Task Force Hawk

Infobox Military Unit
unit_name= Task Force Hawk


caption=
dates= 1999-04-05 through 1999-06-24
country= United States
allegiance=
branch= United States Army
type=
role= Deep Strike
size= 5,100
command_structure=
garrison=
garrison_label=
equipment= Various
*AH-64 Apache
*UH-60 Black Hawk
*OH-58 Kiowa
*CH-47 Chinook
*MLRS
*M109 howitzer
*M102 howitzer
*M1 Abrams
*M2 Bradley
*M1097 Avenger
equipment_label=
nickname=
patron=
motto=
colors=
colors_label=
march=
mascot=
battles=
anniversaries=
decorations= Multiple
*Kosovo Campaign Medal
*Air and Space Campaign Medal
*NATO Medal
battle_honours=
current_commander=Gen. John W. Hendrix
current_commander_label=Task Force Hawk Commander
ceremonial_chief=
ceremonial_chief_label=
colonel_of_the_regiment=
colonel_of_the_regiment_label=
notable_commanders=
identification_symbol=
identification_symbol_label=
identification_symbol_2=
identification_symbol_2_label=

Task Force Hawk was the unit constructed and deployed by General Wesley Clark to provide additional support to NATO's Operation Allied Force by NATO operations against the former Yugoslavian government during the 1999 unrest in Kosovo. The task force would operate from the March 1999 when its formation was announced until June 1999 when Slobodan Milošević withdraw the Yugoslavian Army from Kosovo.

Task Force Hawk, which never fired a round, has been hailed as both one of the largest blunders and largest successes by the US Military in recent years. This action has been reviewed and analyzed from every angle to determine what went right and what went wrong.

From a different point of view compared to the person who wrote this.(I was a part of TF Hawk, and we fired many rounds down range. Though most were in self defense from Milosevic supporters. We never really had a chance to engage the enemy because of the Clinton Administration.)

Planning / pre-deployment

Planning for Task Force Hawk didn't start until March 20, 1999 in Grafenwohr, Germany; even though, the planning for Operation Allied Force had begun in the winter of 1998. Gen Clark and Admiral James O. Ellis, while at the Warfighter Exercise, discussed how to utilize the Apaches to augment the Air Force assets posed to strike in 4 dayscite book
last = Nardulli
first = Bruce
authorlink =
coauthors = Perry, Walter L.; Pirnie, Bruce R.; Gordon, John IV; McGinn, John G.
title = Disjointed War - Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999
publisher = RAND Corporation
date = 2001
location = Santa Monica, CA
pages = 57 - 97
url = http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1406/
doi =
id = ISBN 0-8330-3096-5 ] . The Army's planners would be strapped for time to put together a plan to deploy a mission that had never been employed by an AH-64 Apache unitcite journal
last = Gordon
first = John IV
authorlink =
coauthors = Nardulli, Bruce; Perry, Walter L.
title = The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk
journal = Joint Force Quarterly
volume = Autumn/Winter 2001-2002
issue = 29
pages = 52–57
publisher = Institute for National Strategic Studies
month = January | year = 2002
url = http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1229.pdf
format = PDF
doi =
id = ISSN 1070-0692
accessdate = ] . Instead of supporting ground troops the Apaches would be supporting Air Force missions.cite paper
author = Curtin, Neal P.
title = KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS - Army Resolving Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter
version =
publisher = United States General Accounting Office
date = March 2001
url = http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/gao/d01401.pdf
format = PDF
accessdate = ] Gen. Clark's vision for the unit was to destroy the Yugoslavian units stationed in Kosovo supporting the Serbian police force. The Yugoslavian units were not formed in the company or battalion sized formations but rather spread out through the countryside. This made acquiring the targets and relaying the information to bomber units who couldn't spot them easily. It was projected that the Apache units would be able to identify and eliminate these targets more efficiently, due to their effectiveness in the first Gulf War. The Apaches would be supported by MLRS units conducting SEAD missions. Gen. Clark's hope was that by eliminating a large enough portion of the Serbian forces would force Yugoslavian government to end the conflict. Gen. Clark would face opposition to this opinion from several members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By March 22, 1999, the planners would be finished with the initial plans for operation. These plans projected that the forces would be deployed to Macedonia, but the Macedonian government refused to allow offensive NATO operations to be speared from their country. "Army planners in Germany learned the mission would probably be cancelled on the Friday before Easter." Many soldiers would be given their first day off in weeks due to the Warfighter Exercise, hasty redeployment from Grafenwohr, and preparations for deployment on Task Force Hawk; however, on April 3, Gen. Clark would decide to deploy the task force. It was announced on April 4, 1999 by the Department of Defense that Task Force Hawk would be deployed to Albania to assist in Operation Allied Forcecite press release
title = U.S. ATTACK HELICOPTERS AND MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS TO DEPLOY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ALLIED FORCE No. 145-99
publisher = U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
date = April 04, 1999
url = http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=2030
accessdate = ] . The original size of the task force was estimated at 2000 [cite news
last = Clinton
first = William J.
authorlink = Bill Clinton
title = Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, April 5, 1999
pages = 1
publisher = United States State Department
date = 1999-04-05
url = http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/990404_clinton_ksvoletter.html
accessdate = ] but had to be increase due to the lack of force protection that was present in Macedonia.

Deployment

Many units would begin the movement to Ramstein Air Base in Ramstein-Miesenbach, Germany, the main departure point as many of the units were part of V Corps. The airlift was directed by the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC) at the Ramstein Air Base, who was also coordinating the relief effect flights to Rinas. The Air Force would utilize the C-17 Globemaster III instead of C-5 Galaxy to deploy the Task Force to Tirana's Rinas Mother Teresa Airport airfield due to the runaway length, taxiway, and ramp requirementscite paper
author = United States Department of Defense
title = Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report
version =
publisher = United States Department of Defense
date = January 1, 2000
url = http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf
format = PDF
accessdate = ] cite journal
last = Lambeth
first = Benjamin S.
authorlink =
coauthors =
title = Task Force Hawk
journal = Air Force Magazine
volume = 85
issue = 02
pages = 78–83
publisher = Air Force Association
month = February | year = 2002
url = http://www.afa.org/magazine/Feb2002/0202hawk.pdf
doi =
id =
accessdate = |format=PDF] . The short runaway length would not be the only challenge for the deployment at Rinas. Operation Shining Hope was also utilizing the airfield to spearhead the humanitarian effects for the refugees of the war. The limited number of runaways would only allow 20 sorties to be flown in the base per day. It would take 200 sorties to deploy full complement of equipment. Despite this being the first time that the United States Transportation Command "gave a theater tactical control of a significant number of strategic airlift aircraft for a specific deployment",Gen Montegomery C. Meigs later called one of the most successfulairlift operations in history."

= Units deployed cite journal
last = Hollis
first = Patrecia Slayden
authorlink =
coauthors =
title = Transforming the Army to Meet the 21st Century Threat
journal = Field Artillery
volume = May-June 2000
issue = 3
pages = 4–6
publisher =
date = May-June 2000
url = http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2000/MAY_JUN_2000/MAY_JUN_2000_PAGES_4_6.pdf
format = PDF
doi =
id = ISSN 0899-2525
accessdate = ] =

* Task Force Command Group (V Corps Headquarters - Minus)
* V Corps Artillery Headquarters - Minus
* U.S. 41st Field Artillery Brigade - Headquarters
* 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS - Plus)
* 12th Aviation Brigade - Minus
* 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (Two Squadrons of Apaches)
* 2d BCT, 1st Armored Division - Minus (Force Protection)
** 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mechanized) Augmented with A Battery 4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Paladin and FA Target Acquisition Section
** 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment Augmented with A and C Company, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment and C Battery 1st Battalion 319th Field Artillery M119, 2nd Platoon,C Company 307th EN BN,82nd Airborne Division, Ft Bragg, North Carolina.
* 7th Corps Support Group - Minus
* 32nd Signal Battalion - Minus
* 3rd Plt 212th Military Police Company
* Psychological Operations Detachment
* Special operations Command and Control Element

Lessons learned

There were many lessons learned from this operation. These challenges can be broken into two large categories: how the army deploys its troops and how the air force and the army work jointly together.

References