- Tengiz Kitovani
Tengiz Kitovani ( _ka. თენგიზ კიტოვანი) (born
June 9 1938) is a retired Georgian politician and military commander with high-profile involvement in the Georgian Civil Warearly in the 1990s when he commanded the National Guard of Georgiaand served as a Defense Minister until being gradually sidelined by Eduard Shevardnadzewho had earlier been invited to lead the nation after a successful coup d'etatlaunched by Kitovani and his allies against President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
Early life and career
Tbilisi, Kitovani graduated from the Tbilisi Fine Arts Academy and taught at a boarding school in the town of Tetritsq'aro, and then worked as a main painter for the Tbilisi State Advertising Bureau between 1967 and 1969.
Kitovani entered the national politics early in 1990 when the independence movement reached its climax in then-Soviet Georgia. Elected to the
Supreme Council of Georgiathe same year, he was closely associated with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Soviet-era dissidentwho went on to become the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council and eventually the President of Georgiain 1991. In December 1990, Gamsakhurdia decreed the creation of the National Guard of Georgiaand appointed Kitovani as its head. However, the two men collided in August 1991, when Gamsakhurdia sacked him as National Guard commander. Kitovani subsequently claimed that Gamsakhurdia was intending to disband the National Guard, and had been ordered to do so by the leaders of the Moscow Putsch who had briefly taken power in the Soviet Union, but did not produce the documents he claimed to possess confirming this. Kitovani refused to accept his dismissal and left Tbilisi with most of his troops to entrench himself in the Rkoni Gorge. This was the beginning of the end for Gamsakhurdia, whose inflexible politics forced many of his former supporters into opposition. [Wheatley (2005), pp. 54-5.]
Military coup and civil war
The confrontation between pro- and anti-Gamsakhurdia factions quickly degenerated into a series of strikes and armed clashes, and eventually, Kitovani, joined by Gamsakhurdia’s former Prime Minister
Tengiz Siguaand the paramilitaryleader Jaba Ioseliani, launched a violent coupin December 1991. Ioseliani, as well as Gamsakhurdia’s supporters and some independent observers, claimed that Kitovani hired some Soviet/Russian troops stationed in Tbilisi to join the attack on the government. [Wheatley (2005), p. 65.]
Gamsakhurdia had been forced into exile by
January 6, 1992, and the coup leaders invited the former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadzeto head the post-coup provisional government– the State Council – in March 1992. As a result of the power-sharing arrangement that was eventually struck between Ioseliani, Kitovani, Sigua and Shevardnadze, Kitovani remained the commander of the National Guard and retained a considerable influence on decision making. In May 1992, Shevardnadze appointed Kitovani Minister of Defence in an effort to bring the National Guard under central control. However, both Kitovani and Ioseliani were reluctant to concede power to Shevardnadze and tended to engage in unilateralactions, and in doing so frequently conflicted with each other. [Wheatley (2005), pp. 68-70.]
The first and most obvious of such actions was taken by Kitovani during a planned
military operationagainst Gamsakhurdia’s supporters who had formed pockets of armed resistance in western Georgia and had taken Georgian government officials hostage. On the night of August 13 1992, Kitovani’s force entered the autonomous republicof Abkhazia, whose leadership had taken a series of steps towards secession from Georgia, in order to establish control over the region’s railways sabotaged by Gamsakhurdia's loyal militias. Although this operation and show of force resulted in the eventual release of the hostages, Kitovani, acting most probably on his own initiative, proceeded towards Abkhazia’s capital of Sukhumiand forced the Abkhaz leaders into flight. [Wheatley (2005), pp. 72-3.] Shevardnadze failed to have Kitovani’s force withdrawn from Abkhazia and the country became involved in a thirteen-month-long war which would end in Georgia’s loss of control over most of Abkhazia. Another version of these events, often quoted in Georgia, says that Russia, while supporting the Abkhaz, also instigated Kitovani to trigger the conflict and perhaps even promised support for his leadership ambitions in Georgia after a successful operation. [Cornell, Svante E., Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Case in Georgia, p. 183, n. 18. "Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 61". Uppsala. ISBN 91-506-1600-5.] Later, Shevardnadze would accuse Kitovani of provoking an armed conflict in Abkhazia, claiming that Kitovani disavowed his order and advance with his military to Sukhumi. [Tunç Aybak (2001), "Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict", p. 189. I.B.Tauris, ISBN 1860644546.] [ [http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsid=6178 Eduard Shevardnadze accuses Tengiz Kitovani of provoking war in Abkhazia.] "The Georgian Times", August 14 2007.] Kitovani however blamed Shevardnadze for preventing him from following up an offensive on Sukhumi with an attack on the Abkhaz stronghold in Gudauta, home to a Russian military base which supplied the secessionist forces with instructors and munitions. [Parrott (1995), p. 217.] Shevardnadze’s successor as President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, has also accused Kitovani of being a "Russian agent" and blamed him for the loss of Abkhazia. [ [http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17362 Saakashvili Says No to Treaty on Non-Use of Force.] "Civil Georgia", March 15 2008.]
Conflict with Shevardnadze
During the war in Abkhazia, Kitovani developed a power centre rivalling Shevardnadze’s and on several occasions challenged Shevardnadze, now Head of State, on defence matters, suggesting that he should be responsible only for foreign policy. [Darchiashvili (2005), p. 6.] [Parrott (1995), p. 216.] Kitovani stood as a candidate in Georgia's parliamentary elections of
October 11 1992and was elected in the single-mandate constituency of Bolnisi. [Wheatley (2005), p. 75.] In the aftermath of the elections, Shevardnadze attempted to replace him as Minister of Defence with a professional soldier, General Anatoli Kamkamidze, but was unable to do so. Amid persistent rumors that he was planning a new military coup, Kitovani was finally forced into resignation in May 1993 – though a protégé, Gia Karkarashvili, was named as his replacement, and he was able to retain some of his power – partly, according to widespread rumours in Tbilisi, through his control over Georgia’s "energy mafia" [Dawisha & Parott (1997), pp. 166-7.] and his "special relationship" with Russian defence minister Pavel Grachev. [Dmitri Trenin, [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0301.htm "Russia's Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region"] , in: Bruno Coppieters (ed., 1996), "Contested Borders in the Caucasus". VUBUniversity Press.]
However, Shevardnadze was able to exploit the military setback in Abkhazia to embark on a crackdown on the
paramilitarygroups and ultimately their leaders. [ [http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=14&issue_id=834&article_id=8441 Georgia puts Kitovani on trial while Ioseliani awaits same] . "The Jamestown FoundationMonitor" Volume 1, Issue 163, December 28 1995.] After the pro-Gamsakhurdia rebellion had been quashed with Russian aid by December 1993, Shevardnadze was able to increasingly consolidate his power and deprive both Kitovani and Ioseliani of influence over national security policy. [Wheatley (2005), p. 79.]
After spending some time in Russia, Kitovani returned to Tbilisi and, together with Tengiz Sigua and
Boris Kakubava, leader of a faction of ethnic Georgian IDPsfrom Abkhazia, founded the National Front for the Liberation of Abkhazia in the autumn of 1994. [J. F. Brown (ed., 1997), "The OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union - "1996: Forging Ahead, Falling Behind," pp. 227-230. M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 1563249251.]
January 13 1995, Kitovani, with the support of Tengiz Sigua, led a force of some 700 lightly armed supporters in a march against Abkhazia. They were stopped by Georgian policeand arrested. [Wheatley (2005), p. 87.] Kitovani was tried for having organized an unlawful armed force and sentenced to eight years' imprisonmentin October 1996. He served four years of his eight-year term and was pardoned by Shevardnadze on medical grounds on May 22 1999. [ [http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=22&issue_id=1552&article_id=15727 Kitovani released from prison] . "The Jamestown FoundationMonitor" Volume 5, Issue 102, May 26 1999.]
Since early 2000s, Kitovani has lived in
Moscowfrom where he harshly criticized the Shevardnadze government on several occasions. In February 2002, he responded scandalously to the mysterious suicide of Nugzar Sajaia, Shevardnadze’s close ally and an influential Chairman of Georgia’s National Security Council, making allegations that Sajaia was a homosexualand had ordered the 2001 murder of journalist Giorgi Sanaia. [Irakly Areshidze, [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/418 Nugzar Sajaia, Shevardnadze’s closest confidant, commits suicide.] "Central Asian-Caucasus Institute Analyst", February 27 2002.] Later that year, Kitovani accused Shevardnadze of being behind the 2002 assassinationof Kakhi Asatiani, a businessman and former soccer star. He also upheld Russia’s claims that some 700 Chechen fighters had spent that winter in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. [Sergei Blagov, [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010603.shtml Military issues block Russia-Georgia détente.] "Eurasianet", January 6 2003.] He further claimed that Russian General Gennady Shpigun, abducted and killed in Chechnyain 1999/2000, was in fact held captive and put to death in Pankisi, with the body then taken to southern Chechnya. Georgia dismissed all these claims, however. [ [http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1666 Georgia Denies Kidnapped Russian General was Detained in Pankisi.] "Civil Georgia", March 28 2002.] Georgian Prosecutor-General Nugzar Gabrichidze claimed that Kitovani had been in close contact with National Guard veterans who staged a failed mutinyon March 23 2003. [ [http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2003/03-03-24.rferl.html Georgian National Guard veterans seize military base.] " Radio Free Europe/Radio LibertyNewsline", cited in: "Hellenic Resources Network". March 24 2003.] Kitovani, however, denied any links with the mutiny. [ [http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=3402 Veterans' Failed Mutiny Unsettles Georgian Politicians.] "Civil Georgia", March 25 2003.]
*Jonathan Wheatley (2005), "Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union". Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., ISBN 0754645037.
*Bruce Parrott (1995), "State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia". M.E. Sharpe, ISBN 1563243601.
*Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott (1997), "Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus".
Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521597315.
*David Darchiashvili, [http://osgf.ge/ccds/Doc/Articles_001_Darchiashvili_David_001_Eng.pdf "Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform",] in: Bruno Coppieters (2005), "Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution".
MIT Press, ISBN 0262033437.
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.