Task Force Faith

Task Force Faith, also sometimes referred to as Task Force Maclean (and by its official designation, RCT 31) was a United States Army unit destroyed in fighting at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War between November 27 and December 2, 1950. It comprised primarily infantry, artillery, and tank units from the 7th Infantry Division, numbering approximately 3,000 soldiers. Of these, about 600 were KATUSAs (Korean Augmentee To the U.S. Army). The name Task Force Faith was originally coined by a U.S. Army historian, however the unit was never known by this name. RCT 31, which consisted of the 31st Infantry Regiment and supporting units, had the 1/31 Infantry detached and the 1/32 Infantry (from the 32nd RCT) added, and the designation RCT 31 was never changed.

Purpose and composition

The task force was created as part of the final United Nations offensive to occupy North Korea and cut the main supply route into the neighboring Eighth United States Army zone. In the X Corps area of northeastern Korea, the main effort would be made by the 1st Marine Division, attacking northwest from the Chosin Reservoir. The 7th Infantry Division was ordered by Major General Ned Almond, X Corps commander, to provide a regiment-sized force to guard the Marines' east (right) flank, by occupying the east side of the reservoir. This force would also attack north to the Yalu River, the boundary between North Korea and China, once the offensive began.

In earlier operations, 7th Division units had become widely spread out and isolated from each other in the rugged, mountainous terrain and primitive road network of the region. This made it impossible to assemble a full-strength task force in time, or to effectively coordinate its operations with the Marines on the south and western sides of the Chosin Reservoir.

Nevertheless, by November 27, RCT 31, commanded by Colonel Allan MacLean, had arrived in two separate positions along a ten mile (16 km) stretch down the east side of the reservoir. Consisting of the 3/31st and 1/32nd infantry battalions, two batteries of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, and one platoon of D Battery, 15th Antiaircraft Battalion, it was short one infantry battalion and a tank company, both of which were expected to arrive soon. Basic defensive positions were established, but the Americans, not expecting enemy activity, did not set up a tight perimeter with 360 degree security. Colonel MacLean planned to attack north the following morning. [ [http://www.armyhistory.org/armyhistorical.aspx?pgID=868&id=40&exCompID=32 Seelinger, Matthew J. "Nightmare at the Chosin Reservoir"] ]

Chinese attacks and isolation

However, during the night, powerful Chinese forces — which had infiltrated the area undetected — made a surprise attack on the task force elements as well as the Marines, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the postponement, though not the cancellation, of the planned offensive. The following afternoon General Almond and his aide, 1st Lt. Alexander Haig, flew into the perimeter of RCT 31. Despite all the evidence of massive Chinese intervention, Almond exhorted the soldiers to begin the offensive. "The enemy who is delaying you for the moment is nothing more than remnants of Chinese divisions fleeing north" he told the soldiers, "We're still attacking and we're going all the way to the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundry-men stop you." [ [http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/stewart.pdf#page=12 Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950] ] The corps commander then flew back to Hagaru-ri, convinced that RCT 31 was strong enough to begin its attack and deal with whatever "remnants" of CCF forces were in their way. [ [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention, pg. 17] ] Although large numbers of Chinese troops were seen moving south all day, on the hills east of the task force position, U.S. officers did not change their view of the situation. MacLean still expected reinforcements: his third infantry battalion and the 31st Tank Company.

The reinforcements did not arrive. Two Chinese divisions had — unbeknownst to MacLean — completely surrounded the task force, cutting it off from the south, where they established a strong roadblock a few miles north of the Marine base at the ruined village of Hagaru-ri. When the tank company reached the south end of the reservoir and moved north past Hagaru-ri, it was stopped by the Chinese roadblock, losing several tanks to enemy fire. The next day, it tried again, this time with scratch infantry support from headquarters and service troops of the 31st Infantry and 57th Field Artillery, but it was again beaten back. This force then returned to the position they had occupied at Hudong, a small, abandoned village north of Hagaru-ri, about four miles (6.5 km) south of RCT 31.

The Marines — surrounded and under heavy attack—had been unable to give assistance to the Army relief effort. MacLean's expected infantry battalion never made it to the Chosin area at all. MacLean was unaware of this. For some reason MacLean made no effort to establish communications with higher headquarters and report his situation using Captain Edward Standford's (the Marine air controller) radio.

During the night of November 28, the Chinese again struck the task force, overruning several positions, again inflicting many casualties. Also enemy tanks and armored vehicles made their appearance (they were destroyed). Conditions were rapidly deteriorating, including the weather. The temperature plunged as low as -30 degrees F (-34 C), as heavy snow fell, impeding mobility. Visibility was low and the troops were suffering from the intense cold (several men froze to death in their foxholes). Colonel MacLean decided to pull his lead battalion, the 1/32 Infantry, back into the perimeter of his other units a few miles to the south, to provide a stronger defense.

All the rest of the day 1/32 moved forward under constant cover of Marine and Navy planes from VMF-212, VMF-214, VMF-312, VMF(N)-513, and Hedron-12. Thousands of enemy troops moving south on the road and along the ridges made excellent targets. In addition to the cover afforded by F4U Corsair fighter-bombers, much needed supplies were dropped by the Air Force Combat Cargo Command. At times, Captain Standford (the Marine FAC) found himself directing both air drops from cargo planes and close support strikes over the same radio net. The air was filled with cargo planes, chutes, and agile Corsairs.

Finally, 1/32 joined the casualty-ridden 3/31 after 40 Marine aircraft had hit the enemy with some 225 rockets, 18 napalm tanks, 10 500-lb bombs, and 29 fragmentation bombs. This ordnance was delivered from early morning until the last flight left its station at 17:05.

During the course of the withdrawal, MacLean saw what he thought were his long awaited reinforcements, but as he approached them they turned out to be Chinese, who shot MacLean several times and took him prisoner, where he died four days later. Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith, commander of the 1/32nd, now took command. Reaching the southern position, he consolidated the task force into one defensive perimeter as the Chinese intensified their attacks. With the assistance of Marine Corps air support — expertly coordinated by Captain Stamford and without which it would have been overwhelmed — the task force fought off heavy Chinese assaults for another two days, inflicting severe losses on the communist forces, who left many hundreds of bodies in the snow around the Army position.

Breakout attempt

The Americans were running low on ammunition, and over half their number had been killed or wounded, including a high proportion of key leaders. Faith, realizing he was surrounded and outnumbered by two enemy divisions, decided to attempt a breakout to the south, toward Marine lines. The situation was so desperate that only a minimum of equipment and sufficient vehicles to carry the wounded was taken, freeing more soldiers to fight as infantry. The rest was destroyed in place, including the artillery's howitzers after they fired their last rounds.

The breakout began on December 1, greatly aided by Marine F4U Corsairs and Navy F7F twin-engine fighters which strafed and bombed Chinese positions as the American truck column, encumbered with hundreds of wounded and under constant attack, made its way down a gravel road on the east side of Chosin Reservoir.

The march south was interrupted when the Corsairs mistakenly bombed short, spraying the lead platoons of the task force with napalm, killing and burning troops. The napalm drop had a demoralizing effect on the task force. As the front of RCT 31 made their way against close-range fire, heavy small arms fire from across the small valley caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road, instead of protecting the trucks. The enemy fire killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers who viewed the job as a form of suicide. In the late afternoon, with light fading, Faith got the column moving again, albeit slowly, until it approached a Chinese-occupied hill (1221) which overlooked a strong roadblock. Several units attacked Hill 1221 trying to clear it. As Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was hit by an enemy grenade and badly wounded.

Destruction

At this point, darkness closed in, ending the protective Marine air cover. Chinese infantry assaults grew bolder, penetrating closer to the convoy. RCT 31 began to disintegrate. Almost all of its officers were dead or seriously wounded. Separate attacks were made on the hill which cleared part of it, but many of the leaderless soldiers, instead of returning to the column, continued out onto the frozen reservoir immediately behind the hill and walked on the ice toward Marine positions several miles to the south, seeking safety.

The roadblock at the base of the hill was finally removed, and the truck column again crept forward in the dark but was finally halted by another Chinese roadblock just north of Hudong. The U.S. troops and tanks occupying Hudong — who might have saved at least part of the task force — had been ordered back to Hagaru-ri the previous day (an action which remains controversial).

Here the Chinese renewed their attack, swarming among the trucks, throwing white phosphorus grenades into vehicles loaded with wounded, setting some of them on fire. [ [http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/hill303.htm Hill 303 Massacre] ] Lieutenant-Colonel Faith, hit again by rifle fire, died of his wounds (he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor). Major Harvey Storms, the last commander of 3/31 Infantry and a respected and admired leader, was also killed. The remaining American rear-guard soldiers abandoned the truck convoy and attempted to escape individually, many crossing onto the ice of the reservoir.

Aftermath

Withdrawal from North Korea

Roughly 300 able-bodied survivors of Task Force Faith were formed into a provisional battalion which was attached to the Marines and fought with them in the breakout of the 1st Marine Division during the remainder of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. This unit was made up of survivors from east of Chosin , as well as units from Hudong-ni and Hagaru-ri; Tank Company, 31st Infantry, which had been at Hudong-ni and withdrawn on November 30 with other Hudong units, was attached to the 5th Marines as rear guard during the breakout on December 6 and December 7. The so-called Provisional Battalion (known as "31/7" under LTC Berry K. Anderson) was actually formed into two small battalions of three rifle companies each, 3/31 (MAJ Carl Witte) with I, K and L, 1/32 (MAJ Robert Jones) with A, B and C companies.Nine members of the task force were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the army's second highest decoration for bravery.

Casualties

During the night of December 1, hundreds of survivors from the task force reached Marine positions south of the reservoir at Hagaru-ri. Several hundred more were rescued the following day by Marine jeep patrols. Some soldiers taken prisoner by the Chinese were released a few hours later. Of the 2,500 troops trapped by the Chinese north of the roadblock, about 1,500 eventually made it back to American lines, the majority of them wounded or badly frostbitten. Over 1,000 soldiers of Task Force Faith were killed or died in Chinese captivity.

Casualties for the Chinese 80th and 81st Divisions are not known but are believed to be extremely heavy. Both divisions were not identified again on the battlefield until early April 1951.

RCT 31 was the largest American unit destroyed, and Colonel MacLean was the highest ranking American officer killed in action during the Korean War.

The majority of survivors, suffering from wounds and/or frostbite, were evacuated to hospitals in Japan. 7th Division units comprising the task force were soon reconstituted, going back into battle in February 1951.

Legacy

The presence and fate of the Army troops east of Chosin in November and December 1950 is not well known. Many accounts of the Chosin Reservoir campaign tend to overlook or minimize their role. Also overlooked is that RCT 31 accomplished at least part of its mission. It successfully guarded the right flank of the 1st Marine Division, protecting it from Chinese attack for four days. If not for the presence of the task force, the Chinese 80th and 81st Divisions might have captured the key Marine base and air-strip at Hagaru-ri before the Marines had concentrated sufficient units to defend it. This would have blocked the only escape route of the Marines and other Army units, leading to a significantly different outcome at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.

In 2001 the Navy awarded the task force the Navy Presidential Unit Citation, once Chinese records revealed the extent of the enemy opposition.

Honors

The following soldiers were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, for actions East of the Reservoir:
* George R. Cody Captain, HMC 31 Inf., posthumously awarded .

* James H. Godfrey Cpl., D/32 Inf.

* Harold B. Haugland Sgt., D/15 AAA Bn.

* Charles Garrigus Sgt., 1/32 Inf., posthumously awarded.

* Robert E. Jones Maj., S-3 of 1/32 Inf.

* John E. Gray Lt., M/31 Inf.

* Earle Jordan Capt., M/31 Inf.

* Robert G. Schmitt Lt., M/31 Inf.

* Stanford O. Corners Sgt., Med/A/57 FAB.

Notes

References

*Appleman, Roy. "East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea". 1950, Texas A&M University Press, College Station(1987)
*Blair, Clay. "The Forgotten War". Times Books, NY(1987)

External links

* cite web
last = Seelinger
first = Matthew J.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 2006
month =
url = http://www.armyhistory.org/armyhistorical.aspx?pgID=868&id=40&exCompID=32
title = "Nightmare at the Chosin Reservoir"
format =
work = Korean War 1950-1953
pages =
publisher = Army Historical Foundation
language =
accessdate = 2006-07-15
accessyear =