Melbourne-Voyager collision

The "Melbourne"-"Voyager" collision, also referred to as the "Melbourne"-"Voyager" incident" or simply the "Voyager" incident", was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN); aircraft carrier HMAS "Melbourne" and destroyer HMAS "Voyager". On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two ships were performing manoeuvres in Jervis Bay, when "Voyager" sailed under "Melbourne"’s bow, where she was cut in two and sunk. 82 of "Voyager"’s crew were killed.

Two Royal Commissions were held to investigate the incident; the first studying the events of the collision, while the second focused on claims by a former "Voyager" officer that the destroyer's captain was unfit for command. It is the only time in Australian history two Royal Commissions have been held for a single incident.

hips

HMAS "Melbourne" (R21) was the lead ship of the "Majestic" class of aircraft carriers. She was laid down on 15 April 1943, although delays brought on by the end of World War II and the upgrading of her design, systems, and equipment meant she was not completed until 1955. "Melbourne" was sold to the Royal Australian Navy in 1948, along with sister ship HMAS "Sydney.

HMAS "Voyager" (D04) was a ship of the "Daring" class of destroyers. She was laid down by Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952, and commissioned into the RAN on 12 February 1957.

Collision

On 10 February 1964, "Melbourne" was performing trials in Jervis Bay under the command of Captain John Robertson, following the refit.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 8] The "Daring" class destroyer HMAS "Voyager" was also present, undergoing her own trials following refit, under the command of Captain Duncan Stevens. That evening, "Melbourne" was to perform night flying exercises, while "Voyager" acted as the carrier's planeguard escort. This required "Voyager" to maintain a position 20° off "Melbourne"’s port quarter at a distance from the carrier of 1,500 to 2,000 yards.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 11]

During the early part of the evening, "Voyager" had no difficulties maintaining her position during the manoeuvres both ships performed. During a series of manoeuvres intended to reverse the courses of both ships beginning at 8:40 pm, "Voyager" ended up to starboard of "Melbourne". At 8:52 pm, "Voyager" was ordered to resume the planeguard station.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 12] The procedure to accomplish this required "Voyager" to turn away from "Melbourne" in a large circle, cross the carrier's stern, then advance along "Melbourne"'s port side. Instead, "Voyager" first turned to starboard, away from "Melbourne", then turned to port without warning. It was initially assumed by "Melbourne"’s bridge crew that "Voyager" was conducting a series of tight turns in order to lose speed before swinging behind "Melbourne", but "Voyager" did not alter course again.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 13]

At 8:55 pm, with "Voyager" still turning to port, "Melbourne"’s navigator ordered the carrier's engines to half astern speed, with Robertson ordering an increase to full astern a few seconds later. At the same time, Stevens, having just arrived on "Voyager"’s bridge, gave the order "Full ahead both engines. Hard-a starboard.", before instructing the destroyer's Quartermaster to announce that a collision was imminent. Both ships' measures were too late to avoid a collision; "Melbourne" hit "Voyager" at 8:56 pm.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 14-15]

"Melbourne" impacted just aft of "Voyager"’s bridge structure; the destroyer rolled to starboard before she was cut in half.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 1] "Voyager"’s forward boiler exploded, briefly setting fire to the bow of the carrier before it was extinguished by seawater. The destroyer's forward section sank quickly, due to the weight of the two 4.5-inch gun turrets.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 2] The aft section did not begin sinking until half an hour after the collision, and did not completely submerge until just after midnight.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pgs 3, 7] Messages were sent to the Fleet Headquarters in Sydney immediately after the collision, although they initially underestimated the extent of the damage to "Voyager".Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 5] "Melbourne" launched her boats almost immediately after the collision to recover survivors, and the carrier's wardroom and C Hangar were prepared for casualties.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 4] At 9:58 pm, "Melbourne" was informed that HMA Ships "Snipe", "Teal", "Hawk", "Ibis", and "Curlew", as well as search-and-rescue boats from HMAS "Creswell" and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra, had been despatched.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 5-6] From the 314 personnel aboard "Voyager" at the time of the collision, 14 officers, 67 sailors, and 1 civilian dockyard worker were killed, including Stevens and all but one of the bridge crew.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 5] "Melbourne" returned to Sydney with the survivors, and was docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 21]

First Royal Commission

A Royal Commission into the events of the collision, headed by Sir John Spicer, was announced by Prime Minister Robert Menzies on 13 February 1964.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 27] This commission was directed to primarily investigate the causes of the collision and the circumstances leading to the collision, with secondary considerations including the suitability of both ships for the exercise and the rescue and treatment of survivors. These instructions were prepared without the consultation of the RAN. The number of competing arguments caused the progress of the investigation to slow, and it was not until 25 June that the inquiry was ended and the report begun.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pgs 53, 64] The Spicer Report was released publicly on 26 August 1964.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 67]

The report is considered to be of poor quality, with a disjointed narrative and failures to cite the relevant evidence.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 68] In it, Spicer concluded that the collision was primarily the fault of "Voyager"'s bridge crew neglecting to maintain an effective lookout and awareness of the carrier's location, although he did not blame individual officers.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 69] When reporting on the contribution of "Melbourne" and her crew to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of Robertson and two other bridge officers, primarily to alert "Voyager" to the danger she was in and to take measures to prevent "Melbourne" from colliding.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 67-68] Robertson was posted to HMAS "Watson", a training base in Sydney, and the decision was made by the Admirals of the RAN to prevent Robertson from serving on "Melbourne" again.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 78] Robertson submitted his resignation on 10 September 1964, two days after receiving official notice of his new posting.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 79] The media considered Robertson to be a scapegoat for the incident.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 82]

econd Royal Commission

Over the next few years there was increasing pressure from the public, the media, and politicians of the Government and Opposition over the handling of the first Royal Commission, as well as claims made by Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, the former executive officer of "Voyager", that Captain Stevens frequently drank to excess and was unfit for command. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 88; David Stevens (ed.), 2001, "The Royal Australian Navy", p 202] On 18 May 1967, Prime Minister Harold Holt announced a second Royal Commission into the "Melbourne"-"Voyager" collision, with Sir Stanley Burbury as presiding Commissioner, to investigate the claims made by Cabban. [Tom Frame, 2005, "The Cruel Legacy", pp 114-115] It was the only occasion in Australian history that two Royal Commissions have been held on the same incident, although it was emphasised that the enquiry was to focus on Cabban's allegations, not the accident itself. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 117] The commission opened on 13 June 1967, with hearings beginning on 18 July. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 117-118]

During the Commission, it was argued that Stevens was unfit for command on the evening of the incident due to illness, drunkenness, or a combination of the two, and that the description of the collision in Spicer's report and the conclusions drawn from it were inconsistent with events. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 144-145] The hearings lasted 85 days, and the Burbury Report was released publicly on 25 February 1968. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pgs 149, 157] It found that Stevens was medically unfit for command and that some of the findings of the first Royal Commission were based on incorrect assumptions. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 159-160] Robertson and the other officers of "Melbourne" were absolved of blame for the incident. [Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 160]

Repairs and replacement

Repairs to "Melbourne"’s bow were completed at Cockatoo Island Dockyard by May 1964.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", p 21] She remained in service with the RAN until 1982, and was sold for scrap to China in 1983.

Following the collision, both the United Kingdom and the United States of America offered to loan ships to the RAN as a replacement; the Royal Navy offering "Daring" class destroyer HMS "Duchess" while the United States Navy offered two "Fletcher" class destroyers: US Ships "The Sullivans" and "Twining". "Duchess" was accepted and modernised, and as she was only intended to be in RAN service for four years (although she was later sold to the RAN and served until 1977), the RAN ordered the construction of two improved frigates based on the "River" or "Type 12" class design.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pp 21-22] HMAS "Swan" and HMAS "Torrens" entered service in 1970 and 1971 respectively.Tom Frame, 2005, "A Cruel Legacy", pg 22]

References

Bibliography

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