- Joint Communique
The Joint Communique was an agreement signed in June 1963 between the
South Vietnam ese government ofNgo Dinh Diem and the Buddhist leadership of the country in an attempt to end theBuddhist crisis .Background
South Vietnam's Buddhist majority had long been discontented with the rule of President
Ngo Dinh Diem since his rise to power in 1955. Diem had shown strong favouritism towards his fellow Catholics and discrimination against Buddhists in the army, public service and distribution of government aid. In the countryside, Catholics were "de facto" exempt from performingcorvee labour and in some rural areas, Catholic priests led private armies against Buddhist villages. Discontent with Diem exploded into mass protest in Hue during the summer of 1963 when nineBuddhist s died at the hand of Diem's army and police onVesak , the birthday ofGautama Buddha . In May 1963, a law against the flying of religious flags was selectively invoked; theBuddhist flag was banned from display onVesak while theVatican flag was displayed to celebrate the anniversary of the consecration of ArchbishopNgo Dinh Thuc , Diem's brother. The Buddhists defied the ban and a protest that began with a march starting fromTu Dam Pagoda to the government broadcasting station was ended when government forces opened fire. As a result, Buddhist protests were held across the country and steadily grew in size, asking for the signing of aJoint Communique to end religious inequality. The pagodas was a major organising point for the Buddhist movement and was often the location of hunger strikes, barricades and protests. [Jones, pp. 142–143.] [Jacobs, pp. 247–250.]Negotiations
Negotiations were held in late May, but Diem stalled and attempted brush off Buddhist demands as the protests escalated. However, the self-immolation of the Buddhist monk
Thich Quang Duc generated worldwide headlines and turned up international pressure on Diem. He reluctantly ordered his government committee to resume negotiations with the Buddhist leadership. These became more high profile with the arrival ofThich Tri Quang and patriarchThich Tinh Khiet from Hue to negotiate with Diem's committee. With no immediate upsurge in demonstrations following the self-immolation, Diem assumed that the Buddhists were out of ideas. Diem took the Buddhists' initiation of negotiations to be an expression of weakness. Trueheart warned Diem that without meaningful concessions, the US would publicly repudiate his regime. Diem said that such a move would scupper the negotiations. After a delay of one day due to the need of the frail eighty-year old Thich Tinh Khiet to rest from the long journey south, Diem's committee met the Buddhist on June 14. The Buddhists pushed for revocation of the stipulation that only local officials could authorise flag displays. Pagodas had been regarded as communal property of the hamlets for centuries and the Buddhists insisted that they be put under religious administration. The Buddhists lobbied for Diem to immediately amend Decree Number 10 by Presidential Decree as allowed in the constitution, rather than wait for the National Assembly to do so. The National Assembly had announced a committee would be established on June 12 to deal with the issue. Tureheart recommended that the Interministerial Committee accept the Buddhist's position in a “spirit of amity” and then clarify the details at a later point. During the negoationts, Thich Tinh Khiet issued a nationwide plea to urge Buddhists to avoid any actions that could endanger the the talks while Diem ordered government officials to remove all barriers around the temples. By the end of the evening, substantial progress on the issues of the flags and Decree Number 10 had been announced. [Jones, pp. 273–275.]Agreement
On June 16, an agreement between the committee and the Buddhists was reached. An agreement had been reached pertaining to all five demands, although the terms were vague. Diem smugly asserted that it contained nothing that he had not already accepted. The "Joint Communique" asserted that the national flag "should always be respected and be put at its appropriate place." The National Assembly would consult with religious groups in an effort to removed them "from the regulations of Ordinance No. 10" and to establish new guidelines appropriate to their religious activities. In the meantime the government committee promised a loose application of the regulation. It also promised leniency in the censorship of Buddhist literature and prayer books and the granting of permits to construct Buddhist pagodas, schools and charitable institutions.Hammer, p. 148.] Both sides agreed to form an investigative committee to "re-examine" the Buddhist grievances and Diem agreed to grant a full amnesty to all Buddhists who had protested against the government. The agreement stated the "normal and purely religious activity" could go unhindered without the need for government permission in pagodas or the headquarters of the General Association of Buddhists. Diem also promised an inquiry into the Hue shootings and punishment for any found guilty, although it denied government involvement. In an attempt to save face, Diem signed the agreement directly under a paragraph declaring that "the articles written in this joint communiqué have been approved in principle by me from the beginning," which he added with his own handwriting. [Jones, p. 276.] The Communique was also signed by the members of the committee: Tho, Thuan and Luong as well as the members of the Buddhist delegation.
The joint communiqué was presented to the press on June 16, and Thich Tinh Khiet thanked Diem and exhorted the Buddhist community to work with the government in what he optimistically predicted would be a new era of religious harmony. He expressed his "conviction that the joint communiqué will inaugurate a new era and that . . . no erroneous action from whatever quarter will occur again." He also declared that he protest movement was over, and called on Buddhists to return to their normal lives and pray for the success of the agreement.Jacobs, p. 150.]
The acting US ambassador,
William Trueheart was sceptical about its implementation, noting "If we find Diem in a mood to freeze up, rather than move forward, then I think his days are numbered and we must begin to make moves." The troubles had become a public relations issue for Diem beyond his country, with speculation about a US-Diem rift being discussed in American newspapers following the self-immolation. "The New York Times " ran a front page headline on June 14 citing leaked government information that diplomats had privately attacked Diem’s handling of the crisis. It also reported that GeneralPaul Harkins , the head of the US advisory mission in South Vietnam to order his men not to assist ARVN units that were taking action against demonstrators. The US at the time considered telling Vice President Tho that they would support him replacing Diem as President. This occurred at the time as the surfacing of rumours that Vietnamese Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant ColonelDo Khac Mai had began gauging support among his colleagues for a coup. [Jones, pp. 275–276.]Failure
The communiqué was put in doubt by an incident outside
Xa Loi Pagoda on the following day, shortly after 9:00 a.m. A crowd of around 2000 people were confronted by police who still persisted in ringing the pagoda in spite of the agreement. A riot eventually broke out and police attacked the crowd with tear gas, fire hoses, clubs and gunfire. One protestor was killed and scores more injured. Moderates from both sides urged calm while some government officials blamed "extremist elements". AnAssociated Press story described the riot as "the most violent anti-Government outburst in South Vietnam in years." [Jones, p. 277.]The agreement would only be meaningful if it was put into action, regardless of Thich Tinh Khiet's announcement to his disciples that it heralded a new era. This required the monks to return to their normal lives and government and its officials to implement its promises. Many protesters arrested in the past remained in jail contrary to the communiqué's promises. After the deadly riot occurred only a day after the signing of the communique, the crisis steepened as more Buddhists began calling for a change of government and younger monks such as Thich Tri Quang began to come to the forefront, blaming Diem for discontent that was hindering the effort against the Vietcong. The Buddhists were suspicious of the government and began to step up the production of critical pamphlets and began translating articles critical of Diem in the western media to distribute to Vietnamese. As the promises continued to fail to be materialised, the demonstrations at Xa Loi and elsewhere continued to grow. [Hammer, pp. 149–150.]
Thich Tinh Khiet sent Diem a letter after the funeral of Thich Quang Duc, asserting that the government was not observing the communiqué and that the condition of Buddhists in South Vietnam had deteriorated. Tho denied the allegation, but it was the statements of Nhu that were more telling. He told a reporter that "If anyone is oppressed in this affair, it is the government which has been constantly attack and whose mouth has been shut with Scotch tape." He criticised the agreements through his Republican youth calling on the population to "resist the indirections [sic] of superstition and fanaticism" and warned against "communists who may abuse the Joint Communique". [Hammer, pp. 152–153.] A US State Department report concluded that the religious disquiet was not fomented by communist elements but that communists were "waiting expectantly in the wings for a propitious moment to capitalize on developments." In the meantime the government had quietly informed local officials that the agreements were a "tactical retreat" to buy time before decisive putting down the Buddhist movement. Diem’s regime stalled on implementing the release of Buddhists who had been released for protesting against it. This lead to a discussion within the US government to push for the removal of the Nhus, who were regarded as the extremist influence over Diem, from power.
Henry Cabot Lodge was also announced as the new US ambassador effective in late August, replacing Nolting, who had been considered too close to Diem. [Jones, p. 278.]Notes
References
*cite book| title=A Death in November| authorlink=Ellen Hammer| first=Ellen J.|last=Hammer| year=1987 |publisher=
E. P. Dutton |isbn=0-525-24210-4
*cite book| first=Seth |last=Jacobs| year=2006| title=Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963| publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers | isbn=0-7425-4447-8
*cite book| first=Howard |last=Jones| year=2003| title= Death of a Generation| publisher=Oxford University Press | isbn=0-19-505286-2
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