Policies of the Shinawatra administration

As Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra initiated many distinctive policies affecting the economy, public health, education, energy, drugs, and international relations. His policies have made him very popular with the majority of the Thai people, resulting in two landslide re-election victories. Thaksin's policies have been particularly effective at alleviating rural poverty.

Economic and health policies

Policies

Thaksin's government has been unabashedly populist, spending money on popular causes like low-interest agricultural loans, subsidized universal health care, infrastructure development, school information technology, and the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) rural small and medium enterprise development program.

During the 2004 International Aids Conference in Bangkok, Thaksin committed to providing universal access to anti-retroviral (ARV) for people living with HIV/AIDS. Starting in 2002, the Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) began production of GPO-VIR, a cocktail of three anti-retroviral drugs costing only THB 1,260 (about $36 USD) a month per patient, manyfold cheaper than the cost of imported ARVs. [http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=21720041429227&contenttype=PARA& MSF Access : Key Publications ] ] In 2002, out of 600,000-700,000 people with HIV/AIDS, only 2,500 people had access to ARVs. [ [http://www.aegis.com/news/afp/2003/AF031212.html AEGiS-AFP News: Health-AIDS-Thailand: Thailand to triple AIDS patient access to ARVs in 2004 - December 1, 2003 ] ] The Thaksin-government also introduced changes that required schools nationwide to offer a more open, well-rounded programme of sexual education, and address the issue of sexually transmitted diseases. [ [http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=13448 THAILAND: Straight-talking Sex Educators Reach Youngsters ] ]

Impact

His supporters claim that these economic policies, dubbed Thaksinomics, are responsible for bringing about Thailand's economic recovery from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and substantially reducing rural poverty. Per capita income has risen by 38% during the Thaksin administration's time in power. [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/03/20/headlines/headlines_20003132.php Middle class has paid for PM's popularity ] ] The GDP has grown from from THB 4.9 trillion to THB 7.1 trillion. This is one of the key reasons Thailand was able to repay its Chuan-government debts to the International Monetary Fund 2 years ahead of schedule. Between 2000 and 2004 poverty in Thailand fell from 21.3 per cent to 11.3 per cent, according to the World Bank. Farm income in the poorest part of the country, the north-east, rose 40 per cent in that period. [ [http://smh.com.au/news/world/thailand-protests-put-asias-democratic-ideal-at-crossroads/2006/03/17/1142582522195.html?page=2 Thailand protests put Asia's democratic ideal at crossroads - World - smh.com.au ] ] Sales of manufacturers under the OTOP scheme increased from USD 200 million to USD 700 million in two years, due to improvements in marketing, design and packaging skills. [http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/sathirathai04ny.html H.E. Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai - Thailand: the Path Forward ] ] The Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) found that average economic growth from 2001 to 2005 was 5%, or 0.5-1% higher than other Southeast Asian countries. [http://bangkokpost.net/Business/30Mar2006_biz33.php] Dead link|date=March 2008] The Stock Exchange of Thailand, outperformed other markets in the region with a 17% gain in the main index from 2000-2005.

Thaksin's ARV-access policy has been largely successful. By end of year 2004, 50,000 had access to ARVs, with expansion of access planned.

Criticism

Critics, however, charge that Thaksinomics is little more than Keynesian fiscal policy re-branded as something new and revolutionary. It is also claimed that Thaksinomics has made the poor dependent on debt and relies on the middle-class for taxes. An anti-Thaksin academic has claimed that increased rural income resulting from anti-poverty projects has been spent on mobile phones, pickup trucks, and other flashy consumer items. An academic at Chulalongkorn University said, "The worst thing the prime minister has done is to destroy the basic market mechanism and twist social welfare into political king-playing." It is claimed that the middle-class, defined as those making from THB 100,000 - 1,000,000,000 (USD 2,500 - 25,000,000) per year pay the majority of Thailand's income taxes.

Other sceptics argue that a revival in export demand, rather than the government's fiscal policies, has been the main contributor to Thailand's economic recovery since 1997. TDRI economist Somchai Jitsuchon argues that "we cannot claim that Thaksin's economic management was obviously better than that for other countries [in the region] . Export demand largely contributed to growth." Somchai further argues that domestic consumption grew largely because of a low-interest-rate environment in international markets and not as a result of Thaksin's policies. [ [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/03/30/business/business_30000503.php TDRI ECONOMISTS: Thaksinomics 'not a driver of growth'] - Wichit Chaitrong, "The Nation", March 30, 2006] Thaksin's supporters have countered that no other democratically-elected Prime Minister has reduced poverty by as much as Thaksin.

Although successful in expanding access to ARVs, there have been some concerns that free trade agreements with the US could endanger Thailand's ability to produce low-cost treatments. Ironically, this has made people living with HIV/AIDS some of his most vigorous political enemies. An HIV/AIDS NGO was one of the organizations who successfully petitioned against the privatization of Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). Thaksin's HIV/AIDS policy has also been criticized for not doing enough to limit HIV infections among young people. The Thailand Health Ministry in Thailand has noted that the rate of HIV infection among teenagers rose during 2002 from 11% to 17%, with less than half of teenagers using condoms. [ [http://www.avert.org/aidsthai.htm HIV and AIDS in Thailand ] ] Since the Education Ministry did not offer specific course guidelines on sexual education, schools have often taken a very conservative approach. Efforts to increase condom distribution in schools have also been hampered by both schools and religious groups who fear that this will increase promiscuity.

Anti-drug policies

Thaksin initiated a series of controversial policies to counter a boom in Thailand's illegal drugs market, particularly in methamphetamine. Research and statistics had indicated that some 2.5 - 6 million people were habitual drug users, with up to 3 million of still in school. Up to 2002, Thaksin's anti-drug policies consisted of border blocking (most methamphetamine is produced in Myanmar), public education, sports, and promoting peer pressure against drug use - policies that are generally acknowledged to have been ineffective. In response, the Thaksin government launched on February 1, 2003, a suppression campaign that aimed to "rid every inch of the country" of drugs in 3 months. The policy consisted of:

# Targeting dealers
# Changing the punishment policy such that users would be considered patients in need of treatment
# Giving targets to each province for the number of arrests and seizures
# Awarding government officials for achieving targets
# Ruthless implementation

Regarding the last element, Thaksin said, “Because drug traders are ruthless to our children. So being ruthless back to them is not a big thing…. It may be necessary to have casualties… If there are deaths among traders, it’s normal…”. Various agencies drew up “blacklists” of people suspected to be involved in drug trading, while police were told to meet their arrest quota or face being transferred. Given the short time available, due process reportedly often fell by the wayside in meeting those targets. In parallel, dealers were invited to present themselves to the police and swear they had stopped their activities.

Over the next seven weeks, press reports indicate that around 2,500 people were killed. [ [http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/275/thailandwar.shtml "Thailand War on Drugs Turns Murderous, 600 Killed This Month -- Human Rights Groups Denounce Death Squads, Executions"] . "Drug War Chronicle", Feb. 21, 2003.] [ [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/07/thaila9014.htm Timeline of Thailand’s “War on Drugs”] . July 7, 2004. Human Rights Watch.] The government claimed only around 50 of the deaths were at the hands of the police, and then in self-defense. They included a nine-year-old child. Human rights critics have claimed that a much larger proportion were targets of extrajudicial execution. [http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9405E7DF1038F93BA35757C0A9659C8B63 "A Wave of Drug Killings Is Linked to Thai Police"] . By Seth Mydans. April 8, 2003. "New York Times". [http://www.akha.org/content/drugwar/drugwarsethmydansnyt.html] ] Amnesty International report: [http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA39/008/2003 Thailand: Grave developments - Killings and other abuses] ] Human Rights Watch. Detailed report: [http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm#_ftn1 Thailand: Not Enough Graves: IV. Human Rights Abuses and the War on Drugs] ] [Matthew Z Wheeler. "From Marketplace to Battlefield: Counting the Costs of Thailand’s Drug War." [http://www.icwa.org/txtArticles/MZW-6.htm] [http://www.icwa.org/select1.asp?f=MZW-6.pdf] [http://www.akha.org/content/drugwar/drugwarpage1.html] . May 28, 2003. " [http://www.icwa.org/ArticlesMap.asp?r=14 ICWA Letters] ." Institute of Current World Affairs.] [http://www.akha.org/upload/humanrights/documents/alrchrcthailand2005.pdf "Institutionalised torture, extrajudicial killings & uneven application of law in Thailand"] . April 2005. See Annex 5 for a "Partial list of persons reported killed during the ‘war on drugs’ (revised)." Asian Legal Resource Centre. From Vol. 04 - No. 02: [http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0402/ "Special Report: Rule of Law vs. Rule of Lords in Thailand"] .] [ [http://www.achrweb.org/reports/Thailand/Thailand0105.pdf "Thailand: Not Smiling on Rights"] . July 18, 2005. Asian Centre for Human Rights. See page 24, the section called "Killings in the war against drugs".] "US-Thailand’s 'License To Kill'. 2274 Extra-Judicial Killings In 90 Days". "The Akha Journal of the Golden Triangle." By Matthew McDaniel. Vol. 1, No. 2, October 2003. Relevant section of journal 2: [http://www.akha.org/upload/journal/akhajournal2p6.pdf 2p6.pdf] - Cover and first part of journal 2: [http://www.akha.org/upload/journal/akhajournal2p1.pdf 2p1.pdf] - [http://www.akha.org/upload/journal/ Link list for all parts of the journals] .] [http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/07/international/asia/lett.html?ex=1246939200 "Letter from Asia; She Tilts Against Power, but Don't Call Her Quixotic."] By Jane Perlez. July 7, 2004. "New York Times."] [ [http://gallery.marihemp.com/akha Thailand 2003. Extrajudicial drug-war killings of innocent people] . Photo gallery. Press/media links, and human rights reports.] The victims were overwhelmingly poor, and reports said police with worrying consistency recovered two methamphetamine tablets from their bodies, well below the five needed for a charge of possession with intent to supply. The National Commission on Human Rights made an official objection. The government went out of its way to publicize the implementation of the policy, with daily statistics of arrests, seizures, and deaths published, and entire provinces swearing abstinence in orchestrated ceremonies. Following growing international criticism including expressions of concern from the UN rapporteur on human rights, the "ruthless" element of the policy was reduced and the killings stopped. Meanwhile, only a minute portion of "kingpins" were arrested or targeted for arrest.

Despite some public revulsion, Thaksin's popularity increased. [ [http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/events/lisbon/05_phongpaichit Phongpaichit speech - The First International Symposium on Global Drug Policy: Lisbon 2003 - The Senlis Council ] ] In September 2004, George W. Bush announced in his Annual Determination of Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug-Transit Countries to remove Thailand from the list of major drug-transit or major drug-producing countries.

The policy was effective in substantially increasing the price of methamphetamine and thus reducing the intake of habitual and recreational users, with retail drug prices skyrocketing 2-3 times as a result. The longer-term effectiveness of the crackdown, however, is less clear. An ABAC opinion poll conducted two years after the campaign revealed that 62.2 percent of respondents believed that drug abuse had increased from 2004 to 2005. The same survey also showed that people had lost confidence in the Thaksin's anti-drug policies, with 67.8 percent answering that they no longer trust the government to solve the drug problem. [ [http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:94s3xF89yXIJ:www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.arcview.php%3Fclid%3D2%26id%3D113418%26usrsess%3D+war+on+drugs+poll+thaksin&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=33&inlang=en POLL FINDING: Drug abuse on the rise] , "The Nation", 20 March 2005]

"The Nation" (an English-language newspaper in Thailand) reported on November 27, 2007:

"Of 2,500 deaths in the government's war on drugs in 2003, a fact-finding panel has found that more than half was not involved in drug at all. At a brainstorming session, a representative from the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) Tuesday disclosed that as many as 1,400 people were killed and labelled as drug suspects despite the fact that they had no link to drugs."

The article also reported:

"Senior public prosecutor Kunlapon Ponlawan said it was not difficult to investigate extra-judicial killings carried out by police officers as the trigger-pullers usually confessed." [ [http://nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/read.php?newsid=30057578 "Most of those killed in war on drug not involved in drug"] . November 27, 2007. "The Nation" (an English-language newspaper in Thailand). [http://www.thailandqa.com/forum/showthread.php?t=17217] ] [ [http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/512/thailand_drug_killings_half_not_involved_panel_finds "Southeast Asia: Most Killed in Thailand's 2003 Drug War Not Involved With Drugs, Panel Finds"] . November 30, 2007. "Drug War Chronicle."]

The January 24, 2008 edition of "The Economist" reported:

"Yet a panel set up last year by the outgoing junta recently concluded the opposite: over half of those killed in 2003 had no links to the drugs trade. The panel blamed the violence on a government “shoot-to-kill” policy based on flawed blacklists. But far from leading to the prosecutions of those involved, its findings have been buried. The outgoing interim prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, took office vowing to right Mr Thaksin's wrongs. Yet this week he said there was insufficient evidence to take legal action over the killings. It is easy to see why the tide has turned. Sunai Phasuk, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, a lobbying group, says that the panel's original report named the politicians who egged on the gunmen. But after the PPP won last month's elections, those names were omitted." [http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10566797 "Thailand's drug wars. Back on the offensive"] . January 24, 2008. "The Economist."]

The "New York Times" reported on April 8, 2003:

"Since the death of 9-year-old Chakraphan, there have been frequent reports in the Thai press of summary executions and their innocent victims. There was the 16-month-old girl who was shot dead along with her mother, Raiwan Khwanthongyen. There was the pregnant woman, Daranee Tasanawadee, who was killed in front of her two young sons. There was the 8-year-old boy, Jirasak Unthong, who was the only witness to the killing of his parents as they headed home from a temple fair. There was Suwit Baison, 23, a cameraman for a local television station, who fell to his knees in tears in front of Mr. Thaksin and begged for an investigation into the killing of his parents. His stepfather had once been arrested for smoking marijuana, Mr. Suwit said. When the police offered to drop the charge if he would admit to using methamphetamines, he opted instead to pay the $100 fine for marijuana use. Both parents were shot dead as they returned home from the police station on a motorbike. Mr. Suwit said 10 other people in his neighborhood had also been killed after surrendering to the police."

Education policies

Thaksin implemented a series of revolutionary but highly controversial series of educational reforms during his government. Chief among those reforms was school decentralization, as mandated by the 1997 People's Constitution. [ [http://www.thaiembdc.org/politics/govtment/policy/54thpolicy/policy_e.html 54th Thai Government Policy ] ] Although discussed by academics for decades, this policy was first implemented by the Thaksin government, in tandem with decentralization of taxation, public utilities, and other community services to locally-elected Tambon Administrative Organizations (TAOs). Decentralization would have delegated school management from the over-centralized and bureaucratized Ministry of Education to TAOs. The plan met with massive widespread opposition from Thailand's 700,000 teachers, who would be deprived of their status as civil servants. [ [http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=36491 Pm Wants Small Schools Kept Open - Thailand Forum ] ] There was also widespread fear from teachers that TAOs lack the skills and capabilities required to manage schools. In the face of massive teacher protests and threats of school closure, [ [http://etna.mcot.net/query.php?nid=5008 MCOT English News ] ] Thaksin compromised and gave teachers whose schools were transferred to TAO management two years to transfer to other schools. Teachers formed a core part of the anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The issue caused massive controversy. The usually anti-Thaksin newspaper The Nation said in an editorial "Using such extreme tactics (threatening school closure) is not much different from holding schoolchildren hostage to force the Thaksin administration to comply with all of the teachers’ demands... the protesters have refused to enter a dialogue, let alone compromise". [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2005/11/18/opinion/data/opinion_19190901.html]

Other reforms included learning reform and related curricular decentralization, mostly through greater use of holistic education and less rote learning. [http://www.thailearn.net/schoolreform/4081.html โรงเรียนปฏิรูปการเรียนรู้เพื่อพัฒนาคุณภาพผู้เรียน ] ] Under the new decentralized curricular system, it became important to stress teachers independence and creativity, thus leading to the implementation of reforms to improve teach training and quality assurance. A new teacher licensing system was approved 29 May 2002. The Teaching Profession Development Association of Thailand was launched, and currently has 55 Networks/Centers/Associations and approximately 40,000 members.

Thaksin also initiated the controversial "One District, One Dream School" project, aimed at developing the quality of schools to ensure that every district has at least one high-quality school. Each of the 921 schools covered by the initial stages of the project received 2.5 million baht on average from the Government and another 2.5 million baht from donors. Tax reductions were offered to those who give donations to the schools. The money was used mainly to develop libraries, laboratories, purchase of computers, and develop teacher skills. The project was criticized, with some claiming that the only beneficiaries were Thaksin and companies selling computers and educational equipment.

Thaksin also initiated the Income Contingency Loan program to increase access to higher education. Under the program, needy students may secure a loan to support their studies from vocational to university levels. Thai banks had traditionally not given education loans. Students would repay the loan, interest-free, by installments when they start earning salaries. [ [http://thailand.prd.go.th/ebook/review/content.php?chapterID=19 Inside Thailand Review :: Government Strategy :: ] ]

Energy policies

In energy policy, the Thaksin government took a U-turn from liberalization reform proposed under the Chuan administration, in favor of a model that emphasized privatization of state-owned companies but with little emphasis on competition or regulatory oversight. This policy change has been strongly criticized. The Thaksin administration has also pushed strongly in developing renewable power and promoting conservation.

Privatization

On September 2001, the National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) approved the partial listing of PTT, the state-owned oil and gas company. [ [http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cns14513.htm Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections - Thailand's energy office approves PTT's listing scheme ] ] Like Chuan, Thaksin has repeatedly attempted to privatize the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). One of the goals of the privatization was to raise THB 42 billion from an IPO and use the funds to invest in three new natural-gas powered power plants.

PTT promptly became the largest company by market capitalization upon listing in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). PTT greatly benefited from the global increase in world-wide oil prices following the invasion of Iraq, and the rise in its stock price helped propel the SET to a boom in 2003. However, anti-Thaksin critics have claimed that PTT's bull run was due to manipulation by Thaksin. [ [http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=36937 AsiaMedia :: THAILAND: PM's cronies big winners, says study ] ]

In early 2004, massive employee protests forced the EGAT Governor to resign, thus delaying the planned corporatization and privatization of the state enterprise. New Governor Kraisri Karnasuta worked with employees to address their concerns about the privatization, and by December 2004, approximately 80% of employees supported privatization. [ [http://jpmc.lonebuffalo.com/story.cfm?story_id=975788] ] Permanent protest stages and tents at the EGAT headquarters were taken down as the state enterprise returned to normalcy. After the Mahachon Party (the only party that was officially against privatization of state enterprises) won only 2 seats in the February parliamentary elections, the process towards EGAT's privatization was restarted. The agency was corporatized in June 2005, transforming it from the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand to EGAT PLC. However, EGAT's privatization was abruptly delayed when some NGOs and some Union members filed a petition with the Supreme Court a few days before the scheduled listing. [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2005/11/12/business/data/business_19137516.html]

On 23 March 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled against the privatization of EGAT PLC, citing conflicts of interest, public hearing irregularities, and the continued right of expropriating public land. [ [http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/24Mar2006_news01.php] Dead link|date=March 2008] [ [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/03/24/headlines/headlines_30000086.php Court ends privatisation of Egat ] ] The court said that Olarn Chaipravat, a board member of PTT and Shin Corporation [ [http://www.pttplc.com/en/ptt_core.asp?page=ap_or_bo_detail&id=40 PTT Public Company Limited ] ] (both business partners with EGAT), was on a committee involved in the legal preparation for Egat's privatisation. The court questioned the neutrality of Parinya Nutalai, chair of the public hearing panel on the Egat listing, because he was Vice Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment. It also ruled that insufficient opportunities were given for EGAT employees to make themselves heard - there was only one public hearing for employees during which only 1,057 attended. Lastly, EGAT PLC continued to have the right to expropriate public land to build power plants and transmission lines, a right reserved for the state. Two decrees were nullified: one ordering the dissolution of the status of EGAT as a state enterprise, and the other serving as a new charter for EGAT PLC.

Union leaders and anti-Thaksin protestors cheered the ruling, and called for the renationalization of other privatized state enterprises, [ [http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/24Mar2006_news09.php] Dead link|date=March 2008] [ [http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/24Mar2006_news08.php] Dead link|date=March 2008] like PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP) and Thai Airways International (both privatized in 1992 [ [http://thaiairways.com/About_Thai/Public_Information/Company_Profile/Developments.htm About THAI ] ] [ [http://www.ptt-ep.com/en/about_pttep/profile.asp] ] ), PTT PCL, TOT PCL, MCOT PCL, Thailand Post Co Ltd, and CAT Telecom PCL. [ [http://www.thailandpost.com/about_history_en.asp Thailand Post ไปรษณีย์ไทย ] ] Like EGAT, PTT also retained land expropriation rights after it privatized. However, this was one of the grounds for the nullification of the EGAT privatization. Caretaker Finance Minister Thanong Bidaya has noted that the delisting and renationalization of PTT could force the government to borrow massively from foreign institutions. [ [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/03/25/business/business_30000127.php PTT braces itself for legal action ] ]

Some criticized that the listing of PTT on the SET on the grounds that it represented a massive transfer of public assets for the benefit of a relative few. Though the government initially targeted over 100,000 first-time investors, there were reports that the majority of the shares for sale to retail investors had been reserved for politicians, banks’ preferred clients and journalists, leaving retail investors who stood in long lines to return home empty-handed. A nephew of Suriya Juengrungruangkit, the minister of Industry overseeing PTT and TRT Party secretary general, for example, was reported to have acquired 22 times the maximum amount of PTT shares distributed to retail investors. [http://palangthai.org/docs/PA77.3Thailand.pdf] Fears of this being repeated were often cited as the reason why EGAT's privatization was delayed. Another key argument for delaying privatization was that privatization preceded the establishment of an independent energy regulatory authority. In international experience, there are no examples of successful monopoly utility privatization without regulatory oversight. Under pressure, the Thaksin administration did eventually form an interim electricity regulatory body, but it lacks authority to force compliance, levy fines, or punish defaulters. [ [http://netmeter.org/en/story/28 NetMeter.org: The public interest, and the pursuit of profit ] ] EGAT employee concerns about employment security were also common. Some expressed concern that partial ownership of Thailand's largest electricity producer by foreign shareholders would impact national security.

However, the anti-privatization petitioners (including the Confederation of Consumer Organisations, People Living with HIV/Aids, Alternative Energy Project for Sustainability, Free Trade Area Watch, and the Four Region Slum Network [ [http://netmeter.org/en/story/39 NetMeter.org: Egat investors forewarned ] ] ) have been harshly criticized by both Thai and international investors, who accuse them of using underhand tactics in delaying the listing. They also point to the public mandate of the 2005 election, during which the only anti-privatization party suffered a near complete loss. International power sector governance experts from Harvard University, University of Delaware, and the World Resources Institute lauded the successful repeal of EGAT privatization as an important step towards increased accountability and transparency in the Thai power sector.

Conservation and renewables

To counteract rising energy prices, the Thaksin government started a massive energy conservation drive. Consumers were encouraged to reduce household usage, some companies were forced to reduce their opening hours to reduce electricity consumption, and gasohol became more widespread. Although the government attempted to subsidize energy prices, it eventually had to float diesel prices in early 2005 due to global price trends. Thaksin's government has also targeted that by 2011, 8% of the nation’s total energy demand (approximately 1,900 MW) would come from renewable sources. Renewable sources accounted for only 1% of electricity generated in 2004. [ [http://www.business-in-asia.com/energy/strenthen_sustainability.htm Alternate Energy Industry in Thailand ] ]

A key component of the renewable strategy is the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). Under the RPS, power companies that wish to bid to supply power to EGAT must produce 5% of their installed energy generating capacity from renewable sources. Dr. Surachet Tamronglak, director of the Energy for Environment Foundation estimates that the RPS will result in the generation of 600 MW of power from renewable sources within the next 10 years. The remaining 1,300 MW of renewable power is expected to be supplied by SPPs (small power producers - most of which already use renewable energy or natural gas), enabling the country to achieve its 8% renewable energy target.

The RPS has been criticized by NGOs, who claim that only large power companies will have the technical resources to efficiently generate electricity using renewable sources.

Foreign policies

On foreign policy, Thaksin has said that "Thailand requires a progressive foreign policy that firmly supports its domestic counterpart". [ [http://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/statemnt/pm/sifa031203.html Forward Engagement: the New Era of Thailand's Foreign Policy, Inaugural Lecture at the Saranrom Institute of Foreign Affairs by H.E. Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, Thailand, 12 March 2003 ] ] This included forcing diplomats to support domestic economic programs, for instance promoting abroad the products of the OTOP small and medium enterprise development program. This policy has been fiercely attacked by some prominent career diplomats, with Surapong Jayanama, former ambassador to Vietnam, spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and candidate in the 2006 Senate elections claiming that Thaksin's domestic-consumption focused policies are "demeaning" and did little to enhance Thailand's global stature. [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/03/19/national/national_20003056.php Ex-envoy castigates Thaksin's diplomacy ] ] He has also initiated negotiations for several free trade agreements (FTA) with China, Australia, Bahrain, India, and the US. This policy has also been strongly criticized. It has been claimed, for instance, that the FTA with Australia will wipe out Thailand's domestic dairy industry, initiated by King Bhumibol Adulyadej nearly 40 years ago, but with costs 30% higher than Australia's. [ [http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=983 Milking Thailand: The Thai-Australia Free Trade Agreement ] ]

In a highly controversial move, Thailand joined George W. Bush's multinational coalition in the invasion of Iraq, sending a 423-strong humanitarian contingent. It withdrew the last of its troops on 10 September 2004. Thailand lost two soldiers in Iraq in an insurgent attack. Thaksin has also announced that Thailand would forsake foreign aid, and work with donor countries to assist in the development of neighbours, especially in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. [ [http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3502 Thaksin's Chance for Leading Role in the Region ] ]

Thailand has drawn international criticism regarding the massacre at Tak Bai. Former diplomat Surapong Jayanama claimed that it harmed diplomatic relations with Malaysia and other Islamic countries. The former respected diplomat said "Thaksin had tried to copy the tough style of Malaysian statesman Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore leader Lee Kuan Yew but only succeeded in adopting their more negative qualities,"

Thaksin has also been attacked by influential former diplomats for acting undiplomatically with foreign leaders. Kasit Pirom, former Thai ambassador to Japan and the United States, noted at an anti-Thaksin rally "When Khun Thaksin went to the United Nations to attend a joint UN-Asean session, he did not behave properly when addressing the session, which was co-chaired by the UN secretary-general and the Malaysian premier. In his address Thaksin did not mention the name of the Malaysian premier". [ [http://nationmultimedia.com/2006/03/26/headlines/headlines_30000240.php Ex-envoys tell of 'multi-tasking' premier ] ]

Notes