Abdul Halim Sadiqi

Abdul Halim Sadiqi is a citizen of Pakistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba. [http://www.dod.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf list of prisoners (.pdf)] , "US Department of Defense", May 15 2006] Sadiqi's Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 1007.American intelligence analysts estimate Sadiqi was born in 1968, in Pakistan.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.cite web
url=http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3902
title=Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials
publisher=United States Department of Defense
date=March 6 date=December 2007

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were "lawful combatants" -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Sadiqi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/Set_18_1463-1560.pdf#81 Summarized transcripts (.pdf)] , from Abdul Halim Sadiqi's "Combatant Status Review Tribunal" - pages 81-88]

Allegations

The allegations Sadiqi faced during his Tribunal were:

:""'a. The Detainee is a member of al Qaida.:#"The Detainee directed a network of ten madrassas in Pakistan prior to his capture by coalition forces.:#"The Detainee conspired with high-ranking al Qaida leadership to recruit fighters from his madrassas'.

:""'b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States audits coalition partners.:#"The Detainee assembled a force of approximately 2,000 Pakistani and Arab fighters to battle the United States and coalition forces.:#"The Detainee led his force against the Northern Alliance on the field of battle in the vicinity of Takhar, Afghanistan.:#"The Detainee led a portion of his force against the coalition on the field of battle in the vicinity of Konduz, Afghanistan, where he was eventually captured by the coalition.

Reports lack of help from his Personal Representative

Abdul Halim Sadiqi reported his Personal Representative had not made a copy of the Tribunal documents, translated into his language, Urdu, available to him prior to the Tribunal convening. He asked for time to read it.His Tribunal's President refused him permission, saying that he could trusthis translator.

Abdul Halim Sadiqi reported he was dissatisfied with the efforts his Personal Representative made to answer his questions.

Requested evidence ruled "not relevant"

Abdul Halim Sadiqi had requested three letters he had received from his family be produced for the Tribunal.His Tribunal President ruled: quotation
I understand from the Personal Representative that she made an effort to find those letters. As such, she has not received any official notice back that they can be located. We understand those letters were written from family members, and they were with you one month prior to your capture; as such, they would not have any first-hand knowledge prior to your capture. Based on this, we determine that these will not be relevant to your enemy combatant status.

Testimony

Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Sadiqi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing. [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/ARB_Transcript_Set_10_21352-21661.pdf#217 Summarized transcript (.pdf)] , from Abdul Halim Sadiqi's "Administrative Review Board hearing" - page 217-236 - November 30 2005]

Confusion

Abdul Halim Sadiqi expressed confusion over what kind of evidence would be classified, and withheld from him, and which evidence he would be able to see, and respond to.

Abdul Halim Sadiqi told his Board he didn't understand the nature of the Unclassified Summary.

Enemy Combatant election form

Abdul Halim Sadiqi's Assisting Military Officer told his hearing that they had their initial meeting on November 28 2005, for 79 minutes.He was given a copy of the hearing documents translated into Urdu.His Assisting Military Officer described him as cooperative and polite.

He planned to submit two letters to his hearing.

Factor for and against continued detention

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for every captive for whom an Administrative Review Board hearing was convened, summarizing the "factors" for and against their continued detention. Those factors were always broken down under two headings: "The following primary factors favor continued detention"; and "The following primary factors favor release or transfer".The factors favoring continued detention were further subdivided under sub-headings like: "Training"; "Intent"; "Commitment"; "Associations". And the factors under those sub-headings were sequentially numbered.

Te Summary of Evidence memo was always read out, in its entirety, at the beginning of the hearing. Most captives were offered an opportunity to hear the factors read out, one at a time, so they would have an opportunity to respond to each in turn.

Some captive's transcript recorded the factors, and the captive's responses, but did not record the headings, sub-headings or sequential numbering.

*"The detainee went to the Karachi consulate and obtained a visa.
*"The vis only a day and a night.
*"The detainee was given a letter in a sealed envelope to give to the Kabul office of Jaishe-E-Mohammed "sic". This letter would allow for his brother's release.
*"On 23 September 2001, the detainee legally crossed the border from Chaman to Spin Boldak on a Pakistan] i passport with an Afghanistan visa.
*"The detainee traveled to Kandahar. From Kandahar, the detainee went to an officer in Kabul where he was told his brother was in Konduz. The detainee took a flight from Kabul to Konduz on Iriyana Airlines.
*"Al Qaida and Taliban members used Iriyana Airlines to travel to different areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.
*"The detainee traveled to Dashte Archi, where his brother was located.
*"The detainee's network of madrassas gave him easy access to organize and communicate with al Qaida members and sympathizers and develop new al Qaida recruits.
*"The detainee claimed that his organization had the ability to organize as many as 2,000 men to join in a Jihad against the United States and Coalition Forces.
*"The detainee returned to Pakistan and assembled a force that consisted largely of Pakistanis but also included 300 Arab al Qaida operatives.
*"In the fall of 2001, during the fighting in Afghanistan, the detainee took this force on to Spin Boldak, Afghanistan. This was done by the order of an Arab al Qaida logistics officer.
*"In Spin Boldak, the detainee joined forces with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Commander Juma Namangani who had several hundred men of his own.
*"The detainee and Mamangani traveled north to Takbar Province, Afghanistan, where they combined with other forces and began fighting against the Northern Alliance.
*"Not long after the fighting began in Takbar, the detainee and a significant portion of his force traveled to Konduz where the forces proved too strong, and the detainee and 400 of his men were eventually captured.
*"The detainee's brother once taught him how to assemble and disassemble a Kalashnikov.
*"The detainee met and began cooperating with an Arab al Qaida logistics officer. This logistics officer was an assistant to Usama Bin Laden.
*"In 2001, the logistics officer invited the detainee to attend the wedding of one of Usama Bin Laden's children in Kandahar, Afghanistan. At the wedding, the logistics officer tasked the detainee with using his madrassa to recruit 2,000 fighters.
*"The detainee said he received permission to retrieve his brother from the local Taliban office in Pakistan. He claimed his brother received training at the Jaishe-E-Mohammed training camp for about one month prior to his departure.
*"The detainee denied attending Usama Bin Laden's son's wedding in Kandahar and denied knowing or associating with the Arab logistics officer.
*"The detainee denies knowing anything about al Qaida, the Taliban or madrassas in Pakistan.
*"The detainee denies knowing or associating with Mullah Omar or any Taliban or al Qaida personnel.

References