Kafr Qasim massacre

civilians dead, including 6 women and 23 children aged 8-17. Arab sources usually give the death toll as 49, as they include the unborn child of one of the women.

The border policemen who were involved in the shooting were brought to trial and some served short prison sentences. The case established an important legal principle on when security personnel should disobey illegal orders.

Background

On the day the Suez War broke out, Israel's intelligence service expected Jordan to enter the war on Egypt's side [Benny Morris, "Righteous Victims", p.289] . Acting on this intelligence, soldiers were stationed along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier [http://www.morainevalley.edu/ctl/MiddleEast/images/Map_Israel1949_1967.jpg] .

From 1949 to 1966, Arab citizens were regarded by Israel as a hostile population, and major Arab population centers were governed by military administrations divided into several districts. As such, several battalions of the Israel Border Police, under the command of Israel Defense Forces brigade commander Colonel Issachar Shadmi, were ordered to prepare the defense of a section close to the border officially known as the Central District, and colloquially as the Triangle. It contained seven villages close to the border, not far from Tel Aviv, where about 40,000 Israeli Arab citizens lived. It was regarded as a strategically weak point by Israel, and regularly patrolled by soldiers to halt infiltration of fedayeen and other Arabs across the border.

Timeline

On October 29, 1956, the Israeli army ordered that all Arab villages near the Jordanian border be placed under a wartime curfew from 5 p.m. to 6 a.m. on the following day. Any Arab on the streets was to be shot. The order was given to border police units at 3:30 before most of the Arabs from the villages could be notified. Many of them were at work at the time. That morning, Shadmi, who was in charge of the Triangle, received orders to take all precautionary measures to ensure quiet on the Jordanian border. On Shadmi's initiative, the official nightly curfew in the twelve villages under his jurisdiction was changed from the regular hours. Shadmi then gathered all the border patrol battalion commanders under his command, and reportedly ordered them to 'shoot on sight' any villagers violating the curfew. Once the order was given, the commander of one of Shadmi's battalions, Major Shmuel Malinki, who was in charge of the Border Guard unit at the village of Kafr Qasim, asked Shadmi on how to react to those villagers who were unaware of the curfew.

Malinki later testified as follows:

' [Shadmi said] anyone who left his house would be shot. It would be best if on the first night there were 'a few like that' and on the following nights they would be more careful. I asked: in the light of that, I can understand that a guerilla is to be killed but what about the fate of the Arab civilians? And they may come back to the village in the evening from the valley, from settlements or from the fields, and won't know about the curfew in the village - I suppose I am to have sentries at the approaches to the village? To this Col. Issachar replied in crystal clear words, 'I don't want sentimentality and I don't want arrests, there will be no arrests'. I said: 'Even though?'. To that he answered me in Arabic, "Allah Yarhamu", which I understood as equivalent to the Hebrew phrase, 'Blessed be the true judge' [said on receiving news of a person's death] '.

Shadmi, however, denied that the matter of the returnees ever came up in his conversation with Malinki.

Malinki issued a similar order to the reserve forces attached to his battalion, shortly before the curfew was enforced: "No inhabitants shall be allowed to leave his home during the curfew. Anyone leaving his home shall be shot; there shall be no arrests." (ibid., p.141)

At 4.30 p.m., the mukhtar (mayor) of Kafr Qasim was informed of the new time. He asked what would happen to the about 400 villagers working outside the village in the fields that were not aware of the new time. An officer assured him that they would be taken care of. When word of the curfew change was sent, most returned immediately, but others did not.

Between 5 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., in nine separate shooting incidents, the platoon led by Lt. Gabriel Dahan that was stationed in Kafr Qasim all together killed nineteen men, six women, ten teenage boys (age 14-17), six girls (age 12-15), and seven young boys (age 8-13), who did not make it home before curfew. [http://journals.cambridge.org/bin/bladerunner?30REQEVENT=&REQAUTH=0&500001REQSUB=&REQSTR1=S0020743803000163] .One survivor, Jamal Farij, recalls arriving at the entrance to the village in a truck with 28 passengers:-

'We talked to them. We asked if they wanted our identity cards. They didn't. Suddenly one of them said, 'Cut them down' - and they opened fire on us like a flood.' [Yoav Stern: [http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/780569.html 50 years after massacre, Kafr Qasem wants answers] (Ha'aretz, 30 October 2006)]

The many injured were left unattended, and could not be succoured by their families because of the 24 hour curfew. The dead were collected and buried in a mass grave by Arabs, taken for that purpose, from the nearby village of Jaljuliya. When the curfew ended, the wounded were picked up from the streets and trucked to hospitals. [ [http://www.art.net/%7Esamia/Fiftieth/introduction.html Kafr Qasem Memorial Exhibition 1956 ] ]

No villagers in other villages under Shadmi's control were shot, because local commanders gave direct orders to disobey Shadmi's and Malinki's orders by holding fire. Also, among the platoons stationed in Kafr Qasim itself, only the one led by Dahan actually opened fire.

Following events

News of the incident leaked out almost immediately, however it took two months of lobbying by communist Knesset Members Tawfik Toubi and Meir Vilner, and members of the press before the government lifted the media blackout imposed by David Ben-Gurion. Meanwhile, the government had started to conduct an internal inquiry, involving, among others, the Criminal Investigations Division of the military police.Cite book|author=Asher, Danny|month=April|year=2008|publisher=Israeli Ministry of Defense|title=Red and Blue - A Corps's Story 1948–2008|pages=pp. 48-49 he icon] To limit publicity, a military cordon was maintained around the village for months, preventing journalists from approaching (Robinson p.400).

Following public protests, eleven Border Police officers and soldiers involved in the massacre were charged with murder. On October 16, 1958, eight of them were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms. Malinki received 17 and Dahan 15 years imprisonment. The court placed great emphasis on the fundamental responsibility of Shadmi, though the latter was not a defendant. Shadmi was subsequently charged as well, but his separate court hearing (February 29, 1959) found him innocent of murder and only guilty of extending the curfew without authority. His symbolic punishment, a fine of 10 "prutot", i.e. a "grush" (10 Israeli cents), became a standard metaphor in Israeli polemic debate. (Robinson, Lipmann, Bilsky). The fact that other local commanders realised they had to disobey Shadmi's order was cited by the court as one of the reasons for denying Dahan's claim that he had no choice.

The court of appeal (April 3, 1959) reduced Malinki's sentence to 14 years and Dahan's to 10. The Chief of Staff further reduced them to 10 and 8 years, then the Israeli President reduced them to 5 years each. Finally, the Committee for the Release of Prisoner's ordered the remission of one third of the prison sentences, resulting in all the convicted persons being out of prison by November 1959. (Lipmann) Soon after his release, Malinki was promoted and put in charge of security for the top secret Negev Nuclear Research Center. In 1960, Dahan was placed in charge of "Arab Affairs" by the city of Ramla (Bilsky, p322).

Legal impact

The Kafr Qasim trial considered for the first time the issue of when Israeli security personnel are required to disobey illegal orders. The judges decided that soldiers do not have the obligation to examine each and every order in detail as to its legality, nor were they entitled to disobey orders merely on a subjective feeling that they might be illegal. On the other hand, some orders were "manifestly" illegal, and these "must" be disobeyed. Judge Benjamin Halevy's words, still much-quoted today, were that "The distinguishing mark of a manifestly illegal order is that above such an order should fly, like a black flag, a warning saying: 'Prohibited!'." (Lippman, Bilsky)

The incident was partly responsible for gradual changes in Israel's policy toward Arab citizens of Israel. By 1966, the military administration was abolished.

Memorials

On November 20 1957, 400 distinguished guests and representatives from different sectors of Israeli society, including Knesset members, cabinet ministers, members from the then ruling Mapai party, national trade union officials, and notable members from neighboring Arab villages, held a reconciliation ceremony in memory of the victims at Kafr Qasim. The government subsequently distributed reparations to the family of the victims.

In October 2006, Yuli Tamir, the education minister in Israel, ordered schools around the country to observe the Kafr Qasim massacre and to reflect upon the need to disobey illegal orders. In December 2007, President of Israel Shimon Peres apologised for the massacre. [ [http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/937116.html President Peres apologizes for Kafr Qasem massacre of 1956] Haaretz, 21 December 2007]

The townspeople of Kafr Qasim annually observe the massacre and a commemorative memorial was raised in the village. A museum dealing with the events was opened on October 29 2006. [ [http://www.art.net/%7Esamia/Fiftieth/introduction.html Kafr Qasem Memorial Exhibition 1956 ] ] [cite news|title=Islamic Movement head: We're staying in Israel, dead or alive|author=Yuli Kromchenko and Yoav Stern|date=2006-10-29|publisher=Haaretz|url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/780898.html]

Operation Hafarferet

Approximately 1/3 of the court hearings were held in secret, and the transcript has never been published. According to journalist Ruvik Rosenthal, the court received descriptions of a secret plan called Operation Hafarferet (mole) to expel the Arabs of the Little Triangle in case of a war with Jordan. However, Rosenthal found no evidence that the killings were part of the plan or in any way pre-planned. Like many tentative scenarios, such a plan has never been put into effect.

References

* Shira Robinson, Local struggle, national struggle: Palestinian responses to the Kafr Qasim massacre and its aftermath, 1956-66, "International Journal of Middle East Studies", vol 35 (2003), 393–416.
* Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, Owl Books, 2000, ISBN 0-8050-6660-8, pp298-302.
* Leora Y. Bilsky, Transformative Justice : Israeli Identity on Trial (Law, Meaning, and Violence), University of Michigan Press, 2004, ISBN 0-472-03037-X, pp169-197, 310-324.
* Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, Monthly Review Press, 1977, ISBN 0-85345-406-X.
* M. R. Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope of the Superior Orders Defense, "Penn State International Law Review", Fall 2001.
* Israel Military Court of Appeal, judgment (translated), "Palestine Yearbook of International Law", Vol II, 1985, 69-118.

External links

* [http://www.kufur-kassem.com/cms/ Kufur-Kassem home page] ar icon
* [http://www.pmwatch.org/pmw/manager/features/display_message.asp?mid=363 Report of Israeli Cabinet deliberations]
* Yoav Stern: [http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/780569.html 50 years after massacre, Kafr Qasem wants answers] (Ha'aretz, 30 October 2006)

*Rami Issa: [http://www.kafr-qassem.net/content/category/1/31/ kafr-qassem massacre]
*Rami Issa: [http://www.kafr-qassem.net/ Kafr-qassem official Home page]