Second Battle of Tembien

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict= Second Battle of Tembien
partof= the Second Italo-Abyssinian War


caption=
date= 27 February to 29 February 1936
place= Tembien Province, Ethiopia
result= Decisive Italian victory, destruction of the Ethiopian Army of the Center in the north
combatant1=
combatant2=
commander1=
commander2= Ras Seyoum
strength1=Approximately 70,000, With Approx. 50,000 in reserve
strength2=Approximately 40,000
casualties1=Approx. 600
casualties2=Approx. 8,000
Almost entire army ultimately neutralized as a fighting force

The Second Battle of Tembien was a battle fought on the northern front of what was known as the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. This battle consisted of attacks by Italian forces under Marshal Pietro Badoglio on Ethiopian forces under Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum. This battle was primarily fought in the area around the Tembien.

Background

On 3 October 1935, General Emilio De Bono advanced into Ethiopia from Eritrea without a declaration of War. De Bono had a force of approximately 100,000 Italian soldiers and 25,000 Eritrean soldiers to advance towards Addis Ababa. In November, after a brief period of inactivity and minor setbacks for the Italians, De Bono was replaced by Badoglio.

Haile Selassie launched the Christmas Offensive late in the year to test Badoglio. By mid-January 1936, Badoglio was ready to renew the Italian advance on the Ethiopian capital. Badoglio ultimately overwhelmed the armies of ill-armed and uncoordinated Ethiopian warriors with mustard gas, tanks, and heavy artillery. [John Laffin. "Brassey's Dictionary of Battles", pg. 28]

Preparation

In early January 1936, the Ethiopian forces were in the hills everywhere overlooking the Italian positions and launching attacks against them on a regular basis. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was impatient for an Italian offensive to get under way and for the Ethiopians to be swept from the field. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 59]

The Ethiopians facing the Italians were in three groupings. In the center, near Abbi Addi and along the Beles River in the Tembien, were Ras Kassa with approximately 40,000 men and Ras Seyoum with about 30,000 men. On the Ethiopian right was Ras Mulugeta and his army of approximately 80,000 men in positions atop Amba Aradam. Ras Imru with approximately 40,000 men was on the Ethiopian left in the area around Seleclaca in the Shire Province. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 55]

Badoglio had five army corps at his disposal. On his right, he had the Italian IV Corps and the Italian II Corps facing Ras Imru in the Shire. In the Italian center was the Eritrean Corps facing Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum in the Tembien. Facing Ras Mulugeta atop Amba Aradam was the Italian I Corps and the Italian III Corps. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 55]

Initially, Badoglio saw the destruction of Ras Mulugeta's army as his first priority. Mulugeta's force would have to be dislodged from its strong positions on Amba Aradam in order for the Italians to continue the advance towards Addis Ababa. But Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoumm were exerting such pressure from the Tembien that Badoglio decided that he would have to deal with them first. If the Ethiopian center was successful, the I Corps and III Corps facing Mulugeta would be cut off from reinforcement and resupply. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 59]

From 20 January to 24 January, the First Battle of Tembien was fought. The outcome of this battle was inconclusive, but the threat Ras Kassa posed to the I Corps and III Corps was neutralized. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 59]

From 10 February to 19 February, Badoglio attacked the army of Ras Mulugeta dug in atop Amba Aradam during the Battle of Enderta. Ras Mulugeta was killed and his army destroyed. With this completed, Badoglio turned back to the center to complete what he had started with the First Battle of Tembien. He would leave the army of Ras Imru for another day. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

Badoglio now had access to three times the men fielded by the three remaining Ethiopian armies. By this time, extra divisions had arrived in Eritrea and the network of roads he needed to guarantee resupply had been all but completed. Even so, Badoglio stockpiled 48,000 shells and 7 million rounds of ammunition in forward areas before he committed to attack Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

Badoglio planned to send the III Corps towards Gaela to cut off the main line of withdrawal for Ras Kassa. After establishing itself across the roads running south from the Abbi Addi region, the Eritrean Corps would advance south from the Warieu Pass and the Abaro Pass. These moves by the III Corps and the Eritrean Corps would place the armies of Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum in a great trap. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

It is possible that Ras Kassa sensed what Badoglio planned. He sent a wireless message to Emperor Haile Selassie requesting permission to withdraw from the Tembien. The request was superfluous. The Emperor had already indicated that Ras Kassa should fall back towards Amba Aradam and link up with the remnants of Ras Mulageta's army. But something changed Ras Kassa's mind. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

Battle

Per Badoglio's plan, the Eritrean Corps advanced from the mountain passes and the III Corps moved up from the Geba Valley. The Second Battle of the Tembien was fought on terrain which favored the defense. It was a region of forests, ravines, and torrents where the Italians were unable to deploy artillery properly or use armored vehicles. But the warriors of Ras Seyoum failed to take advantage of the terrain and so they were defeated. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

The right wing of the Ethiopian armies rested on Amba Work (the "mountain of gold"). The Ethiopians established a strong point there. Amba Work blocked the road to Abbi Addi on which the Eritrean Corps and the III Corp planned to converge. One-hundred-and-fifty Alpini and Blackshirt commandos were ordered to capture it under cover of darkness. Armed with grenades and knives, the commandos found the Ethiopians on the summit unprepared when they scaled the peak. The issue of who controlled Amba Work was settled quickly. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

Once Amba Work was in Italian hands, two columns from the Eritrean Corps set off towards Zebandas and Worrega and the inevitable clash followed. Early on the morning of 27 February, the army of Ras Seyoum was drawn up in battle array in fromt of Abbi Addi. Heralded by the wail of battle horns and the roll of the "negarait" war drums, a seemingly uncoordinated mass of Ethiopians left the shelter of the woods covering Debra Ansa to attack the Italians in the open. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 83]

From 8 am to 4 pm, wave after wave of Ethiopians tried to break through or get around the forward lines established by the Alpini and the Blackshirts of the Eritrean columns. Armed for the most part with swords and clubs, the waves were mowed down and turned back by concentrated machine gun fire time and time again. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 84]

Finally, after sensing that the attacks were becoming less frequent, the Italian commander counterattacked. Pounded by artillery, hounded by bombers that dropped nearly two-hundred tons of high explosives, and threatened with encirclement, Ras Seyoum decided that his men could take no more. His army left more than one-thousand dead on the battlefield as it fled. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 84]

With his right flank in the air, Ras Seyoum ordered his army to pull back to the Takkaze fords. But, as his men straggled back along the one road open to them, they were bombed repeatedly. The rocky ravine where they were to cross the river turned out to be a bottleneck. The Italian bombers focused on the concentrated solid mass of defeated Ethiopians and soon the area around the fords was turned into a charnel house. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 84]

Meanwhile, Ras Kassa and his army on Debra Amba had not yet seen action. Ras Kassa now decided to do what the Emperor had indicated and started to withdraw his army towards Amba Aradam. But now it was the turn of his army to be bombed. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 84]

On 29 February, the III Corps and the Eritrean Corps linked up about three miles west of Abbi Addi and the trap was completed. Even so, a large portion of both armies managed to escape Badoglio's dragnet. However, the men of the Ethiopian armies were demoralized and their fighting days were over. The Ethiopians wanted to get away from the region, the high explosive bombs, the rattle of machine gun fire, and the deadly mustard gas. By the time Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum reached Haile Sellassie's headquarters at Quorom two weeks later, they were accompanied by little more than the men of their personal body guards. [Barker, A. J., "Rape of Ethiopia 1936", p. 84]

Aftermath

Only one of the four northern armies remained and Badoglio now turned his attention towards Ras Imru and his forces in the Shire.

See also

* Ethiopian Order of Battle Second Italo-Abyssinian War
* Army of the Ethiopian Empire
* Italian Order of Battle Second Italo-Abyssinian War
* Royal Italian Army

Sources

*
*
*

References