History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria

:"This article refers to the Syrian organisation called the Muslim Brotherhood; for other organisations that use the same name, see the Muslim Brotherhood article."

Towards the end of the 1930s, the ideas of Hassan al-Banna reached Syria as young Syrians, who had graduated from university in Cairo and participated in the Muslim Brotherhood there, returned home and founded associations called "Muhammad's Youth" ("Shabab Muhammad"), which were to become the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. By 1954, the Syrian association, under the leadership of Mustafa al-Siba'i, was able to offer assistance to its Egyptian sister organisation, which Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser was then subjecting to severe repression. [Carré , 125.]

However, it was not until the 1960s that the Syrian Brotherhood came to play a major role in politics, as part of a broad-based resistance movement, which developed into armed struggle, against an authoritarian regime. After the Ba'thist military coup of 8 March 1963, the new regime made itself extremely unpopular by drastically restricting political freedoms, launching a campaign against Islam and in favour of atheism, and concentrating power in the hands of the military and the country's Alawite minority, marginalising the Sunni majority. From the start, Islamic political groups, of which the Brotherhood was the most prominent, represented the strongest opposition to the regime. In 1964 and 1965, strikes and mass demonstrations spread throughout Syria's major cities, and were crushed by the military. In 1970, General Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, seized power; in 1973 violent demonstrations broke out again in response to a proposed constitution that did not require the president to be a Muslim. Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war in 1976 on the side of the Maronites (and hence technically on the side of Israel) sparked renewed agitation in Syria, and assassinations began to target members of the Syrian regime and prominent Alawites; the Muslim Brotherhood later claimed responsibility for most of these. [Carré, 131-135, 156.] [ICG, 3-4.]

On 16 June 1979, members of the Fighting Vanguard, a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, carried out an attack on the Military Academy of Aleppo, killing at least 83 cadets as well as an officer, Dr. Yusef al Yusef. This incident is often cited by secular activist Wafa Sultan as the reason she came to oppose Islam in general. The Syrian government responded by sentencing about 15 prisoners, who had already been accused of being Iraqi agents, to death for belonging to the Islamic resistance movement. Terrorist attacks then became a daily occurrence, particularly in Aleppo and other northern cities. The government tended to ascribe these attacks to the Brotherhood, but as the armed resistance gained widespread popular support and more loosely defined armed groups appeared, especially in poor neighborhoods, it became difficult to determine the extent of the Brotherhood's involvement. [Carré, 135-137.]

In November 1979, a Brotherhood leaflet stated:

We reject all forms of despotism, out of respect for the very principles of Islam, and we don't demand the fall of Pharaoh so that another one can take his place. Religion is not imposed by force.... [Carré, 139.]

In the days leading up to 8 March 1980 (the seventeenth anniversary of the Ba'thist coup), nearly all Syrian cities were paralysed by strikes and protests, which developed into pitched battles with security forces. Many organisations, both religious and secular, were involved, including the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime responded with overwhelming military force, sending in tens of thousands of troops, supported by tanks and helicopters. In and around Aleppo, hundreds of demonstrators were killed, and eight thousand were arrested. By April, the uprising had been crushed. [Carré, 141-146.]

In June 1980, the Brotherhood tried and failed to assassinate president Assad. The military retaliated by massacring between 500 and 1,100 prisoners, mostly Muslim Brothers or others allied with them, in the prison of Palmyra. The Syrian public did not find out about this until January 1981, when some of the soldiers who had carried out the massacre were arrested in Jordan for attempting to assassinate the Jordanian prime minister, Mudar Badran, who the Syrian government accused of supporting the Brotherhood, and an interrogation of the soldiers was broadcast on Jordanian television. [Carré, 146-148.]

A few days after the Palmyra massacre, a newspaper article by the president's brother, Rif'at al-Assad, stated that the regime was prepared to "sacrifice a million martyrs" (over a tenth of Syria's population at that time) in order to stamp out "the nation's enemies". On 7 July 1980, the government passed a law making membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death. Typically, however, the regime practiced indiscriminate, collective punishment: in August, after an attack on soldiers stationed in Aleppo, the army executed 80 residents of a block of flats that happened to be located nearby. In April 1981, after a failed terrorist attack on an Alawite village near Hama, the army executed about 400 of Hama's inhabitants, chosen randomly among the male population over the age of 14. [Carré, 148-151.]

During a 50-day moratorium on the application of the 7 July law, over a thousand Muslim Brothers turned themselves in, hoping to escape the death penalty; information published about them in the official press may give some insight into the composition of the Brotherhood's membership at that time. Most of those who gave themselves up were students under twenty-five years of age, from Damascus and other large cities; others were schoolteachers, professors or engineers. [Carré, 151.]

In August, September and November 1981, the Brotherhood carried out three car-bomb attacks against government and military targets in Damascus, killing hundreds of people, according to the official press. On 2 February 1982, the Brotherhood led a major insurrection in Hama, rapidly taking control of the city; the military responded by bombing Hama (whose population was about 250,000) throughout the rest of the month, killing between 10,000 and 30,000 people. The tragedy of Hama marked the defeat of the Brotherhood, and the militant Islamic movement in general, as a political force in Syria. [Carré, 159.] [ICG, 4.]

Having suppressed all opposition, Hafez al-Assad released some imprisoned members of the Brotherhood in the mid-1990s. After his death in 2000, Assad was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad, who initially signalled greater openness to political debate. In May 2001, encouraged this new political climate, the Muslim Brotherhood published a statement in London rejecting political violence, and calling for a modern, democratic state. Many political prisoners, including Muslim Brothers, were pardoned and released. However, this "Damascus spring" was short-lived; in the same year, the few political freedoms that had been granted were abruptly revoked. [ICG, 4, 7-8.]

Although its leadership is in exile, the Brotherhood continues to enjoy considerable sympathy among Syrians. Riyyad al-Turk, a secular opposition leader, considers it "the most credible" Syrian opposition group. The Brotherhood has continued to advocate a democratic political system; it has abandoned its calls for violent resistance and for the application of "shari'a" law, as well as for Sunni uprisings against Alawites. Al-Turk and others in the secular opposition are inclined to take this evolution seriously, as a sign of the Brotherhood's greater political maturity, and believe that the Brotherhood would now be willing to participate in a democratic system of government. [ICG, 15, 17]

In a January 2006 interview, the Brotherhood's leader, Ali Bayanouni, "said the Muslim Brotherhood wants a peaceful change of government in Damascus and the establishment of a 'civil, democratic state', not an Islamic republic." [McCarthy 2006.]

Notes

References

* Carré, Olivier and Gérard Michaud. 1983. "Les Frères musulmans : Egypte et Syrie (1928-1982)". Paris: Gallimard.
* International Crisis Group. 11 February 2004. [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2516&l=1 "Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges"] . Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group.
* McCarthy, Rory. 26 January 2006. [http://www.guardian.co.uk/syria/story/0,,1694985,00.html "We would share power, says exiled leader of Syrian Islamist group"] . London: "The Guardian".