Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd.

SCCInfoBox
case-name=Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd.
full-case-name=Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd.
heard-date=Argued February 25, 1999
decided-date=September 10, 1999
citations= [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108; (1999), 176 D.L.R. (4th) 257; [1999] 9 W.W.R. 380; (1999), 50 B.L.R. (2d) 169; (1999), 67 B.C.L.R. (3d) 213
docket=26415
ruling=
ratio=Extended the "principled exception" to the doctrine of privity of contract for third party beneficiaries.
SCC=1998-1999
Unanimous=Iaccobucci J.
NotParticipating=Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux-Dubé J.

"Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. v. Can-Dive Services Ltd.", [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision where the Court re-affirmed and expanded the on the exception to the doctrine of privity first established in "London Drugs v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd.", [1992] S.C.R. 299.

Background

Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd. owned a derrick barge that it chartered to Can-Dive Services Ltd. who accidentally sank the barge while it was chartered. Fraser River collected on a $1.1 million insurance policy for the barge. The original policy between Fraser River and their insurer contained a subrogation clause which waived the insurer's right of subrogation against any third-parties. Fraser River and their insurer entered an agreement which waived the original subrogation waiver, intending to allow the insurance company and Fraser River to sue Can-Dive.

In their defence, Can-Dive claimed that the insurer already waived their subrogation rights and so could not unwaive them.

The question before the Supreme Court is whether Can-Dive could rely on the waiver of subrogation in the original insurance policy.

Reasons of the Court

Justice Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court, held in favour of Can-Dive on the basis that they were able to rely on the subrogation clause. The case turned on the existence of any exceptions to privity. Iacobucci first affirmed the existence of an agency exception to privity, and then expanded on the "principled exception to the privity of contract doctrine" established in "London Drugs v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd.".

He noted that in cases were the agency exception did not apply, as in this case, courts "may nonetheless undertake the appropriate analysis, bounded by both common sense and commercial reality, in order to determine whether the doctrine of privity with respect to third-party beneficiaries should be relaxed". This principled approached, he believed, was preferable to having "yet another ad-hoc exception".

A two stage test was devised to determine if the exception could be applied. First, the parties to the contract "must have intended the relevant provision to confer a benefit on the third party." Namely, those who are not "mere strangers" to the contract. Second, the third-party must demonstrate that their actions "came within the scope of the agreement between the initial parties". This involved two requirements. The third party must have been acting within the course of the agreement when the loss had occurred, and the status and activity of the third party are within the contemplation of the contract.

Iacobucci acknowledged that this exception was a departure from the doctrine of privity; however, it was only "incremental" in nature and did not abdicate any existing principles. Since the exception was dependent on the intention within the contract it would not frustrate the expectations of the parties to the contract.

On the facts, Iacobucci found that the policy was clearly intending to extend a benefit to Can-Dive satisfying the first stage. It was noted that parties to a contract cannot unilaterally revoke the rights of a third party once they have received an actual benefit. On the second stage the requirements were easily satisfied as well since Can-Dive was acting in accordance with the charter agreement.

External links

*