René Massigli

René Massigli (1888-February 3, 1988) was a French diplomat who played a leading as a senior official at the Quai d'Orsay, and was regarded as one of the leading French experts on Germany.

Early career

The son of a Protestant law professor, Massigli joined the French foreign service during the First World War. During World War I, Massigli served in the "Maisonde la Presse" section of the Quai d'Orsay in Bern, Switzerland, where he analyzed German newspapers for the French government.Ulrich, page 132] In the spring of 1919, Massigli was sent on several unofficial missions to Berlin to contact German officials about the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. [Ulrich, pages 132-133] In May 1919, Massagli met a series of secret meetings with various German officials in which he offered on behalf of his government to revise the peace terms of the upcoming Treaty of Versailles in Germany’s favour in regards to territorial and economic clauses of the proposed treaty.Trachtenberg, page 42] Massigli suggested “practical, verbal discussions” between French and German officials in the hope of creating "“collaboration franco-allemand”". During his meetings, Massigli let the Germans know of the deep divisions between the “Big Three” at the Paris Peace Conference, namely Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau.Trachtenberg, page 43] Speaking on behalf of the French government, Massilgi informed the Germans that the French considered the “Anglo-Saxon powers”, namely the United States and the British Empire to be the real post-war threat to France, argued that both France and Germany had a common interest in opposing “Anglo-Saxon domination” of the world and warned that the “deepening of opposition” between the French and the Germans “would lead to the ruin of both countries, to the advantage of the Anglo-Saxon powers”. The French overtures to the Germans was rejected by the latter because the Germans regarded the French offers to be a trap to trick them into accepting the Versailles treaty "as is" and because the German foreign minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that the United States was more likely to soften the peace terms then France.

The 1920s

Massigli served as the secretary-general for the Conference of Ambassadors between 1920-1931 before becoming the head of the Quai d'Orsay's section dealing with the League of Nations. Using a pseudonym, Massigli wrote an article in the "L'Ere Nouvelle" newspaper in March 1920, in which condemned "the revival of militarism" in Germany as represented by the Kapp Putsch, predicated that the "Reichswehr" would never accept democracy, but claimed that there was a genuine desire for democracy among the German people.Ulrich, page 135] In another series of articles published in June 1920, Massigli articulated what he regarded as the central dilemma of France’s German policy; namely to insist upon a too forceful enforcement of Versailles would undermine German moderates, but at the same time, enemies of democracy were strong in Germany, and thus to loosen Versailles would make the task of any potential future anti-democratic government in Germany easier. [Ulrich, pages 135-136]

During his time at the Conference of Ambassadors, Massigli was closely involved in the disputes about Upper Silesia, the Memelland, the Vilnius/Wilno dispute, the borders of Austria and Hungary, and the enforcement of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles (the section that dealt with disarmament).Ulrich, page 134] In the early 1920s, Massigli was known for his vigorous efforts to enforce Part V, and attempted to thwart German efforts to violate Part V. In Massigli's view, the French should be moderate in the enforcement of Versailles, but in return, the Germans must obey all of the articles of Versailles, above all Part V. As Massigli wrote: "The touchstone for Germany is the execution of the Treaty, or at least, since I am prepared to believe that certain of its clauses cannot be applied, to give evidence of goodwill in its execution. The starting point must be the disarmament of the "Reichswehr".Ulrich, page 136] In September 1923, during the Ruhr crisis, Massigli was sent to the Rhineland to report to Paris on the viability of the Rhenish separatist movement, and what support, if any France should offer the separatists. Massigli was very cool in his assessment of the Rhenish separatists, whom he described as badly organized and lacking in popular support, and advised against support for a Rhenish Republic.

Starting in the mid-1920s, Massigli came to relax his views, and started to advocate reconciliation with Germany, through not at the expense of French security. In 1925, Massigli played a major role in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Locarno. Through welcoming Gustav Stresemann's initiative in renouncing claims upon Alsace-Lorraine as a very important step for peace, in private Massigli was troubled by the refusal of the Germans to give similar guarantees for their neighbors in Eastern Europe, especially Poland or to abide by the terms of Part V. [Ulrich, pages 138-139] A close friend and associate of Aristide Briand, Massigli worked strongly in the late 1920s for Franco-German détente.Ulrich, page 137] However, Massigli never lost any of his concerns about the "Reichswehr", and felt that Franco-German rapprochement should best take place within the broader framework of European integration and collective security. As Massigli later told the historian Georges-Henri Soutou "Briandism had the great merit of drawing a good number of European states towards the French viewpoint." In accordance with these views, Massigli played a major role in working behind the scenes in the talks that led to Germany joining the League of Nations as a Council permanent member in 1926.Ulrich, page 140] For Massigli was open to revising Versaillies within Germany's favor, but only within the context of multilateral organizations like the League of Nations. In 1929-1930, Massigli worked closely with Briand in his project for creating a European "federation" that many have seen as a prototype for the European Union.

The 1930s

From 1930 on, Massigli was intimately involved in the preparatory work for the World Disarmament Conference scheduled to open in 1932. [Ulrich, page 141] The increasing divergence between German demands for "gleichberechtigung" (“equality of armaments”) (i.e. abolishing Part V) and the French demand for "sécurité" (“security”) (i.e. maintaining Part V) together with the strains in Franco-German relations imposed by the abortive Austrian-German customs project of 1931 left Massigli increasing disillusioned with the Weimar Republic. [Ulrich, 141-142] In 1931, Massigli advised the Premier Pierre Laval before his summit with the German Chancellor Dr. Heinrich Brüning that France should offer a bail-out for the collapsing German bank system only if the Germans were prepared to forgo the demand for "gleichberechtigung" at the upcoming World Disarmament Conference.Ulrich, page 142] Dr. Brüning refused the French conditions at his summit with Laval. Massigli was a prominent player at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, and helped to write famous "Barthou note" of April 17, 1934 issued by the Foreign Minister Louis Barthou that helped to terminate the conference. Massigli was especially opposed to the Premier, Édouard Herriot's acceptance in December 1932 "in principle" of "gleichberechtigung", predicating correctly that it would lead to opening the door for German rearmament.

In 1933, Massigli was appointed the Deputy Political Director at the French foreign ministry. During the 1930s, Massigli was a leading member of the so-called "Protestant clan", namely a group of Protestants who held high offices in the Quai d'Orsay.Duroselle, pages 217-218] As a diplomat, Massigli was noted for his efficency and his crisp, lucid writing style. In general, Massigli was identified with as an advocate of "firmness" in dealing with the new German government, and in note of December 11, 1933 argued that the main thrust of German policy would be to keep Franco-German relations in good state in exchange for French acceptance of German expansionism into Eastern Europe before turning west for a final showdown with France. [Ulrich, pages 142-143] Unlike his superior, the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay, Alexis Saint-Legér Léger, Massilgi was more open to enlisting Italy as an ally against Germany. During the crisis caused in March 1936 by German remilitarization of the Rhineland, Massigli urged that Paris use the crisis as a way of strengthening French ties with the United Kingdom and Belgium and the League of Nations.Ulrich, page 144] Massigli especially hoped to use the Rhineland crisis as a way of securing the British “continental commitment” (i.e. an unequivocal British commitment to defend France via an expeditionary force of the same size as the British Expeditionary Force of World War I). After meeting with the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in London in March 1936, Massigli was angry with what he regarded as the feeble British response to the Rhineland remilitarization. Massigli regarded the vague British promise to come to France's aid in the event of a German attack coupled with staff talks of very limited scope as a most unsatisfactory substitute for the “continental commitment”. In 1937, he was promoted the Political Director of the Qui d'Orsay upon the recommendation of Saint-Legér Léger.

During the crisis in 1938 occasioned over Czechoslovakia, Massigli was not in sympathy with his government's policy, and in private deplored the Munich Agreement as a disaster to France. [Ulrich, page 145] In September 1938, Massigli followed the Premier, Édouard Daladier to Munich as part of the French delegation, and upon his return to Paris, witnessing the vast cheering crowds, he wrote in a letter “Poor people, I am overwhelmed with shame.”Adamthwaite, page 150] After the Munich Agreement, Massigli wrote in memo that "Far from bringing Germany back to a policy of co-operation, the success of her method can only encourage her to persevere in it. The enormous sacrifice conceded by the Western powers will have no counterpart: once more we will be reduced to an act of faith in the peaceful evolution of the new Pangermanism." [Vaïsse, page 233] In August 1938, Massigli argued to the British Chargé de Affairs, Campbell what he saw as the significance of Czechoslovakia as way of blocking German expansion into Eastern Europe. However, Massigli felt given various economic and strategic concerns, that France could not go to war over Czechoslovakia without British support, and should that support not materialize, then it would be best for the French to explain the strategic state of affairs “frankly” to Prague. Massigli felt that in the event of a German attack, then France should not automatically declare war as the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924 required, but instead Paris should present the hypothetical German-Czechoslovak war to the League of Nations Council, and then wait until the Council decided if the war was a case of aggression or not. Massigli saw the Czechoslovak crisis as a way of strengthening Anglo-French ties and on September 17, 1938 Massigli wrote a memorandum in which stated: “If the British Government pushes us along the path of surrender, it must consider the resulting weakness of French security, which on numerous occasions, has been declared inseparable from British security. To what extent might a reinforcement of the ties of Franco-British collaboration compensate for this weakening in the common interests of the two countries? This is a matter to which the attention of the British leaders should be drawn."

Relations between Massigli and his superior in 1938, Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet were very poor and his memoirs, Bonnet lambasted Massigli quite severely. [Adamthwaite, page 149] For his part, Massigli accused Bonnet of seeking to alter the documentary record in his favor. [Adamthwaite, page 142] On October 19, 1938, Massigli was sacked as Political Director by Bonnet who exiled him to Turkey as Ambassador. [Ulrich, pages 145-146] An Anglophile, Massigli's removal meant a weakening of those officials in the Quai d'Orsay who favored closer ties to Britain. [Watt, page 73] During his time in Ankara, Massigli played an important role in ensuring that the Hatay dispute was resolved in Turkey's favor.Adamthwaite, page 328] Massagli felt that the best way of ensuring a pro-Western tilt in Turkey was to accede to the Turkish demands for the "sanjak" of Alexandretta (modern İskenderun). During his talks with the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Saracoğlu, Massigli was hindered by the continual poor state of his relations with Bonnet. In addition, Massigli faced much opposition from Arab nationalists and the French High Commission in Syria, who were both opposed to ceding the "sanjak" of Alexandretta. When the talks over Hatay began in February 1939, Massagli went for weeks without negotiating instructions by Bonnet, and thus was only able to complete the Hatay negotiations on June 23, 1939. In 1939, Massigli was heavily preoccupied with competition with the German Ambassador Franz von Papen in an effort to secure Turkish adhension to the Allied side in the event of war breaking out.

World War Two and the Cold War

In October 1939, the furious rivalry between Massagli and von Papen finally ended with the conclusion of a mutual security pact between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey. However, as Massagli admitted in his memoir of time as Ambassdor in Ankara, "La Turquie devant la Guerre", his triumph proved to be an ephemeral one as the Turks chose to interpret Clause Two of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance in such way as justifying remaining neutral. [Purcell, page 153] However, Massigli contended that he failed to bring Turkey into the war on the Allied state, he at least foiled von Papen's efforts to bring Turkey into the war on the Axis side.

In August 1940, Massigli was removed by the Vichy government as Ambassador to Turkey. After his firing, Massigli returned to France and was in contact with several Resistance leaders in the Lyon area, most notably Jean Moulin. In January 1943, Massigli escaped to London and served as Charles de Gaulle's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs (in effect the Free French foreign minister) in 1943-1944. In 1943, Massigli opposed the visit of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri as-Said Pasha to Algeria after a summit with the Prime Minister of Egypt, Mustafa el-Nahhas Pasha under the grounds that such visit would encourage Arab nationalist sentiment in French North Africa, would give the impression that France was aligning itself with one fraction centered around as-Said Pasha and might weaken the electoral chances of pro-French Lebanese nationalists in the upcoming Lebanese elections. [El-Solh, page 194] In January 1944, at the conference called by General de Gaulle to consider the post-war fate of the French African colonies in Brazzaville in the French Congo, Massigli strongly urged that representatives from the protectorates of Tunis and Morocco and the government of Algeria not be allowed to attend the conference.Shipway, page 30] Massigli’s advice was not ignored.

In the spring of 1944, Massigli on the behalf of General de Gaulle presented a offer to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden for a “Third Force” in the post-war world standing between the Soviet Union and the United States that was to comprise the United Kingdom, France and Belgium who to integrate their defense and economic policies and jointly control the western half of Germany.Loth, page 5] The British were not initially interested in the proposal, while de Gaulle who was always cool to the idea of British involvement in the “Third Force” concept, and had only agreed to British participation to allay Belgian concerns about post-war French domination. Moreover, de Gaulle had imposed as a precondition for British participation that London should support France annexing the Ruhr and Rhineland regions of Germany after the war, a demand the British rejected.

In 1944, de Gaulle decided that the Anglophile Massigli was too pro-British for his liking and demoted him to Ambassador to London. From August 1944 until June 1954, Massigli was the French Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. In August 1944, Massigli lobbied Winston Churchill for a allowing a greater French role in the war in the Far East as the best way of ensuring that French Indochina stay French after World War II had ended. [Kratoska, page 237] In November 1944, when Churchill visited Paris, he presented to de Gaulle his offer for an Anglo-French pact, which Massigli urged the General to accept, but which de Gaulle refused. During his time in Britain, Massigli was very much involved in the debates about the Cold War and European integration . Massigli was strongly opposed to the vision of European federation of Jean Monnet. Instead he urged the creation of an Anglo-French bloc which would serve as the basis for a federation of Europe. In 1954-1956, Massigli served as the Secretary-General of the Quai d'Orsay. As Secretary-General, Massigli played a major role behind the scenes in resolving the 1954 crisis in trans-Altantic relations caused by the rejection by the French National Assembly of the European Defence Community treaty. In 1956, Massigil retired. His memoirs, "Une Comédie des Erreurs" were published in 1978.

Works

*“New Conceptions of French Policy in Tropical Africa” pages 403-415 from "International Affairs", Volume 33, No. 4, October 1957.
*"La Turquie devant la Guerre: Mission a Ankara 1939-1940", Paris: Plon, 1964.
*"Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943-1956 souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne", Paris: Plon, 1978.

Notes

References

*Adamthwaite, Anthony "France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939", London: Frank Cass, 1977, ISBN 0-7146-3035-7.
*Duroselle, Jean Baptiste "France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy, 1932-1939", New York Enigma Books, 2004 ISBN 1929631154
*El-Solh, Raghid "Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation" London: I. B. Tauris, 2004
*Kratoska, Paul "South East Asia: Colonial History " Volume 6, ”The Future of French Indochina 1940-1945” London: Routledge, 2001
*Loth, Winifred “General Introduction” from "Documents on the History of European Integration: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Count " edited by Winifred Loth Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988
*Purcell, H.D. Review of "La Turquie devant la Guerre: Mission a Ankara 1939-1940" pages 152-153 from "International Affairs", Volume 41, Issue # 1 January 1965
* Shipway, Martin "The Road To War: France and Vietnam 1944-1947", Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002
*Trachtenberg, Marc “Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference” pages 24-55 from "The Journal of Modern History", Volume 51, Issue # 1, March 1979.
*Ulrich, Raphäelle "René Massigli and Germany, 1919-1938" pages 132-148 from "French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power" edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998, ISBN 0-415-15039-6.
*Vaïsse, Maurice "Against Appeasement: French Advocates of Firmness, 1933-38" pages 227-235 from "The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement" edited by Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin, London, United Kingdom, 1983, ISBN 0049400681.
*Watt, D.C. "How War Came : The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939", New York : Pantheon Books, 1989, ISBN 039457916X.

Further reading

*Burgess, Patricia (editor) pages 100-102 from "The Annual Obituary 1988", St James Press, 1990 ISBN 1558620508
*Pastor-Castro, Rogelia “The Quai d’Orsay and the European Defence Community Crisis of 1954” pages 386–400 from "History", Volume 91, Issue #303, July 2006.