Strategic Army Corps

Infobox Military Unit
unit_name= Strategic Army Corps


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motto= "Skilled, Tough. Ready Around the Clock."
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notable_commanders= Lt. Gen. Robert Frederick Sink
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aircraft_transport=The Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) was a command of the United States Army, with a mission of high readiness, active in the 1960s, but later inactivated.

Background

STRAC was a designation given to the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1958. The designation was, in reality, the assignment of an additional mission rather than a true designation. The additional mission was to provide a flexible strike capability that could deploy worldwide on short notice without declaration of an emergency. The 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, and the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, were designated as STRAC's first-line divisions, while the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg were to provide backup in the event of general war. The 5th Logistical Command (later inactivated), also at Fort Bragg, would provide the corps with logistics support, while Fort Bragg's XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery would control artillery units.Mark A. Olinger, "Airlift operations during the Lebanon crisis: airlift of a Marine Corps battalion to Lebanon demonstrated that deploying contingency forces from the continental United States to an overseas operation was feasible and expeditious," Army Logistician, May-June, 2005.]

Airlift assets were made available to U.S. forces based on the possible outbreak of a general war in Europe. In his paper, "Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon," prepared for the Army Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies Institute, Roger J. Spiller notes:

"The Military Air Transport Service could deliver up to 188 million ton-miles of mobility under the general war scenario, and it was calculated that the Army's part would come to 80 million ton-miles of the total. From these figures, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Major General Earle Wheeler, made the assumption that "if the general war requirement could be met, it would seem likely that the limited war requirement of the Army could be met in most circumstances."

Although the STRAC mission was to provide an easily deployable force for use in a limited war or other emergency, its ability to deploy overseas was limited by airlift constraints. Without the declaration of a national emergency, the required lift assets would not be released to support a STRAC deployment.

Operations

Training

Training included unidentified semi-annual maneuvers (Desert Strike, Swift Strike) with the 82nd and101st Airborne held under the auspices of the XVIII and STRAC. [ [http://www.mtaofnj.org/newsletter/year_2003/nl_0803.pdf August 2003 Motopool Messenger ] ]

Berlin Crisis

The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment returned to the United States from Germany in February 1958, and was once again stationed at Fort Meade. The Regiment became part of STRAC and, from 1958-1961, it was the recipient of four STRAC streamers, awarded for superior readiness and training. In reaction to the Berlin Crisis, the Regiment redeployed to Germany in October 1961. Alerted for movement on October 10th, although scattered at different training sites along the Eastern Seaboard, the Regiment arrived at its new duty stations of Baumholder and Kaiserslautern exactly thirty days later. [www.hood.army.mil/3d_acr/docs/part_2.pdf ]

Cuban Missile Crisis

The general purpose forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force started to organize for the emergency on October 16. The command organization, as finally developed, called for the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), to provide the unified command. He also retained control of all naval components involved in tactical operations, as the Commander of the U.S. Fleet, Atlantic. The responsibility for Army and Air Force components was assigned to the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and the Tactical Air Command (TAC) under the designation of Army Forces, Atlantic (ARLANT), and Air Forces, Atlantic (AFLANT). The commander of the Army XVIII Airborne Corps was designated Joint Task Force Commander to plan for any joint operations that might become necessary. Over-all direction was exercised by the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who named the Chief of Naval Operations as their representative for the quarantine.http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-2.htm ]

The operational control of the quarantine force was assigned to the Commander of the Second Fleet, who organized Task Force 136 for this purpose. Effective deployment constituted a mammoth task to be accomplished in minimum time. To prevent future difficulties, plans had to be developed, ship captains briefed, supply ships dispatched, and thousands of details checked. Other Navy and Marine forces faced similar tough schedules. Marines, if not already engaged in landing exercises, were loaded on amphibious ships and ordered to sea. At Guantanamo, dependents were evacuated to the United States on October 22, and Marine units were shipped by air and sea to reinforce the base. Task Force 135, including the carrier Enterprise, was sent to the south of Cuba, ready to join in the defense of Guantanamo if needed. The carrier Independence and the supporting ships of Carrier Division Six stood by to provide additional support. Antisubmarine forces were redeployed to cover the quarantine operations. An intensive air surveillance of the Atlantic was initiated, keeping track of the 2,000 commercial ships usually in the area; regular and reserve Navy aircraft were joined in this search by SAC bombers.

Major elements of STRAC were designated for use by ARLANT and placed in advanced alert status. Logistic support for the more than 100,000 men involved was directed by a newly established Peninsula Base Command. Preparatory steps were taken to make possible the immediate callup of high priority Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. Air support for the ground forces was provided by the TAC, which moved hundreds of tactical fighter, reconnaissance, and troop carrier aircraft to the southeast. To make room for all these units, the bombers, tankers, and other aircraft not required for the current operations were ordered to other bases in the United States.

Flexible Response

September 1961, Fort Hood again became the home for the III Corps, and in February 1962, III Corps was assigned as part of the STRAC. [http://pao.hood.army.mil/Sub/Hood_History.htm]

In March 1962 the 2ID was designated as a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) unit. Following this the Division became engaged in intensified combat training, tactical training, and field training exercises, in addition to special training designed to improve operational readiness.Fact|date=May 2007

Other Definitions

STRAC is Army slang term for "a well organized, well turned-out soldier, (pressed uniform, polished brass and shined boots)." A proud, competent trooper who can be depended on for good performance in any circumstance. Gear clean and tight; Weapon clean and ready; Mind clear, organized, and ready for action.S- skilled T- tough R- ready A- around the C- clock. STRAC

References