Battle of Slim River

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of Slim River
partof=the Battle of Malaya, World War II


caption=Indian troops in Singapore, November 1941. Two Indian brigades were practically annhilated at Slim River.
date=6–8 January 1942
place=Slim River, British Malaya
result=Japanese Victory
combatant1=flagicon|India|British 11th Indian Division
combatant2=flagicon|Japan 5th Division
commander1=flagicon|United Kingdom Archibald Paris
commander2=flagicon|Japan Hajime Shimada
strength1=
strength2=
casualties1=
casualties2=
notes=|

The Battle of Slim River occurred during the Malayan campaign in January 1942 between the Imperial Japanese Army and the British Indian Army on the west coast of Malaya.

Background

Japanese forces had invaded north-west Malaya from southern Thailand on December 11 1941 and eastern Malaya on December 7 at Kota Bharu. From Thailand they had driven relentlessly down the western coast of Malaya defeating all British attempts at stopping them. By Christmas Day the Japanese held all of north-west Malaya. One of the few moments where British troops managed to inflict any form of effective defense against Japanese tactics occurred near Kampar on the Dipang River. There, in a four day battle notable for the effectiveness of the British artillery, the Japanese suffered heavy casualties. The Gurkha's fought hand-to-hand with kukris. The Argylls repelled several attacks and the Sikhs carried out bayonet charges through machine-gun and mortar fire. By January 2, though, the Indian 11th Infantry Division was out flanked, cut off from the road to Singapore, and so they withdrew to some prepared positions at Trolak five miles north of the Slim River. [pg 324-345 Colin Smith]

British positions at Trolak

The defenses on the road to Trolak started with a four mile corridor through almost impenetrable jungle, after the village the road then wound its way through rubber estates for five miles before reaching the Slim River rail bridge. The road then follows the river upstream for another six miles before it crosses the river at a road bridge. The British commander, Acting Major-General Paris (normally commander of the 12th Brigade), had lost one of his three brigades after the fighting at Kampar (5/16 Brigade had been moved to a coastal defense position further south). This left Paris with Lt.Col.Stewart's 12th Indian brigade and Lt.Col.Ray Selby's 28th Gurkha Brigade to defend the northern bank of the river. Stewart's battalions were in a line straddling either side of the road and spreading back through the thick jungle part of the corridor and Selby's Gurkhas were spread along the road and railway leading up to the bridges which were prepared for demolition. [Ch.20, Colin Smith]

The Japanese attacking force

The Japanese attacking force came from Colonel Ando's battle group which had taken over the chastened Okabe regiment which had suffered heavy casualties in the artillery ambush at Kampar, both units were from the 5th Division (Imperial Japanese Army). The assault force consisted of about thirty tanks under the command of Major Hajime Shimada, mostly Type 95 medium tanks. Shimada came up with the plan, unusual in World War II, of a night attack using tanks to spearhead the infantry, a dangerous proposition for tanks considering the extremely low visibility factor which would hamper their crews. [pg 330-331 Colin Smith]

The battle

12th Brigade positions

At 3.30 am on January 7 1942, in heavy rain, Shimada's force started a mortar and artillery bombardment on the first of the British positions (occupied by the 4/19th Hyderabad Regiment under Lt.Col.Wilson Haffenden). Within fifteen minutes Japanese infantry were dismantling the British road block and were pushing back the young and in-experienced Hyderabads who were unable to contact their artillery support. The Japanese infantry was immediately followed by Shimada's tanks which easily broke the spirit of the remaining Hyderabads who scattered before the tanks.

Many Hyderabads fell back to the next battalion (Lt.Col.Cecil Deakin's 5/2nd Punjab Regiment) infecting some of the Punjabis with their panic. Shimada lost his two leading tanks to land mines and Boys anti-tank rifle in front of the more experienced Punjabi position. The Punjabis then managed to set fire to another tank with Molotov cocktails and if the British artillery (who were not contacted due to communication lines being cut) had come into action Shimada's column would have possibly been destroyed due to their strung out position and surrounded by jungle. This golden opportunity for the British was lost and Shimada's infantry were able to push through Deakin's Punjabis. The Punjabis had held Shimada until around 7am in heavy fighting. Deakin and a handful of his remaining Punjabis managed to reach the Argylls in the next position and from there escape across the Slim River.

The next battalion to face Shimada's attack was the 2nd Bn, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under Lt.Col.Lindsay Robertson who were positioned around the village of Trolak itself and Stewart's 12th Brigade H.Q. This was a regular British Army battalion and very experienced, considered to be one of the best jungle fighting units the British had in Malaya. The Argylls had been fore warned of the attack coming their way by the earlier arrival of panic stricken sepoys from the Hyderabads. Even with that warning the first four tanks were mistaken for Punjab Bren Carriers and drove straight through the Argylls, neatly dividing the battalion and then headed for the railway bridge. With the arrival of the remainder of Shimada's main force soon after, the Argylls were split in half completely. The force east of the road under Col.Robertson fought their way into the jungle in-land, breaking up into small parties and headed for the British lines. Six weeks later some of these soldiers would still be in the jungle. A company of the Argylls west of the road managed to break out of the encircling Japanese and cross the river, but the other company to the west suffered the same fate as Robertson's Argylls, having to scatter into the jungle and attempt to reach British lines. [pg 334-338 Colin Smith]

Atrocities

An instance of a Japanese atrocity was committed in the area of the rubber trees around Trolak. In this area were a number of Argyll and Hyderabad wounded. 2nd Lieutenant Ian Primrose reports that after he regained consciousness from an injury during the fighting he discovered that the Japanese were dividing the wounded into those who said they could walk and those who said they couldn't. Primrose decided he could walk, which was a good choice as the Japanese then proceeded to shoot and bayonet all the wounded who could not walk. Afterward the survivors were made to dig graves for the dead and then told to carry the Japanese wounded. [pg 337-338 Colin Smith (description of killing)]

The 28th Brigade positions

Before reaching the 28th Gurkha Brigade Shimada's tanks were offered a perfect target in the form of Lt. Col. Cyril Stokes' 5/14th Punjabis who were in marching order along the road to Trolak to re-inforce Stewart's brigade. Commanding Shimada's three leading tanks was Lt. Sadanobu Watanabe, who lead his tanks straight through Stokes' Punjabis, mortally wounding Stokes and inflicting heavy casualties on his battalion. By 8.30 the leading Japanese tanks were within Selby's brigade H.Q. area. The 28th Brigade were completely unaware of what had happened to Stewart's entire brigade and the Japanese tore through them faster, scattering both the 2/2nd and 2/9th Gurkhas which were spread around Selby's brigade H.Q. Although many of these troops made it across the rail bridge.

Like the Punjabi's, the 2/1st Gurkhas under Lt. Col. Jack Fulton were on the march either side of the road as the Japanese tanks reached them. This time though the marching column of Gurkha's were facing the other way and Watanabe's tanks caught them from behind, the death toll was even higher than with the Punjabis. One officer and twenty-seven other ranks answered roll call the next day. Fulton, wounded and taken prisoner, would die in captivity two months later. [pg 339-341 Smith (destruction of 28th Brigade)]

The bridges

Shimada's tanks had by now broken through both brigades and was into the rear area of the 11th Indian Division, and heading for the two bridges. Leaving the rail bridge for Shimada and the main Japanese force Lt Watanabe headed toward the more important road bridge six miles away. In this attack Watanabe breaks through the artillery, medical and other support units in front of the road bridge. In this lightening attack two British artillery commanders are surprised and killed while driving on the road. Upon reaching the road bridge Watanabe finds it defended by a battery of Bofors anti-aircraft guns from the Singapore and Hong Kong Artillery Regiment. Although two of the guns managed to lower their barrels fast enough to fire on the tanks the rounds exploded on the tanks armor harmlessly and the gunners fled. Watanabe himself cut the wires to the demolition charges on the bridge. It was still only mid morning and the Japanese attack had managed to scatter the entire 11th Indian Division leaving most of it to attempt an escape across the Slim River. [pg 341-343 Colin Smith]

In the last part of this Blitzkrieg like attack Watanabe sent a force of three tanks under the command of Ensign Toichero Sato to explore the other side of the river. Sato managed to get a further three miles before running into some prepared British artillery which destroyed his tank, killing Sato, and chasing the other two back.

Aftermath

It seems that even some of the British, who had suffered so badly in this battle, were impressed by the attack. In the words of a British artillery commander, Lt. Col. Arthur Harrison, who had narrowly escaped being killed by Watanabe's tank, remarks with obvious admiration;

The 11th Indian Infantry Division had suffered huge casualties, although many would eventually make their way back to join in the surrender at Singapore many more would still be in the jungle after the surrender. The 12th Indian Brigade had practically ceased to exist and the 28th Brigade was but a shadow.

Some of the Argylls were still at large by August 1945. Stewart's 12th Brigade could muster no more than 430 officers and men. Selby's brigade was slightly better off with 750 answering roll call the next day. In all the 11th Division lost an estimated 3,200 troops and a large amount of irreplaceable equipment. [pp 324-345 Colin Smith] The Japanese had managed to attack through a division along nineteen miles and take two bridges at minimal cost to themselves all before lunch time.

The devastation caused by this short battle resulted in Lieutenant-General Percival changing his tactics of defensive prepared positions and ordering a rapid retreat to the south where an ambush would be prepared at Gemensah Bridge by the Australians.

ee also

* Battle of Malaya
* Japanese Invasion of Malaya
* Japanese Invasion of Thailand
* Battle of Jitra
* Battle of Muar
* Battle of Singapore
* Greater East Asia War in the Pacific

* Malaya Command
* Operation Krohcol
* Operation Matador
* Pacific War

External links

* [http://www.far-eastern-heroes.org.uk/2nd_Lt_Robert_Hartley/html/slim_river.htm Battle of Slim River Far Eastern Heroes]
* [http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/armedforces_2nd_argylls.htm Cofepow Site]

References

Books

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