Kiev Offensive (1920)

Oleksa Pidlutskyi, "Postati XX stolittia", (Figures of the 20th century), Kiev, 2004, ISBN 966-8290-01-1, ]

As the treaty legitimized the Polish control over the territory that the Ukrainians viewed as rightfully theirs, the alliance received a dire reception from many Ukrainian leaders, ranging from Mykhailo HrushevskyProf. Ruslan Pyrig, "Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Bolsheviks: the price of political compromise", "Zerkalo Nedeli", September 30 - October 6, 2006, available online [http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/616/54623/ in Russian] and [http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/616/54623/ in Ukrainian] .] the elected leader of the UNR, to Yevhen Petrushevych, the leader of the West Ukrainian National Republic that had previously been defeated by Poland. However, such objections were brushed aside. Hrushevsky, de-facto powerless, was ignored, and Petrushevych was sacked by Petlura and forced into exile.

The initial expedition in which sixty-five thousand Polish and fifteen thousand Ukrainian soldierscite book | first= Orest| last= Subtelny, Orest | title=Ukraine: A History | location= Toronto | publisher=University of Toronto Press | year=2000 | id=ISBN 0-8020-8390-0 | pages = 375 |chapter=Twentieth Century Ukraine: The Ukrainian Revolution: Petlura's alliance with Poland] took part started on April 24, 1920. The military goal was to outflank the Soviet forces and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. The Polish southern flank was to be held by Polish-allied Ukrainian forces under a friendly government in Ukraine. On May 7, Polish and Ukrainians soldiers entered Kiev.

The campaign

Polish advance

Pilsudski's forces were divided into three armies. Arranged from north to south, they were the 3rd, 2nd and 6th, with Petliura's forces attached to the 6th army. Facing them were the Soviet 12th and 14th armies led by Alexander Yegorov. Pilsudski struck on April 25, and captured Zhytomyr the following day. Within a week, the Soviet 12th army was largely destroyed. In the south, the Polish 6th Army and Petliura's forces pushed the Soviet 14th army out of central Ukraine as they quickly marched eastward through Vinnytsia.cite book | first= Richard| last= Watt | title=Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918-1939 | location= New York | publisher=Simon and Schuster | year=1979 | id=ISBN 0-671-22625-8 | pages = 119] The combined Polish-Ukrainian forces entered Kiev on May 7, encountering only token resistance. On May 9 the Polish troops celebrated the capture of Kiev with the victory parade on Kreschatyk, the city's main street. However as the parading troops were Piłsudski's Poles instead of Petlura's Ukrainians, the Kievans watched this demonstration of force with great ambivalence, which looked to them just like another occupation army. Following this parade, however, all Polish forces were withdrawn from the city and control was given to the Ukrainian 6th division under the control of Petlura's Ukrainian government.cite book| author=Kutrzeba, T. | title= Wyprawa kijowska 1920 roku| location= Warsaw | publisher= Gebethner i Wolff | year = 1937| ]

On April 26, in his "Call to the People of Ukraine", Piłsudski assured that "the Polish army would only stay as long as necessary until a legal Ukrainian government took control over its own territory".pl icon, Włodzimierz Bączkowski, [http://www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpage&pageid=8 Włodzimierz Bączkowski - Czy prometeizm jest fikcją i fantazją?] , Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej (quoting full text of "odezwa Józefa Piłsudskiego do mieszkańców Ukrainy"). Last accessed on 25 October 2006.] Despite this, many Ukrainians were just as anti-Polish as anti-Bolshevik,Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States", Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-508105-6, [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0195081056&id=8RPJuAW9dQYC&pg=PA106&lpg=PA106&sig=0ds1fD09iqtWe0hH94B0sOtjzs4 Google Print, p.106] ] and resented the Polish advance, [http://www.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/lect11.htm THE REBIRTH OF POLAND] . University of Kansas, lecture notes by professor Anna M. Cienciala, 2004. Last accessed on 2 June 2006.] which many viewed as just a new variety of occupationTadeusz Machalski, then a captain, (the future military attache to Ankara) wrote in his diary: "Ukrainian people, who saw in their capital an alien general with the Polish army, instead of Petlura leading his own army, didn't view it as the act of liberation but as a variety of a new occupation. Therefore, the Ukrainians, instead of enthusiasm and joy, watched in gloomy silence and instead of rallying to arms to defend the freedom remained the passive spectators".
Oleksa Pidlutskyi, "ibid"] considering previous defeat in the Polish-Ukrainian War. "In practice, [Pilsudski] was engaged in a process of conquest that was bitterly resisted by Lithuanians and Ukrainians (except the latter's defeat by the Bolsheviks left them with no one else to turn but Pilsudski)."
cite book | last = Roshwald | first = Aviel | authorlink = | title = Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 1914-1923 | url = http://books.google.com/books?ie=UTF-8&vid=ISBN0415242290&id=qPyer6Pks0oC | edition = | year = 2001 | publisher = Routledge (UK) | location = | id = ISBN 0-415-24229-0 | pages = | chapter = | chapterurl = http://books.google.com/books?id=qPyer6Pks0oC&pg=PA164&lpg=PA164&sig=O-9FXzZz2mDsX8Gm9U7QwcCYO2s|quote =] Thus, Ukrainians also actively fought the Polish invasion in Ukrainian formations of the Red Army.Peter Abbot." [http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN1841766682 Ukrainian Armies 1914-55] ", Chapter " [http://books.google.com/books?id=S0Us4SD3_3QC&pg=PA34&lpg=PA34&sig=8fWQsxjUSolZvZM-_1vUAbAt5CE Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1917-21] ", Osprey, 2004, ISBN 1-84176-668-2] The Soviet propaganda also had the effect of encouraging negative Ukrainian sentiment towards the Polish operation and Polish-Ukrainian history in general.Edith Rogovin Frankel, Jonathan Frankel, Baruch Knei-Paz, "Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917", Cambridge University Press, 1992, ISBN 0521405858, [http://books.google.com/books?id=Jz-KV8_gMW0C&pg=PA244&dq=propaganda+Ukraine+1919&as_brr=3&sig=5JYu5Wz7H1UrLjWkXx41WjAcF_o Google Print, p.244] ] Opaska, Janusz, " [http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=e666abbb-7b9c-4bd2-813c-c7558f421039&articleId=61a7389c-7381-4d3c-9e82-068e408454e8 $Off with th eagle!] ", Karta (46/2005)] pl icon Katarzyna Pisarska, [http://www.diplomacy.pl/artykuly/Referat_Ukraina.doc UKRAIŃSKIE POLITYCZNE ZMAGANIA O NIEPODLEGŁOŚĆ W LATACH 1917 - 1920] , The Polish Forum of Young Diplomats] pl icon Robert Potocki, [http://exlibris.org.ua/potocki/r203.html Idea Restytucji Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej] , Monografie Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, t. 1. Lublin, Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 1999.] pl icon [http://www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpage&pageid=11 Włodzimierz Bączkowski - Sprawa ukraińska] , 9 April 2005, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej]

The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the Soviets in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign ultimately failed. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions largely due to the ambivalent attitude of Ukrainians towards the alliance. Petliura was only able to recruit 20,000-30,000 additional soldiers into his army, a number insufficient to hold back the Soviet forces.

However the Bolshevik army, although having suffered some defeats, avoided total destruction. The Polish offensive stopped at Kiev and only a small bridgehead was established on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

Soviet counterattack

The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met the Red Army counterattack. On May 24, 1920 the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budionny and his famous First Cavalry Army. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On June 3, 1920 another Russian assault began north of the city.

Meanwhile, Polish military intelligence was aware of Russian preparations for a counteroffensive, and Polish commander-in-chief Józef Piłsudski ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General Antoni Listowski, to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in Warsaw, it was clear that the recently-created Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in Belarus and north of the Pripyat Marshes. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the General Staff regrouping all his forces at Kiev and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.

Polish retreat

Repeated attacks by the Budionny's 1st Cavalry Army eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on June 5 and on June 10 Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. On June 13 Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets.

As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the Auta River during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand, the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of Lwów.

Controversies

The mutual accusations by both parties of the conflict in violations of the basic rules of the war conduct were rampant and full of exaggerations. Norman Davies writes that "Polish and Soviet newspapers of that time competed in which could produce a more terrifying portrait of their opponent."Davies, "White Eagle...", Polish edition, p.243-244] Soviet propaganda claimed that Poles destroyed much of Kiev's infrastructure, including the passenger and cargo railway stations, and other purely civilian objects crucial for the city functioning, such as the electric power station, the city sewerage and water supply systems as well as monuments such as St. Volodymyr's Cathedral.cite book| author=Кузьмин Н.Ф. | title=Крушение последнего похода Антанты| location= Moscow | publisher= | year = 1958| id = |url = |pages = 64-65
cite book| author= | title=Из истории гражданской войны. Т. 3. | location= Moscow | publisher= | year = 1961| id = |url = |pages = 266-269
cite book| author= Пшибыльский А. | title= Войны польского империализма 1918—1921. Russian translation from Polish| location= Moscow | publisher= | year = 1931| id = |url = |pages = 152-153
Likely original: cite book| author= Przybylski, Adam| title= Wojna polska, 1918-1921. (in Polish)| location= Warszawa| publisher=Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy | year = 1930| id = [http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=55053688&Search_Code=STNO&PID=27655& LCCN 55053688] |url = |pages =
above sources cited by cite book| author=Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Meltyukhov)| title=Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939)| location= Moscow | publisher= Вече (Veche)| year = 2001| id = ISBN 5-699-07637-9| url = http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html ] The Poles denied that they committed any such acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up Kiev bridges across the Dnieper River, cite news | url= http://www.ukraine-observer.com/articles/193/324 | title= Fording the Dnipro. The past, present and future of Kyiv's bridges | publisher= The Ukrainian observer, issue 193|] for strictly military reasons.See eg. the [http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1920/military/ch38.htm#bk01 editor's note] to "The War with Poland, Postal Telegram No.2886-a" from "The Military writings of Leon Trotsky", Volume 3: 1920] Many of Soviet propaganda claims, such as the alleged destruction of the cathedral, proved to be false. According to some Ukrainian sources, incidents of more controversial and not warranted by the military needs destruction in the city by the retreating Polish army have also occurred.Among the destroyed objects were the mansion of the General-Governor of Kiev at Institutskaya street (cite book|title=Osobnyaki Kyieva|author=Druh, Olha|coauthors=Dmytro Malakov|publisher=Kyi|year=2004|id=ISBN 966-7161-60-9|pages=124) and the monument to Taras Shevchenko recently elected on the former location of the monument to Olga of KievАлександр Анисимов, "Время возводить памятники…" (The time to erect monuments...), "Кіевскій Телеграфъ", №33 (76), September 3-9, 2001]

Accusations were made against the Soviet side as well. Richard Watt writes that the Soviet advance into Ukraine was characterized by mass killing of civilians and the burning of entire villages, especially by Budyonny's cossacks, designed to instill a sense of fear in the Ukrainian population."‘Having burst through the front, Budyonny's cavalry would devastate the enemies rear - burning, killing and looting as they went. These Red cavalrymen inspired an almost numbing sense of fear in their opponents [...] the very names Budyonny and Cossack terrified the Ukrainian population, and they moved into a state of neutrality or even hostility toward Petliura and the Poles..."’"
from Richard Watt, 1979. Bitter Glory: Poland and its fate 1918-1939. New York: Simon & Shuster. ISBN 0-671-22625-8] Norman Davies notes that on 7 June - two days after breaking Polish frontline - Budionny's 1st Army destroyed the bridges in Zhytomyr, wrecked the train station and burned various buildings; on the same day it burned a hospital in Berdychiv, with 600 patients and Red Cross nuns, and that such terror tactics were common for Budionny's Cossacks.Davies, "White Eagle...", Polish edition, p.123-124] According to "The Black Book of Communism", in the pacification of Ukraine that began during the Soviet counteroffensive in 1920 and which would not end until 1922 the Soviets would take tens of thousands of Ukrainian lives. Courtois, Stephane; Werth, Nicolas; Panne, Jean-Louis; Paczkowki, Andrzej; Bartosek, Karel; Margolin, Jean-Louis (1999). The Black Book of Communism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-07608-7]

Isaac Babel, a war correspondent embedded with the Red Army, in his diary wrote down first-hand accounts of atrocities committed by the Polish troops and their allies during their retreat (particularly notorious were the regiment of the Cossack defector Vadim Yakovlev who switched sides and became a Polish ally). The retreating Polish army instilled fear among the civilian population, especially the Jews who suffered from multiple pogroms committed by the Cossack troops.Isaac Babel, "1920 Diary", Yale, 2002, ISBN 0-300-09313-6, ex. pp. [http://books.google.com/books?id=ZFKtD0ahKW0C&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&sig=n8A1Q-7RKFb_1wjFkkMn3vGeJw8 4] , [http://books.google.com/books?id=ZFKtD0ahKW0C&pg=PA7&lpg=PA6&sig=do-yuUkOCNlQYYQxjgkkesBU7go 7] , [http://books.google.com/books?id=ZFKtD0ahKW0C&pg=PA10&lpg=PA10&sig=9fFRtLRlXT__hdfqLKNNPCwZUm0 10] , [http://books.google.com/books?id=ZFKtD0ahKW0C&pg=PA26&lpg=PA25&sig=IIqXpJC8PsrV-JR_t0-pa0MhH8Q 26] , [http://books.google.com/books?id=ZFKtD0ahKW0C&pg=PA33&lpg=PA32&vq=dubno&sig=0xmPStbbwUNbjiGUL8WzO2EirGg 33] , [http://books.google.com/books?id=ZFKtD0ahKW0C&pg=PA84&lpg=PA84&printsec=8&vq=yakovlev&sig=t97ff37ax8TOgMH6Pa6qPOc0gLE 84] ] Babel also describes the murders of the Polish POWs by the Red Army troops and looting of the civilian population by Budyonny's Red Cossacks. [Babel, "ibid"] Babel's writings became so known that Budionny himself protested against "defamation" of his troops.

Aftermath

In the aftermath of the defeat in Ukraine, Polish government of Leopold Skulski resigned on the June 9, and a political crisis gripped Polish government for most of June.Davies, "White Eagle...", p.127 and p.160] Bolshevik and later Soviet propaganda used the Kiev Offensive to portray the Polish government as an imperialist aggressors.pl iconJanusz Szczepański, [http://www.mowiawieki.pl/artykul.html?id_artykul=404 KONTROWERSJE WOKÓŁ BITWY WARSZAWSKIEJ 1920 ROKU] (Controversies surrounding the Battle of Warsaw in 1920). "Mówią Wieki", online version.]

Opposing forces

The following is the Order of Battle of Polish and Bolshevik forces taking part in the struggles in Ukraine, as of April 25, 1920. It should be noted that the command structure of both sides changed during the operation. Also, the Russian forces were joined by Budennyi's 1st Cavalry Army in the latter part of the operation, while a large part of the Polish forces was withdrawn by then to Belarus.

Among Polish Airforce was the 7th Kościuszko Squadron.

Poland/Ukrainian People's Republic

oviet Russia/Soviet Ukraine

See also

* Kiev Expedition

Notes

# The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from Kiev and Russian advance was a severe blow to Józef Piłsudski's political plans to uphold the UPR's independence, as part of the "Międzymorze federation.". As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski, as well as to Petliura.

References

Further reading

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* Korzeniewski, Bogusław;, [http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=40e53184-cef1-4727-8399-631b8bb2cfbd&articleId=218d7e4a-9c96-417f-a7ce-fb3ea7a27928 THE RAID ON KIEV IN POLISH PRESS PROPAGANDA] , Humanistic Review (01/2006)

External links

*ru icon/uk icon "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," "Zerkalo Nedeli" (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online [http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/329/29435/ in Russian] and [http://www.zn.kiev.ua/ie/show/329/29435/ in Ukrainian] .
*ru icon "Dramas of Ukrainian-Polish Brotherhood" (documentary film), a review in "Zerkalo Nedeli" (Mirror Weekly), March 13-19, 1999, available [http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/231/20879/ online (in Russian)] .
* cite book
author=Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Meltyukhov)
title=Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939)
location= Moscow | publisher= Вече (Veche)
year = 2001
id = ISBN 5-699-07637-9
url = http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html .
* [http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1920-mil/ch27.htm Kiev is in the Hands of the Polish Gentry!] The Military writing of Leon Trotsky Volume 3: 1920 — The War with Poland
* [http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1920-mil/ch38.htm Postal Telegram No. 2886-a] The Military writing of Leon Trotsky Volume 3: 1920 — The War with Poland