Frankfurt counterexamples

Frankfurt counterexamples (also known as Frankfurt cases or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities" or PAP, which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if she has free will (i.e. she could have done otherwise).

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities

The principle of alternate possibilities forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, as detailed below:

(1) PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent is free.

(2) An agent is free only if causal determinism is false.

(3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false.

Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, like Alfred Ayer and Walter Terence Stace) try to reject premise two, arguing that, properly understood, free will is not incompatible with determinism. According to the traditional analysis of free will, an agent is free to do otherwise when he would have done otherwise had he wanted to do otherwise (Ayer, 1954). Agents may possess free will, according to the conditional analysis, even if determinism is true.

Frankfurt's objection

From the PAP definition "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise", Frankfurt infers that a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he could "not" have done otherwise — a point with which he takes issue: our theoretical ability to do otherwise, he says, does not necessarily make it "possible" for us to do otherwise.

Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend compatibilism, in particular by rejecting premise one of the argument. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.

Frankfurt's examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behaviour even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise. Here is a typical case:

Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about the Democrats' promise to ensure defeat in Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord. Apparently, Donald is responsible for voting Democratic in spite of the fact that, owing to Ms. White's device, he lacks freedom to do otherwise.

If Frankfurt is correct in suggesting both that Donald is morally responsible for voting Democratic and that he is not free to do otherwise, moral responsibility, in general, does not require that an agent have the freedom to do otherwise (that is, the principle of alternate possibilities is false). Thus, even if causal determinism is true, and even if determinism removes the freedom to do otherwise, there is no reason to doubt that people can still be morally responsible for their behaviour.

Having rebutted the principle of alternate possibilities, Frankfurt suggests that it be revised to take into account the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility. It must be "because" of coercion that the agent acts as he does. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: " [A] person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it "because" he could not have done otherwise." [Frankfurt: "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility" in Feinberg; Shafer-Landau: "Responsibility & Responsibility", p. 488.]

Opposition

An oft-citedwho counter-argument to Frankfurt's contestation is Galen Strawson's "basic argument", which posits a fundamental level at which free will is unfeasible, irrespective of the rights and wrongs of determinism:

# We do what we do because we are what we are.
# To be ultimately responsible for what we do, we must be ultimately responsible for what we are.
# But we cannot be morally responsible for what we are because, quite simply, we are what we are, and have no say or control over it.
# Therefore, we are not ultimately responsible for what we do.

Applying this theory to the Frankfurt counterexamples has notable repercussions, as it eradicates moral responsibility in every case. Strawson would disagree with the notion that Donald is ultimately responsible for what he does, because he is not morally responsible for what he is. However, as Frankfurt's examples call into question the principle of alternate possibilities rather than the broader matter of moral responsibility, its crux is relatively unaffected.

References

* Frankfurt, Harry (1969). “ [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819691204%2966%3A23%3C829%3AAPAMR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility] ,” "Journal of Philosophy" 66, 829-39.
* Ayer, A. J. (1954) “Freedom and Necessity in "Philosophical Essays", London: Macmillan.