United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

SCOTUSCase
Litigants=United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
ArgueDateA=November 19
ArgueDateB=20
ArgueYear=1936
DecideDate=December 21
DecideYear=1936
FullName=United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation et al.
USVol=299
USPage=304
Citation=299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255
Prior="Judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment", 14 F.Supp. 230 (D. D.C. 1932)
Subsequent=
Holding=Found in favor of the government, reasoning that while the Constitution may not explicitly say that all ability to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the nation is vested in the President, it is nonetheless given implicitly and by the fact that the Executive, by its very nature, is empowered to conduct foreign affairs in a way which Congress cannot and should not.
SCOTUS=1932-1937
Plurality=Sutherland
Dissent=McReynolds
NotParticipating=Stone
LawsApplied=

"United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.", 299 U.S. 304 (1936)ref|citation, was a United States Supreme Court case involving principles of both governmental regulation of business and the supremacy of the executive branch of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs.

Facts

'In Curtiss‐Wright, the Supreme Court relied on just such inferences to conclude not only that the foreign affairs power vested in the national government as a whole, but that the president of the United States had “plenary” powers in the foreign affairs field not dependent upon congressional delegation.

Congress, acting by joint resolution, had authorized the president to place an embargo on arms shipments to countries at war in the Chaco region of South America. Acting pursuant to the resolution, President Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed such an embargo. When Curtiss‐Wright Export Corp. was indicted for violating the embargo through the sale of bombers, it defended itself on the grounds that the embargo and the proclamation were void because Congress had improperly delegated legislative power to the executive branch by leaving what was essentially a legislative determination to the president's “unfettered discretion.”

In 1936 the defendant Curtiss-Wright Corporation was charged with illegally sending arms of war to Bolivia prior to the revocation of the first proclamation.United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).] Despite the controversy surrounding it, the Curtiss‐Wright decision is one of the Supreme Court's most influential. Most cases involving executive branch–legislative branch conflicts involve political questions that the courts refuse to adjudicate. Therefore, the sweeping language of Curtiss‐Wright is regularly cited to support executive branch claims of power to act without congressional authorization in foreign affairs, especially when there is no judicial intervention to interpret the meaning of that text.

Issue

The defendant raised several issues for consideration by the Court:
# Did the Joint Resolution passed by Congress grant too much authority to the President, in violation of the non-delegation doctrine?
# Was the President required by due process considerations to make findings of fact in support of the proclamation?
# Did the revocation of the May 1934 proclamation operate to eliminate the penalty for its violation?

Decision of the Court

The Court has not recognized the full scope of executive power suggested by Justice Sutherland's sweeping language. Congressional authorization may be necessary to legitimize many executive acts. In Regan v. Wald (1984), for example, the Supreme Court cited Curtiss‐Wright in upholding the constitutionality of the president's regulations restricting travel to Cuba expressly on the ground that they had been authorized by Congress. On the other hand, in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc. (1976), the Court validated presidential restrictions on oil imports based on very broad congressional language delegating apparently unlimited regulatory authority to the executive branch. In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments and found in favor of the government. The Court reasoned that, while the Constitution may not explicitly say that all ability to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the nation is vested in the President, such power is nonetheless granted implicitly. Moreover, said the Court, the Executive, by its very nature, is empowered to conduct foreign affairs in a way which Congress cannot and should not. The Court stated that "there is sufficient warrant for the broad discretion vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will have a beneficial effect upon the reestablishment of peace in the affected countries."

The upshot of this ruling not only upheld export limitations on the grounds of national security (similar ones still exist today) but also established the broader principle of executive supremacy in national security and foreign affairs – one of the reasons advanced in the 1950s in favor of the almost-successful attempt to add the Bricker Amendment to the Constitution.

ee also

* List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 299

References

External links

* [http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CASE&court=US&vol=299&page=304 299 U.S. 304] Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
* [http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/395/ Summary of case from OYEZ]

Robert A. Divine, “The Case of the Smuggled Bombers,” in Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution, edited by John A. Garraty (New York: Harper & Row, 1987)