Folk psychology

Folk psychology (also known as common sense psychology, naïve psychology or vernacular psychology) is the set of assumptions, constructs, and convictions that makes up the everyday language in which people discuss human psychology. Folk psychology embraces everyday concepts like “beliefs”, "desires”, “fear”, and “hope".

Folk psychology as a theory

A theory is a group of principles or rules which are used to explain how a certain phenomenon works. Folk psychology is interpreted as a theory when the ‘common sense’ perceptions of one’s daily life (such as those of pain, pleasure, excitement, anxiety, etc.) are interpreted as principles that are used to explain mental states. When our ordinary view of mental states is interpreted as a ‘common sense’ or folk theory of mind, it is referred to as the theory theory.^[1] The theory of mind consisting of our ‘common sense’ understanding mental states can be interpreted two distinct ways, in an external sense and an internal sense.

Principles

As a set of folk theories, folk psychology is a passively (sometimes actively) gathered and occasionally invoked compendium of day-to-day non-critical postulation.^{[citation needed]} Likewise, all folk theory combine to serve as a code of wisdom, assorted from experiences of a limited but "adequate" level of confirmation. In principle, folk theorization is a complex, haphazard activity of the mind in a struggle to inform actions, opinions or a concept of the world, based on the joined account of known fact, hearsay and personal experience; or rather, correlating the outward aspects of human behaviors, mental states (sometimes linked to broader conditions), and a register of situations, to certain attitudes and developments.^{[citation needed]}

An important hallmark of a folk theory, as such, is its not being subject to the rigorous experimentation characteristic of empirical science. One could say, however, that folk psychology resembles heuristics, specifically a sort of people-heuristics, albeit with less inclination to revision. Folk theories will commonly exhibit a logically deductive structure, suggesting a close relationship to schools of reason and rationality.^{[citation needed]} In this light, folk theory could be viewed as a "lazy mind's science," or a precursor to formal human examination.

Folk theory typically influences people's value judgments and ultimately their social action.^{[citation needed]} Evolutionarily, acquiring a rudimentary catalog of "common sense" psychological knowledge that is serviceable when presented with limited time for social maneuvering is quite handy, but not without pitfalls. Reinforcement of a cherished folk theory may be erroneously taken as proof of principle, and transit to the realm of "fact". Solidifying of folk theory may prevent adoption of a more informed truth realized only later. The overwhelming nature of the resulting dissonance might then to lead to the rejection of broader fact.^{[citation needed]}

Manifestations

Folk psychology is seen as manifested in common sense, proverbs and metaphors.

Examples

Many philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein and Sellars, have denied that the alleged theoretical entities posited by folk psychology ("beliefs", "desires", etc.) have any causal status.^{[citation needed]} According to the theory-theory, a typical causal or counterfactual generalization (or law) of folk psychology would be characterized schematically as follows:

If X wants that Y, and believes that Z is necessary for Y, then X will do Z.

If, as Wittgenstein claims^{[citation needed]}, propositional attitudes are not causes, then this would turn out to be meaningless. However, it is not clear on this analysis what properties such mental states do have, if not that of causality.

In the view of Daniel Dennett,^[2] X wants that Y and believes that Z is necessary for Y just in case it can be predictively attributed these beliefs and desires. He maintains this even if it is a simple animal, such as a frog, or a non-living object, such as a robot. In this, he declines to identify beliefs or desires with specific natural kinds. Thus, our folk-psychological talk about beliefs and desires is essential and frequently true, but does not concern entities in the brain.

Another perspective: It has been argued (during past academic dialog) that individuals, beginning at some infantile stage, are responding in an adaptive manner to the world around us; more specifically the people in it. The stated anecdotal evidence is the seemingly uncanny (naive, functional) tendency of a child to try to manipulate those raising them to satisfy their needs/wants. And, often being incredibly successful at it. In the case of abuse and neglect, this development is contaminated and twisted, leaving the child with very dysfunctional relational and behavioral patterns—complete with often pathological explanations and justifications for their actions and emotive states.

If such explanation and analysis is valid, it would appear most likely to fit within development constructs, Therefore, the best definition(s) and understanding of it may well be found or inferred via developmental theories. As such, it is not then necessarily evolutionary (in a purely random or macro evolutionary sense), nor locked in stasis at a particular stage of development. Rather, it is likely subject to complex changes ranging from further life experiences in general, education both formal and informal, and, especially, the social norms and pressures, including interpretive explanations of those groups.

Another inference is that we all are practicing our own unique "brand" of naive psychology virtually all the time. Social animals that we are, we are both influenced and influencing each other in overt and subtle ways (conscious and unconscious). The worst possible personal condition then is that we compound our very likely and common interpretive errors with the errors of others and warp our perception of reality by being naive to this then "normal" naive state. Awareness of this naive state and any possibility of directed (micro evolutionary) adaptive growth is significantly enhanced by an admission of its personal and pervasive probability—and hindered by any and all denial that we are somehow magically not subject to it.

Rejections and responses to folk psychology

Folk psychology relies largely on the clause of ceteris paribus, i.e. “all else being equal”. For example, if John was hungry, and John had a bowl of mashed potatoes, and John thought eating those mashed potatoes would satisfy his hunger, then John would eat the mashed potatoes, ceteris paribus. Many philosophers (e.g. Nancy Cartwright) say that using ceteris paribus makes a statement vacuous because it makes a statement incapable of being disconfirmed. For example, they would take the sentence “If Pooh were hungry and had some honey, Pooh would eat the honey, ceteris paribus” as “If Pooh were hungry and had some honey, Pooh would eat the honey, unless he didn’t”. Jerry Fodor would argue that those philosophers would be defining ceteris paribus in the wrong way. Fodor says that a claim in commonsense psychology relies on ceteris paribus in the same way that any hard science would. Fodor states, “For surely ‘Ceteris paribus, a meandering river erodes its outside bank’ means something like ‘A meandering river erodes its outside bank in any nomologically possible world where the operative idealizations of geology are satisfied.’ That this is, in general, stronger than ‘P in any world where not not-P’ is certain. So if, as it would appear, commonsense psychology relies upon its ceteris paribus clauses, so too does geology.”^{[3][page needed]}

Many philosophers^[who?] believe that if Folk Psychology is to be a theory, there should be generalizations to be taken from the theory and used. If these generalizations really are as common-sense as folk psychology would lead one to believe, then people should be aware of them, but in actuality, there are few of these generalizations that can be held to be true.

There are philosophers who believe that the ontology of folk psychology, meaning the idea of beliefs, desires, intentions and so on, are so incorrect that in time, modern science will overwrite and eliminate what we know as folk psychology. These philosophers are known as eliminative materialists, one of their leading defenders being Paul Churchland. Eliminative materialism states that the mental states that folk psychologists believe to be part of the mind, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions don’t actually exist. There are three main arguments which Churchland uses against folk psychology:

1. Folk psychology, as a whole, does not explain very much
2. The theory is stagnant and has not developed much throughout its history
3. It seems unlikely that the categories of which folk psychology speaks (beliefs, desire intentions, etc.) will “reduce” to physical categories, meaning scientists will not be able to scientifically explain those categories, hence, they will not be scientifically proven

Tim Crane refutes each of these claims in his book The Mechanical Mind. In Churchland’s first claim against folk psychology, he states that folk psychology cannot explain things such as “[T]he nature and dynamics of mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination… [and] the nature and psychological function of sleep.” Crane asks why a theory pertaining to beliefs and desires should try to explain things such as mental illness and sleep. He also suggests that a reason for the theory being so stagnant throughout the ages is that it is well established, rather than lacking the ability to evolve. Finally, in response to Churchland’s third argument, Crane says that even if folk psychology’s categories are not explainable by physics, there should be no reason why it should be necessary for it to be explained by physics in the first place to be true. As many philosophers believe, there may be many things explainable beyond the realm of physics.^{[4][page needed]}

Reception

Folk physics, the untrained human perception of basic physical phenomena, has been, to a large extent, shown to be inadequate in providing robust explanations of various physical phenomena.^{[citation needed]} Similarly, folk psychology's validity is a subject of lively debate in the philosophy of mind.

Philosophers take various attitudes toward the possibility of vindicating / extending folk psychology by allowing its theoretical terms (e.g. 'belief' 'desire' etc.) to play a role in serious scientific theorizing.

Among the advocates of such a possibility, Jerry Fodor is surely the most famous (for a defense of this view see his 1987 book "Psychosemantics"). The other extreme is exemplified by eliminative materialists, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland and Stephen Stich. Although Stich no longer considers himself an eliminativist, his book, "From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief" generated much attention for eliminative materialism.

Philosopher Daniel Dennett's intentional stance theory can be viewed as a third apex of the triangle formed by the representation theory of mind (like Fodor) and the eliminative materialists (like Churchland).^{[improper synthesis?]} He concedes some aspects of eliminativism (arguing that folk psychological entities will not/cannot match discoveries of science) whilst still seeing the value of folk psychological concepts as both essential to our understandings of and dealings with other people, and as grounded in real regularities in human behavior.^{[citation needed]}

See also

• Behaviorism
• Belief
• Eliminative materialism
• Instrumentalism
• Philosophy of mind
• Propositional attitude

References

1. ^ Ravenscroft, Ian (2010). "Folk Psychology as a Theory". In Zalta, Edward N.. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory. 
2. ^ Daniel C. Dennett (1996), The Intentional Stance (6th printing), Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-54053-3 (First published 1987).
3. ^ Fodor, Jerry (1989). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. ISBN 9780262560528. 
4. ^ Crane, Tim (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A philosophical introduction to minds, machines, and mental representation. New York, NY: Routledge. 

Further reading

• Geary, D. C. (2005). Folk knowledge and academic learning. In B. J. Ellis & D. F. Bjorklund (Eds.), Origins of the social mind (pp. 493–519). New York: Guilford Publications. Full text
• Horgan, T. and Woodward, J. (1999). Folk Psychology is Here to Stay. In Lycan, W.G., (Ed.), Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, 2nd Edition. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
• Hutto, Daniel D. (2008). "Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons", Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-08367-6
• Leslie, Alan M.(2000). The New Cognitive Neurosciences,Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press/A Bradford Book
• Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking commonsense psychology a critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation. Hampshire, England: Palgrave MacMillan.

External links

• "Folk" Psychology as Mental Simulation