Battle of Cape Passero (1940)

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of Cape Passero (1940)
partof=the Mediterranean Theater of World War II


caption=British light cruiser HMS "Ajax".
date=October 12 1940
place=Mediterranean, southeast of Sicily
result=British victory
combatant1=flagicon|United Kingdom United Kingdom
combatant2=flagicon|Italy|1861 Kingdom of Italy
commander1=flagicon|United Kingdom|naval Captain E. D. B. McCarthy
commander2=flagicon|Italy|1861-state Captain Carlo MargottiniKIA
strength1=2 cruisers
strength2=4 destroyers
3 torpedo boats
casualties1=1 cruiser damaged
13 dead
casualties2=1 destroyer sunk
2 torpedo boats sunk
1 destroyer damaged
around 200 deadThe Battle of Cape Passero (1940), was a naval engagement between the British light cruiser HMS "Ajax" and seven torpedo boats and destroyers of the "Regia Marina", southeast of Sicily, on the first hours of October 12, 1940, during the Second World War. It took place in the aftermath of a British supply operation to Malta.

Background

On October 1940, the Mediterranean Fleet mounted a resupply operation to Malta from Alexandria, code-named "MB6". The convoy had four cargo ships escorted by two antiaircraft cruisers and four destroyers. The screening force was leading by Admiral Cunningham flagship, HMS "Warspite", three battleships, two carriers, six cruisers and 16 destroyers. The only remarkable incident concerning the convoy was the damage taken on HMS "Imperial" when she ran into a minefield. The merchantmen reached destiny on 11 October. Until then, bad weather had prevented the intervention of the Italian fleet. An airliner spotted the returning formation shortly after it departed Malta. The HMS "Ajax", meanwhile, was detached along the other cruisers in a scouting mission, at a speed of 15 knots. [Green & Massignani, page 97.]

The engagement

The Italian fleet commander, Admiral Inigo Campioni, ordered a force of destroyers to steam out to Cape Bon, just in case the British warships were heading to Gibraltar. He determined that it was too late for Italians heavy units to operate against the convoy. A flotilla of four destroyers and three torpedo boats were at the same time scouting between 35º 45'N and 35º 25'N of latitude, [De la Sierra, page 122.] each ship spaced some 3 miles apart, in full moonlight. [Greene & Massignani, page 97.] The Italian destroyers, all of them of the "Soldati" class, were the "Artigliere", the "Camicia Nera", the "Aviere" and the "Geniere". The torpedo boat line comprised the "Spica" class "Ariel", the "Alcione" and the "Airone".

Torpedo boat action

At 01:37 AM, the "Ajax" was sighted from the "Alcione" crow's nest steaming to east, 19,600 yards at port side. At 01:48, the three torpedo boats were closing to the British cruiser at full speed. The cruiser was completely unaware of the enemy approach. [De la Sierra, page 123] At 01:57, the "Alcione" fired two torpedoes. The range was of just 1,900 yards. [Greene & Massignani, page 97.] Captain Banfi, commander of the formation, ordered the flagship "Airone" to open fire on the enemy with her 3.9in guns, followed by her sister ships. Three rounds hit home, two on the bridge and the another 6 feet under the waterline. [De la Sierra, page 124] Meanwhile, at 1:55, the "Ajax" had realized she was under attack, and consequently she opened fire to the nearest torpedo boat, while steaming at full speed. This ship came to be the "Ariel", which was shattered by the salvos. The torpedo boat sank only 20 minutes after. It's believed that she was able to fire one of her torpedoes. [Greene & Massignani, page 98.] Captain Mario Ruta, his second in command and most of the crew was killed. [De la Sierra, page 125.] The "Airone" was the next Italian ship to be hit. She managed to launch two torpedoes before. The torpedo boat was disabled and caught fire almost immediately, her bridge and upper deck machine-gunned by the "Ajax" at short range. [Greene & Massignani, page 98.] She sank a few hours later. Banfi was among the survivors. Then the "Alcione", the only Italian warship undamaged, broke contact at 2:03. [De la Sierra, page 125.]

Destroyer action

Meanwhile, the "Ajax", after diverting course during the fighting, had reversed it back to the eastward. At 02:15, her fire-control radar began to track two Italian destroyers, whose commander, Captain Carlo Margottini, had sighted the firing from the south. A radio mishap prevented Margottini to attack in full strength, when three of his destroyers headed to the north-west, instead of the north as ordered. [De la Sierra, pp. 125-126.] The Aviere was battered by a sudden broadside from the British cruiser, and was forced to pull out south, heavily damaged. She was unable to launch torpedoes, as her commander intended to do. [De la Sierra, page 126.] At 2:30, Maringotti sighted the "Ajax". He was about to launch torpedoes when his ship was fired on by the cruiser's guns. The "Artigliere" managed to fire a torpedo and three full salvos at 2,800 yards before being hit and crippled. The torpedo missed, but four 4.7in rounds struck two secondary artillery turrets in the "Ajax" and disabled her radar. [De la Sierra, pp. 126-127] After firing at the "Camicia Nera" without results, the "Ajax", with 13 dead onboard and more than 20 wounded, broke off the action. She had fired 490 rounds of different caliber and four torpedoes. The cruiser repairs took almost a full month before she was back to action again. [ [http://www.regiamarina.net/engagements/capopassero/capopassero_us.htm#prof www.regiamarina.org] ] The disabled "Artigliere", with her commander and most of the staff officers killed, was taken in tow by the "Camicia Nera". They were surprised at first light by the cruiser HMS "York", which scared off the "Camicia Nera" and finished the "Artigliere". The survivors were rescued the next day by the Italian navy. [Green & Massignani, page 98.]

Aftermath

The "Regia Marina" realized for first time the superior skills and equipment of the British warship in night operations. The extensive use of starshells, searchlights and incendiary rounds by the "Royal Navy" had to be counter if the Italians wanted to close the technical gap. They also suspected the use of radar by the enemy, but by this time this was only speculation. [Greene & Massignani, page 99, quotes the Italian memo:

"Every progress in this field will be of paramount importance and perhaps the most important element to organise will be to co-ordinate the employment of searchlights and flares shells from the outset of the action."

] They concluded that the flawed air surveillance hampered the quick reaction of the Italian heavy units, giving the advantage to the British of avoiding contact where the conditions were not favorable to them. [Bragadin, page 40]

Notes

References

* Bragadin, Marc'Antonio: "The Italian Navy in World War II", United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1957. ISBN 0405130317.

* Green, Jack & Massignani, Alessandro: "The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943", Chatam Publishing, London, 1998. ISBN 1861760574.

* Sierra, Luis de la: "La guerra naval en el Mediterráneo, 1940-1943", Ed. Juventud, Barcelona, 1976. ISBN 84-261-0264-6. es.

External links

* [http://www.regiamarina.net/engagements/capopassero/capopassero_us.htm#prof "Battle off Cape Passero"]