6000 MW. To compensate The estimated hours per day of electricity availability has shifted. During the Saddam rule, Baghdad received electricity for between 16 and 24 hours per day with 4 to 8 hours received outside of the capital. Information from the Brookings Institution (early 2007) indicates that Baghdad now receives electricity from 4 to 8 hours per day with the remainder of the nation receiving from 8 to 12 hours of electricity per day [ [http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf ] ]

Much of the efforts to rebuild Iraq's electrical infrastructure has been largely dependent on the repair and construction of transmission lines and substations by global engineering firms willing to work in hostile territories. [ [http://www.symbion-power.com/experience/line_al-qaim.html Transimission line restoration in Sunni Triangle] ] [ [http://www.symbion-power.com/experience/sub_farabi.html Gas Insulated Substations reconstruction near Sadr City, Iraq] ]

Food

In May 2006, the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) concluded its most recent food security survey [ [http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=368 WFP - Where we work - Iraq ] ] .

It found that 15 percent of the total Iraqi population (just over 4 million people) is food insecure and in dire need of different types of humanitarian assistance, including food, despite the rations they are receiving from the Public Distribution System (PDS). This is an increase from the estimated 11 percent (2.6 million people) deemed to be extremely poor in WFP’s first survey in September 2004. The May 2006 survey also indicated that a further 8.3 million people would be rendered food insecure if they were not provided with a PDS ration, compared to 3.6 million people in the previous survey. An earlier survey, conducted in July 2005, found that acute malnutrition rates for children was nine percent overall, but with rates for children between 6 and 12 months old reaching 13 percent and 12 percent for those aged between one and two years.

In 2007, the WFP continues to provide emergency food provisions to about 1.1 million Iraqis. WFP has assisted in the establishment of a Food Security Unit, located in the Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, which collects food security information. The PDS is still a major contributor in stabilizing the food supply in Iraq. For the poor and food insecure, the PDS represents by far the single most important food source in their diet.

Water, sanitation and solid waste

and Thi Qar was completed in April 2006. [ [http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/recon040606.html Gulf Region Division ] ] These projects have provided capacity to supply water to approximately 5.4 million people (1.67 million cubic meters per day). This compares with the target capacity, at the completion of all IRRF funded water projects, of 2.37 million cubic meters per day needed to provide for 8.4 million people. The water that actually reaches Iraqi citizens is difficult to determine because of significant water losses in the distribution systems.

A modern landfill, built to international environmental standards, is planned for southwest Baghdad, with the capacity to handle 2,230 cubic meters of waste per day. The construction was halted prior to completion in November 2005, due to security concerns. There has been some limited utilization of the landfill, however full utilization has not yet been implemented. [http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/assessments/pa-06-067_baghdad_landfill.pdf SIGIR Report 06-067 October 19, 2006] ]

Recent reports on waste collection, [http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/11/news/trash.php NYTimes 10/11/06] ] note that being a garbage collector may be one of the most dangerous jobs in Iraq. Most of the 500 municipal workers who have been killed in Baghdad since 2005 have been waste collectors. There are inadequate waste collection vehicles with only 380 presently in service. Before the invasion there were 1200 working trucks. Most of the vehicles were destroyed or lost in the looting that seized the capital after the American invasion. The deputy mayor of Baghdad estimates the city needs 1,500 waste collection vehicles.

Oil

Before the 2003 invasion, Iraqi crude oil production was about convert|2.5|Moilbbl/d|m3/d (BPD). Since 2003 production has not increased back to this level. In 2006 Iraqi crude oil production averaged 2.12 million BPD. [http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Jan07/pdf/Report_-_January_2007_Complete.pdf SIGIR Report to Congress January 30, 2007] ] In mid-2006, the Iraqi oil minister, said that "he expected output to rise to approximately 4 m BPD by 2010, increasing to 6 m BPD by 2012." [ [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5117170.stm BBC NEWS | Business | Iraq oil output hits a new high ] ]

The situation has been characterized by some Oil Ministry officials as chaotic, with one official stating "We do not know the exact quantity of oil we are exporting, we do not exactly know the prices we are selling it for, and we do not know where the oil revenue is going to."cite news | author = Heiko Flottau | title= Iraqi oil industry in crisis | url=http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13770 | publisher=ISN | date=2005-12-07 | accessdate=2006-12-12]

In Summer, 2008, the nation's Parliament still had not produced a comprehensive "hydrocarbon law" (oil law) apportioning revenue between local governorates and the central government. While oil production in early 2008 exceeded pre-war levels and continued to climb, disagreements remained among oil-rich regions, oil-poor regions, and the national government over contracting rights and revenue-sharing.

Healthcare

Until the early 1990s, Iraq's healthcare system was considered one of the most advanced in the Middle East. Following the Gulf War, it began to deteriorate. Prior to the Iraq War, healthcare spending amounted to 50 cents (US) per Iraqi per year. Today, the Iraqi healthcare system has regressed to a chronic and smoldering condition. Infections are widespread, the infant mortality rate has surged, and medical shortages all threaten the once functioning medical system. [ [http://discovermagazine.com/2007/aug/iraq2019s Iraq’s Medical Meltdown | Health Policy | DISCOVER Magazine ] ] US based NGO, Giving Children Hope, has an on-going healthcare development program in Iraq that equips hospitals and clinics with needed supplies and equipment in conjunction with the US military. [http://71.6.192.13/healthcare-development-in-iraq1.html]

However, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan (the three northern governorates with primarily Kurdish populations) is quite different. Due to their better stability, the Kurdish semi-autonomous area enjoys health care superior to that under Saddam. Health workers have not left the provinces for Syria or Jordan, as they have in sectarian Iraq, and new programs for continuing professional education in major Iraqi Kurdish cities reflect the optimism of the area.

With the primarily Sunni Al Anbar governorate to the west experiencing increased stability due to the U.S. troop surge and the Sunni rejection of Al Qaeda in Iraq, International Health [http://fhp.osd.mil/intlhealth/] analysts hope to see improved health care there, as well. It remains to be seen whether non-governmental organizations and the Shiite-dominated central Iraqi government will take advantage of the enhanced security to enact sustainable services and other improvements. Local initiatives in June 2008 included contracting with the International Medical Corps for a comprehensive Anbar continuing medical education program, rights of return for expatriate health professionals, and an overhaul of nursing, with innovative programs paralleling the "diploma" nursing track of the West, and a goal of attracting women to nursing as a career (70% of Iraqi nurses are male).

Until late 2007, the Ministry of Health had been apportioned by the new Shiite majority to politicians aligned with Moqtada Al Sadr, a minority Shiite party leader and head of a sect prominent in East Baghdad slums. Allegations abounded of abductions of Sunni patients, and Iraqi Security Force (Army and Police) patients, from their hospital beds. The Inspector General was prosecuted for corruption, and the Facilities Protective Service (FPS) commander was dismissed for running a Mafia-like organization, contributing weapons and manpower to terrorist and other gangs.

At the close of 2007, a new Minister of Health, Saleh Al-Hasnawi, was appointed and began ministerial reforms. The Inspector General was replaced and a new openness was encouraged. In June, 2008, the Minister of Health convened a National Strategic Planning Conference in Baghdad. At this conference, attended by professionals, NGOs and Provincial Reconstruction Teams from all over Iraq, he announced that Iraq would direct its own health reconstruction, funding it with Iraqi money according to Iraqi priorities. Although there is still a place for external expert advice, the determination of the Iraqis to direct their own health development was clear.

There are sparse data on the role of private practice in Iraq. Estimates range as high as 70% of outpatient visits, compared to approximately 30% before the war. Iraq has included health care as a constitutional right; as government-sponsored care becomes more accessible, the future of private practice will likely change, but it is an ingrained feature of the Iraqi healthcare fabric.

Private sector development

Proposed Baghdad Renaissance Plan

Some private sector developments have also been proposed. One of these, The Proposed Baghdad Renaissance Plan [http://www.arcadd.com/baghdad-cbd.htm] , is a 25-year scheme, designed by architect Hisham N. Ashkouri to transform 9 km² of silt deposits into an "an up-market commercial and residential neighborhood" astride the Tigris River in central Baghdad, as well as nearby Tahrir Square. Tahrir Square was originally part of the central business district of Baghdad, and Phase I of the plan focuses on the redevelopment of this area. [http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?storyid=64178]

When finished, the "commerce, banking, medical, housing, broadcast and IT, exhibition, conventions and cultural centers" of which the plan is comprised would be occupied by up to one-half million people. [ [http://www.tufts.edu/home/feature/?p=ashkouri Profile: Hisham Ashkouri - Feature - Tufts University ] ] The project received encouragement by the U.S. Department of Commerce as well as other US and Middle East organizations. A smaller-scale proposal of Dr. Ashkouri's is the Sindbad Hotel Complex and Conference Center, [http://www.cinemasindbad.com/pdf/CS%20Factsheet.pdf] a high-rise hotel and movie theater complex which would be Baghdad's first skyscraper.

Prevailing views are that political and social instability in the region are making such developments unduly risky, despite a high projected return on investment. Security concerns during the survey and construction phases are currently a cost-prohibitive factor.

On the other hand, this development is opposed by many Iraqi academics and architects due to its intentions of eliminating the urban fabric a historic parts of city which was created through centuries and replacing it with a commercial version of high rise buildings that lack any regional or local references. This project is one of the attempts to recreate a Dubai like boom to benefit certain groups and entities, ignoring on its way the traditional and historical heritage of a city like Baghdad.

ee also

* History of Iraqi insurgency
* 2003 occupation of Iraq
* 2003 Iraq war timeline
* Development Fund for Iraq
* Post-invasion Iraq, 2003-2006
* New Iraqi Army
* Economy of Iraq
* Iraq oil law (2007)
* International Compact with Iraq

References

Links to Iraq reconstruction agencies

* [http://www.irffi.org International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq] Updates on reconstruction activities by the United Nations and World Bank.
* [http://www.defenselink.mil/tfbso/ Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations - Iraq]
* [http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net/ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] Weekly updates on Iraq reconstruction.
* [http://www.usaid.gov/iraq USAID Assistance to Iraq Homepage] Updates and financial summaries on USAID managed reconstruction projects in Iraq.
* [http://www.sigir.mil/ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction] Watchdog for fraud, waste, and abuse of U.S. funds intended for Iraq reconstruction. Quarterly updates and expenditure progress.
* [http://www.export.gov/iraq Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force (U.S. Dept. of Commerce)] Assistance to the private sector for reconstruction and business opportunities.
* [http://www.icrc.org/ International Committee of the Red Cross] Operational updates for ICRC activities in Iraq.
* [http://www.ifrc.org/where/country/cn6.asp?countryid=87 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies] Updates on activities of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

External articles and references

* [http://www.epic-usa.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2218 The Ground Truth Project] -- A series of exclusive, in-depth interviews and other resources with Iraqis, aid workers, military personnel and others who have spent significant time working to rebuild Iraq from the inside.
* [http://www.map-of-iraq.com Map of Iraq] - High resolution maps of Iraq.
* [http://www.defendamerica.mil Defend America: U.S. Department of Defense News About the War on Terrorism]
* [http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html Measuring Stability and Security: U.S. Department of Defense Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq Quarterly Reports]
* [http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html Fact Sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)]
* * Kenneth M. Pollack, " [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040109faupdate83175/kenneth-m-pollack/after-saddam-assessing-the-reconstruction-of-iraq.html%E2%80%9D After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq] ". From foreignaffairs.org - author update, January 12, 2004.
* [http://www.iraqanalysis.org/info/125 Iraq Analysis Economic Development Page] Comprehensive information source listings on reconstruction of Iraq
* [http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/20942/ Dahar Jamail, "Iraq: The Devastation", AlterNet]
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/file_on_4/4216853.stm Iraq reconstruction funds missing]
* [http://atlas-real.atlas.uiuc.edu:8080/ramgen/ips/acdis/acdis_iraq_2005.04.20.rm Video Seminar on Iraq Coalition Politics] : April 20 2005, sponsored by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois.
* [http://www.arcadd.com/baghdad-cbd.htm Baghdad Renaissance Plan]
* [http://www.iraqieconomy.org/home/bilecon/uae/2004.09.23 UAE Investors Keen On Taking Part In Baghdad Renaissance Project]
* [http://www.tufts.edu/home/feature/?p=ashkouri Man With A Plan: Hisham Ashkouri]
* [http://www.arcadd.com/scholastic-article.htm Renaissance Plan In The News]
* [http://www.arcadd.com ARCADD, Inc.]
* [http://www.symbion-power.com/ Symbion Power]