Rufus S. Bratton

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) in the War Department in December 1941, when the United States entered World War II. A West Point graduate, Colonel Bratton was a language student in Japan and had attended the Japanese Imperial War College in 1932.

On the morning of December 7th, 1941, a secret message from the Japanese government to the Japanese ambassador had been decoded in the War Department. However, the intelligence chief told Colonel Bratton that nothing could be done until Chief of Staff George Marshall arrived (only ten minutes drive away). Bratton tried reaching Marshall at home, yet was repeatedly told General Marshall was out horseback riding as was his practice on Sunday mornings. When Bratton did reach Marshall by phone, he told him of the emergency. Marshall then said he would come to the War Department, but he took 75 minutes to arrive, and didn't come to his office until 11:25am. [ [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack ] ] [ [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bendet1.htm Truman Library - Karl R. Bendetsen Oral History, October 24, 1972 ] ]

Every officer in Marshall's office agreed that these indicated an attack in the Pacific at about 1 p.m. EST. General Marshal concluded that Pacific Commands including Hawaii should be alerted, although the Philippines and Thailand were thought to be more likely targets. Col Bratton took Marshall's warning message, encoded it, and delivered it to the War Department Message Center, where it was sent as a telegram. By the time the warning message was delivered in Hawaii however, the attack was already underway.

According to Gordon W. Prange's "At Dawn We Slept", Colonel Bratton, along with BG Sherman Miles, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2, met with General George Marshall at his office at 11:25am EST on December 7th, 1941, in Washington, D.C. There the two officers presented Marshall with the Fourteen Part Message that the Japanese ambassador was to deliver to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull that afternoon. The fourteenth part of the message spoke of breaking negotiations between Japan and the United States. They were soon joined in Marshall's office by BG Leonard Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, and Colonol Charles Bundy, Chief of the War Plans Group. Upon reading dispatch Marshall realized that it "meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon" (494). Everyone in the room concurred. The next paragraph of Prange's book demonstrates that neither Colonel Bratton, nor any of the other three officers, ever specifically or definitively ever singled out Pearl Harbor as the sole receipiant of a Japanese attack. It reads, "But exactly what American installation? Miles urged an immediate warning to the Philippines, Panama, the West Coast, and Hawaii. Yet no one mentioned the timing of the 1300 message as it related to Hawaii". Bratton is instructed to get the war warning out, but just before he leaves the room, General Gerow tells him, 'If there is any question of priority, give the Philippines first priority". At no point does Bratton ever state that Pearl Harbor is the sole point of attack. Though "Tora, Tora, Tora" is a great movie and actually utilized Mr. Prange's book, it, like many movies, contains error or fictional additions. In addition it should be noted that Mr. Prange spent 37 years interviewing a great number of Japanese and American participants and collecting documents and information related to the attack. That work culminated into "At Dawn We Slept".

Fictional representation

In the film Tora! Tora! Tora! he was played by E.G. Marshall. The film shows him being summoned by Naval Intelligence Lieutenant Commander Alvin D. Kramer, (played by Wesley Addy). We see Bratton reading a Japanese transcription, nicknamed "Magic", as it comes out of the description machine, codenamed "Purple". Later on in the film, because of the incoming messages, Bratton becomes convinced that the Japanese are about to attack Pearl Harbor, though he is incorrect about exactly when the attack will occur-thinking it will come on the Sunday before December 7. The film shows Bratton and Kramer's futile efforts to alert higher-ups that an attack is imminent.

References

*US Senate. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. "Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack". 79th Cong., 2nd sess, (S. doc no. 244) Government Printing Office, 1946.
*Hess, Jerry N., Oral History Interview with Karl R. Bendetsen, General Counsel, Department of the Army, 1949; Assistant Secretary of the Army, 1950-52; Under Secretary of the Army, 1952, New York: November 21, 1972, Truman Library Oral Archives
*Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept. New York. Penguin Books. 1981.

Notes

External links

*The Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack -- [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_0.html]
*Oral History Interview with Karl Bendetsen -- [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bendet1.htm http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bendet1.htm] -- Note: The events and timeline described by Bendetsen are contradictory and conflict with Bendetsen's known military record.