Casablanca directive

The Casablanca directiveChurchill [http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=fpVyh9aAGCAC&pg=PA458&sig=ACfU3U3ucvqjaeZnyERtssIJLPhNIWIdgw p. 458] ] [Other Designations
*Combined Chiefs of Staff designation C.C.S. 166/1/D (United States Department of State p. 781)
*Royal Air Force internal filing designation: C.S. 16536 S.46368 A.C.A.S. Ops. (Harris p.196)] was a policy on the objectives of the Allied aerial warfare strategy during the Second World War that was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th meeting on 21 January 1943 and issued to the appropriate the Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Force commanders on 4 February 1943.Harris [http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jzzl8wUn52cC&pg=PA194&lpg=PA194&dq=S.46368&source=web&ots=CZivLuIVkQ&sig=JQbIrT0zoON5wZ6eKD5zhOeVN2k&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA196,M1 p. 196] ]

Contents

The memorandum (C.C.S. 166/1/D) by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 21 January 1943:quotation

The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom

Directive to the appropriate British and U.S. Air Force Commanders to govern the operation of the British and U.S. Bomber Commands in the United Kingdom (Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th meeting on 21 January 1943)

:1. Your Primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

:2. Within that General concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the following order of priority:

::(a) German submarine construction yards. ::(b) The German aircraft industry. ::(c) Transportation. ::(d) Oil plants. ::(e) Other targets in enemy war industry.

The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be attacked. Examples of these are:

:(1) Submarine operating bases on the Biscay coast. If these can be put out of action, a great step forward will have been taken in the U-boat war which the C.C.S have agreed to be a first charge on our resources. Day and night attacks on these bases have been inaugurated and should be continued so that an assessment of their effects can be made as soon as possible. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary. These objectives have not been included in the order of priority, which coves the long term operations, particularly as the bases are not situated in Germany.:(2) Berlin, which should be attacked when the conditions are suitable for the attainment of the specially valuable results unfavorable to the moral of the enemy or favorable to that of the Russians.

:3. You may also be required, at the appropriate time, to attack objectives in Northern Italy on connection with amphibious operations in the Mediterranean theater.:4. There may be certain other objectives of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary planes and preparations should be made. Of theses, an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.:5. You should take every opportunity to attack Germany by day, to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on the German day fighter force, and to contain German fighter strength away from the Russian and Mediterranean theaters of war.:6. When the Allied armies reeneter the Continent, you will afford them all possible support in the manner most effective.:7. In attacking objectives in occupied territories, you will conform to such instructions as may be issued from time to time for political reasons by His Majesty's Government through the British Chiefs of Staff.
United States Department of State [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS194143.p0781&isize=M p. 781] ]

(C.C.S. 166/1/D) was a revised and expanded version of the "C.C.S 166" which had been presented for discussion to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 20 January by the British Chiefs of Staff. The discussions bought up several issues such as how to phrase the memorandum to balance the concerns of the different stake holders such as the priority to give to anti-u-boat activities and support for the operations to take place in the Mediterranean theatre. Two changes were proposed and agreed that "for political reasons" should be inserted into "... issued from time to time [for political reasons] by His Majesty's Government ..." and that the word "synthetic" was removed "Synthentic oil plants". Further changes were made to the British draft of the memorandum in the ordering of some of the sentences.United States Department of State [http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS194143.p0755&isize=M pp. 669-672] ]

A modified version of the Casablanca directive as sent to RAF Bomber Command on 4 February 1945:

Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris published the directive in his book "Despatch on War Operations: 23rd February, 1942, to 8th May, 1945" with an attached a note to the bottom.

The RAF Bomber command version contains most of the information that is in the C.C.S. memorandum but in a different order and in the note at the bottom it makes it clear that this directive replaced general directive No. 5, that is often referred to as the Area Bombing Directive. Missing from the Bomber command directive are mention of "point 4" in the C.C.S. version — objectives of great but fleeting importance such as the German Fleet — and point 7 which is redundant as RAF Bomber Command already obeyed orders originating from the Chiefs of Staff Committee (British Chiefs of Staff) whatever their military or political origins.

Despite the lack of an explicit mention of point four in the Bomber Command version of the directive, Bomber Command was involved in attacking the German capital ships only a few days after this directive reached them, when along with all the other arms of the British armed forces they failed to prevent the successful Channel Dash made by the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen, supported by a number of smaller ships.

Notes

References

*Churchill, Winston. "The Second World War. Vol.5: Closing the Ring" , Houghton Mifflin Books, 1986 ISBN 0395410592
*Harris, Arthur Travers; Cox, Sebastian (1995). "Despatch on War Operations: 23rd February, 1942, to 8th May, 1945", Routledge, ISBN 071464692X.
*United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States. The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (1941-1943). III. The Casablanca Conference, pp. [485] -849 ff.

Further reading

*Delleman Paul. [http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/delleman.html LeMay and Harris the "Objective" Exemplified] " [http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apje.html Air & Space Power Journal] " [http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc.html Chronicles Online Journal] . Accessed 14 July 2008.
*Lambourne, Nicola "War Damage in Western Europe", Edinburgh University Press, 2000, ISBN0748612858 [http://books.google.com/books?id=u7oyrzWBRLIC&pg=PA140&lr=&as_brr=3&sig=ACfU3U1GDqbXkRrBCCb0WEqoAlpMyj84cQ p.140]
*Wolk, Herman S. [http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2003/0103casa.asp Decision at Casablanca] [http://www.afa.org/ Air Force Magazine online] , January 2003, Vol. 86, No. 1
*Wise S. F.; Greenhous, Brereton; Douglas, W. A. B. "The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force", Department of National Defence, Government Publishing Centre, Canada Supply andServices Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada, ISBN 0802005748. [http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=xcvFbza5RSoC&pg=RA1-PA657&sig=ACfU3U1j6cCLFyIJx1DYWMyfEOt3buzmMw p. 657]