British–Zionist conflict

Between 1945 and 1948, the refusal of the British government to allow Jewish immigration to Palestine led to an increasingly bitter conflict between Britain and Palestinian Jews. In particular it resulted in large scale illegal Jewish immigration, "boat people", and terrorism in Palestine. The policy of opposing Zionism led to deep divisions within the British leadership and anti-semitism in BritainFact|date=September 2008.

British attitudes towards the Jews during the Second World War

Although the British Mandate for Palestine designated the area as a Jewish national homeFact|date=September 2008, the British repudiated any linkage between Palestine and the situation of European Jews (in contrast they did regard themselves as responsible for protecting the Palestinian Arabs from Jewish encroachment).

In response to a request to help Spanish Jews trapped in Eastern Europe, Lord Moyne, Minister Resident in the Middle East, stated:

Military authorities have suggested that we should not relieve the Axis powers of the problem which these Jews represent by assuming the burden ourselves and thereby adding to the strain on our limited transport and resources [UK Public Records Office document: FO 371/42724 Item 146 April 1944, written in response to a request to help 65 Jews holding Spanish passports leave occupied Europe.] .

During World War II, small numbers of Jews escaped Europe with the intention of going to Palestine. Most of those (about 2,000) were interned in a British camp in Mauritius. Opportunities did arise to rescue Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Jews. However at the Bermuda conference on the issue, British delegate Richard Law opposed any rescue effort that

would be relieving Hitler of an obligation to take care of these useless people”. [UK Public Records Office document: FO 371/42724 145 13/4/44 ]

Illegal migration

The continued application of the 1939 White Paper forced the Zionist movement to turn to illegal migration. Over the next few years in Europe and North Africa, tens of thousands of Jews, many of them Holocaust survivors, risked their lives in overcrowded small boats, despite the almost certain knowledge that it would lead to incarceration in a British prison camp (most boats were caught). The determination of these Jews to leave Europe (a parallel movement out of the Arab world was only just beginning) and the absence of alternative destinations fatally undermined British policy in Palestine.

The 1939 White Paper planned to end Jewish migration in March 1944 and in February 1944 The Irgun, now led by Menachem Begin, ended the wartime truce and began blowing up British offices related to immigration and tax collection. [ [http://www.etzel.org.il/english/index2.html ETZEL ] ] In November 1944, Etzel assassinated Lord Moyne, the antisemitic British minister in Cairo.

The Jewish Agency Executive condemned the attacks and called on its members to inform on known members of the Irgun. Leftist Zionist assistance (Irgun were Revisionists, or Political Zionists, at odds with the Labour Zionist movement, known as Practical Zionists) led to the arrest of some 1000 Irgun members, 250 of which were held indefinitely and without trial in internment camps in Eritrea [ [http://www.etzel.org.il/english/index2.html ETZEL ] ] .

In Europe former Jewish partisans led by Abba Kovner began to organize escape routes taking Jews from Eastern Europe down to the Mediterranean where the Jewish Agency organized ships to illegally carry them to Palestine. ["Flight and Rescue: Brichah", written by Yehuda Bauer, published by Random House; New York, 1970 ]

British officials in the liberated zones tried to halt this Jewish immigration by refusing to recognize Jews as a national group and demanding that they return to their places of origin. As a result, Jews displaced by the war (displaced persons) were expected to share accommodation with non-Jewish DPs some of whom were former Nazi collaborators, now seeking asylum. Food allocation to Jewish DPs was lower than to German civiliansFact|date=September 2008 in an effort to encourage them to return ‘home’ and Jews escaping post-war anti-Semitic attacks in Eastern Europe were refused support on the grounds that they were not displaced by the war. [ A. Kochavi, "Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States and Jewish Refugees 1945-1948" (Chapel-Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2001),pp 45-56. Y. Bauer, "Out of the Ashes: The Impact of American Jews on Post-Holocaust European Jewry" (Oxford: Pergamon 1989) chapter 2. ] In order to prevent Jewish illegal migrants reaching Palestine a naval blockade was established to stop boats carrying illegal migrants and there was extensive intelligence gathering and diplomatic pressure on countries through which the migrants were passing or from whose ports the ships were coming.

In 1945, US President Harry S. Truman sent a personal representative, Earl G. Harrison, to investigate the situation of the Jewish survivors in Europe. Harrison reported that

substantial unofficial and unauthorized movements of people must be expected, and these will require considerable force to prevent, for the patience of many of the persons involved is, and in my opinion with justification, nearing the breaking point. It cannot be overemphasized that many of these people are now desperate, that they have become accustomed under German rule to employ every possible means to reach their end, and that the fear of death does not restrain them. [http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/harrison_report.htm accessed Nov 2007]

US policy in the liberated zones increasingly focussed on helping Jews escape Eastern Europe.

Haganah joins the conflict

Despite winning the 1945 British election with a manifesto promising to create a Jewish state in PalestineFact|date=September 2008, the Labour Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin decided to maintain existing policy and keep Palestine closed to Jewish migration.

In October 1945, the Zionist Haganah entered into an alliance with the Irgun and ceased cooperation with the British.

In April 1946 the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry reported that given a chance, half a million Jews would immigrate to Palestine:

In Poland, Hungary and Roumania, the chief desire is to get out……The vast majority of the Jewish displaced persons and migrants, however, believe that the only place which offers a prospect is Palestine”. [Inquiry Report http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/anglo/angch02.htm chapter II paragraph 12]

A survey of Jewish DPs found 96.8% would choose Palestine. [Y. Bauer, Out "of the Ashes: The Impact of American Jews on Post-Holocaust European Jewry" (Oxford: Pergamon 1989) pg 86, Z.V. Hadari, "Second Exodus: The Full Story of Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine 1945-1948" (London: Valentine Mitchell 1991) page 18. In reality less wanted to go to Palestine but DP’s responded to Zionist requests that they write Palestine.] The Anglo-American Committee recommended that 100,000 Jews be immediately admitted into Palestine.

Despite British government promises to abide by the committee's decision, the British decided to persist with a ban on Jewish migration.

The British begin holding illegal Jewish immigrants in prison camps on Cyprus

In June 1946, on "Black Sabbath", the British confiscated the Jewish Agency headquarters in Jerusalem and arrested the leadership of the Jewish Agency, holding them without trial. [ [http://www.etzel.org.il/english/index2.html ETZEL ] ] The leadership of the Haganah now gave Jewish terror groups permission to attack British Army headquarters in Palestine. [ M. Begin, "The Revolt: Memoirs of the Commander of the National Military Organization" (Tel-Aviv: 1984 in Hebrew), chapter 8. ]

On 4 July 1946 46 Jews were lynched in Kielce, Poland, greatly increasing the flow of Jews from Eastern Europe. Although this incident received the most publicity, it was just one of manyFact|date=September 2008.

On 22 July 1946 the headquarters of the British army in Palestine (the King David Hotel) was blown up by the Irgun, killing over 100 people.

The following week four ships carrying 6,000 illegal immigrants arrived in Haifa, completely overflowing the temporary prison for illegal migrants at Atlit. [ The Times 3/8/1946 Pg4.]

On 7 August 1946 there were 2,232 on board a ship at Haifa waiting for a decision on their future, an additional 2,500 due to arrive and unknown thousands expected to follow. The British government decided to intern all illegal immigrants.

In October 1946, in fulfillment of the recommendation of the Anglo-American Committee, Britain decided to allow a further 96,000 Jews into Palestine at a rate of 1,500 a month. Half this monthly quota was allocated to Jews in the prisons on Cyprus. Granting the prisoners entrance permits reduced the likelihood of an eruption on Cyprus, by Cypriots fearful of a large Jewish presence on their soil, or by the Jewish prisoners and, it was hoped, eased pressure in Palestine. [ British Public Records Office, document folder FO 371/52651 ]

The Cypriot Communist Party, which dominated the island’s political life, opposed British rule and supported Greek demands for union. Cyprus was the only place in the Middle East where Britain had full sovereignty and it was considered of great strategic importance to the British Empire. Lord Winster, the Governor of Cyprus demanded guarantees that the Jews would leave. He feared that Cyprus could become a new Palestine. [ New York Times 11/8/46 pg.35 ]

The main alternative to Cyprus was Kenya, however Kenya was taking the 251 suspected Jewish terrorists, held without trial, from the British concentration camp in Eritrea [ [http://www.etzel.org.il/english/index2.html ETZEL ] ] . This was considered more important as these prisoners were “dangerous killers”. Kenya’s governor was opposed to the creation of large camps in his territory as he feared that Jewish immigrants would never leave. He considered them to be “the dregs of the population of Europe”. [ A. Kochavi, "Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States and Jewish Refugees 1945-1948" (Chapel-Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2001), chapters 2 & 3 ] Camp costs were paid by the Government of Palestine. The Cyprus camps cost 1.2 million pounds to construct. In mid 1947 Secretary of State for the Colonies, Creech-Jones, estimated the monthly maintenance of the camps at 45,000 pounds. [ House of Commons debate records, Volume 431 Column 366, 3/12/1946 Volume 436 Column 1938 30/4/1947]

The British leave Palestine

From October 1946, opposition leader, Winston Churchill, began calling for Palestine to be given to the UN. [see the House of Commons Debates (Hansard), Volume 427 Column 1682 23/10/46 ]

In January 1947, all British civilians were evacuated from Palestine.

Britain was at this time negotiating a loan from the United States vital to its economic survival. Its treatment of Jewish survivors generated bad publicity and encouraged the US Congress to stiffen its terms. The post-war conflict in Palestine caused more damage to US-British relations than any other issue. [See "Post-Holocaust Politics Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948" by Arieh J. Kochavi, North Carolina 2001.]

In 1947 the United States chapter of the United Jewish Appeal raised 150 million dollars in its annual appeal – at that time the largest sum of money ever raised by a charity dependent on private contributions. Half was earmarked for Palestine. The Times reported that Palestine brought more dollars into the sterling zone than any other country, save Britain. [Jewish Telegraphic Agency 7/1/48, The Times 19/12/46 page 3 & 27/2/47 page 5.]

In April 1947 the issue was formally referred to the UN. By this time over 100,000 British soldiers were stationed in Palestine. Referral to the UN led to a period of uncertainty over Palestine’s future. A United Nations special committee (UNSCOP) investigated the problem and recommended solutions.

In May a spectacular break-out was staged by 200 Jewish prisoners at the main high-security prison in Palestine at Acre. In June a number of Irgun terrorists were sentenced to death. Etzel responded to the sentences by kidnapping a number of British officers and promising to execute them if its members were hanged. On July 29 1947 the three Jews were executed and the next day the three British officers were found dead.

Following this incident the British government decided to return one ship, the Exodus-1947, to its port of origin in France instead of imprisoning the 4,500 passengers on Cyprus. The passengers refused to disembark, spending weeks in difficult conditions. They were eventually forcibly removed at Hamburg and returned to DP camps. The event became a major media event, influencing UN deliberations and exacerbating anti-semitism in Britain. During the affair (August 1947), there were anti-Jewish riots in every major British city. [Jewish Chronicle 8/8/47 & 22/8/47, both page 1. For a discussion of anti-Semitism in Britain see T. Kushner, "The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British society during the Second World War" (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1989).] Dubious|date=September 2008

Britain rejects the UN partition decision

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended partition, and on 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into two states. The partition resolution (181) intended administration of Palestine to be in the hands of five UN representatives and assumed free Jewish immigration into the Jewish area even before the creation of a Jewish state:

The mandatory power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish state, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later then 1 February 1948. [UN resolution 181 section 1A. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm ]

Britain refused to comply with these conditions on the grounds that the decision was unacceptable to the Arabs. It neither allowed Jewish immigration outside the monthly quota nor granted control to the UN representatives (who became known as the “five lonely pilgrims”). A statement issued by the British Ambassador to the UN stated that the inmates on Cyprus would be released with the termination of the mandate. [The Times 22/1/48 pg.4, Trygve Lie, "In the Cause of Peace, Seven Years with the United Nations " (New York: MacMillan 1954) pg.163]

Over the remaining period of British rule, British policy was to ensure that the Arabs did not resist Britain or blame it for partition. Convinced that partition was unworkable, the British refused to assist the UN in any way that might require British forces to remain on Palestinian soil (to implement it) or turn their army into a target for Arab forces. The Chiefs of Staff in particular, believed they needed the Arabs on their side. Already embroiled in a war against the Jews, they were concerned not to get involved in a war with both sides while trying to withdraw and feared for their extensive Middle Eastern interests. [ British Public Records Office, Cabinet Minutes: CAB 128/6 74 (46) pg 248 (cabinet meeting 29/7/46) and CAB 129/22 CP(47) 320 Cabinet Meeting 3/12/47]

British support for the Arabs during the 1948 War

British society was divided over Palestine with some supporting the Arabs and some the Jews, however British foreign policy, as defined by Ernest Bevin, and its military policy, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was to help the Arabs.

In April 1948 the Security Council called upon all governments to prevent fighting personnel or arms from entering Palestine. Britain in particular was keen to limit entry of fighters as this justified their failure to implement resolution 181 or release the prisoners on Cyprus. There was concern by other members about fairness to the Jews as Arab arms and men were entering Palestine without interference. [Security Council Resolution 46(1948) 17/4/48]

British rule of Palestine formally ended on 15 May 1948 and the State of Israel was declared. Despite this, Britain agreed to release only Cyprus inmates of non-military age. 8,000 men between the ages of 18 and 45 were kept in captivity. 3,000 women refused to leave the Cyprus camps without their menfolk (and had 822 babies before being released).

Britain did release the 250 men held in Kenya as terrorists.

The day after Israel's declaration of independence, the armies of five Arab League members invaded Palestine. UN Secretary General Trygve Lie described this as

the first armed aggression which the world had seen since the end of the war”. [ Trygve Lie, "In the Cause of Peace, Seven Years with the United Nations " (New York: MacMillan 1954) pg.174]

Three of the invaders, Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq had mutual-defence treaties with Britain (Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930)) and received all their arms from Britain. Israel could not legally import arms because of the Security Council resolution banning arms imports into Palestine. [ Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1925): "Treaty between his Britannic Majesty and his Majesty the King of Iraq", League of Nations 1926 VI.A.6. Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty (1928) avaialable in C. Seton, "Legislation of Transjordan 1918-1930" (London 1930) pp703-741. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936] On 28 May 1948 the Security Council debated Palestine. The British proposed that the entry of arms and men of military age into Palestine should be restricted. At the request of the USA, the ban was extended to the whole region. A French amendment allowed immigration so long as soldiers were not recruited from immigrants. [Security Council Resolution 50(1948), clauses 2-4 in Index to resolutions of the Security Council : 1946-1991 (New York: United Nations 1992). See also Security Council Official Records No. 77 29/5/48] Britain cited this resolution as the justification for its refusal to release the Jews imprisoned on Cyprus. Since none were being released, this meant the prisoners were now being held without trial and with no possibility of release.

On 16 September 1948, Folke Bernadotte reported to the Security Council that the United Nations were supervising Israeli ports and placing new immigrants of fighting age who arrived in Palestine in camps so they could not participate in fighting. [Security Council Report 16/9/48 S/1025 paragraphs 32 & 34] The next day Bernadotte was assassinated by the Lehi faction. The assassination was approved by the three-man Lehi 'center': Yitzhak Shamir, Natan Yellin-Mor, and Yisrael Eldad.

The British prepare to invade Israel

In November 1948 Israel conquered the Negev. Fearing an invasion of Egypt and Transjordan, and acting on the basis of the mutual defence pacts with these countries, Britain’s Ministry of Defence began to prepare for the possibility of invading Israel. The RAF conducted reconnaissance flights over Israeli positions, taking off from Egyptian air bases. Some of these flights may have been conducted alongside Egyptian planes. [ TNA:PRO PREM 8/1251: minutes of cabinet meeting from 12/11/48 CM(48)61 for the flights see minutes of cabinet meeting of 17/1/48 CM(49)3 page 4] .

The British Cabinet decided that action could be taken to defend Transjordan, but that under no circumstances would British troops enter Palestine. In December 1948 Israeli troops made a twenty-mile incursion into Egyptian territory and Israeli forces completed the conquest of the Negev, reaching Umm Rash Rash (now Eilat) on the Red Sea. On 2 January 1949, fear of invasion and shortage of ammunition led Transjordan to invoke its mutual defence pact with Britain.

On 6 January 1949 Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease-fire and face-to-face negotiations in Rhodes. This was the first time an Arab state publicly agreed to meet representatives of the Jewish Agency or Israel.

The next day Israeli forces shot down three British Spitfires over the Egyptian border. [The Israeli Air Force story by Murray Rubenstein, Richard M. Goldman 1979] The UK Defence Committee responded by sending two destroyers carrying men and arms to Transjordan. [TNA:PRO FO 371/75293 E3002, telegram 59 (9/1/49).About 40 British officers were serving with the Transjordanian Army and were involved in the fighting in Palestine See FO 371/75297] Israel complained to the UN that these troops were in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 50: the one Britain was using to justify holding the Cyprus inmates. Britain denied this, claiming the resolution did not apply to Britain and that the troops were not new to the region as they had been transferred from Egypt.

On 17 January 1949 the Chief of Staff briefed the cabinet on events in the Middle East. Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, protested at the decision to send arms to Transjordan, taken by the Defence Committee without cabinet approval. He complained that British policy in Palestine was inconsistent with the spirit and tradition of Labour Party policy and was supported by the Deputy Prime-Minister, Herbert Morrison and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Cripps. [TNA:PRO PREM 8/1251, CAB 128/15 3(49) 17/1/49126The Observer 23/1/49] The cabinet voted to continue supporting the Arab states, but also voted to recognize Israel and release the Jews from Cyprus. The last immigrants left in late January and shortly after they left, Britain formally recognized Israel.

References

General sources

*Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes: The Impact of American Jews on Post-Holocaust European Jewry (Oxford: Pergamon 1989)
* Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue: Brichah, (Random House; New York 1970)
*Zeev Hadari, Second Exodus: The Full Story of Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine 1945-1948 (London: Valentine Mitchell 1991)
*Arieh Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States and Jewish Refugees 1945-1948 (Chapel-Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2001)
*Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: MacMillan 1954)
*Tony Kushner (academic), The Persistence of Prejudice: Antisemitism in British society during the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1989).
*Menachem Begin, The Revolt, 1951.

ee also

External links