Amir Sjarifuddin

Infobox Politician
name = Amir Sjarifoeddin


office = 2nd Prime Minister of Indonesia
term_start = July 3, 1947
term_end = January 29, 1948
successor = Mohammad Hatta
predecessor=Sutan Sjahrir
birth_date = birth date|1907|4|27|mf=y
birth_place = Medan, North Sumatra
death_date = death date and age|1948|12|19|1907|4|27|mf=y
death_place = Solo, Central Java
party = Indonesian National Party
religion = Christian

Amir Sjarifuddin (27 April 1907 - 19 December 1948) was a socialist politician and one of the Indonesian Republic's first leaders, becoming Prime Minister during the country's National Revolution.Vickers (2005), page 86] A Christian convert from a Muslim Batak family, Amir was a major leader of the Left during the Revolution. He was executed in 1948 by Indonesian Republican officers following his involvement in a Communist revolt.

Early life

Born into Sumatran aristocracy in the city of Medan, Amir's wealthy background and outstanding intellectual abilities allowed him to enter the most elite schools; he was educated in Haarlem and Leiden in the Netherlands before gaining a law degree in Batavia (now Jakarta). During his time in the Netherlands he studied Eastern and Western philosophy under the tutelage of the Theosophical Society. Amir converted from Islam to Christianity in 1931 whereupon his fervently Islamic mother carried out her threat to commit suicide.Fact|date=April 2007

Dutch East Indies and Japanese Occupation

In 1937, one of the final years of the Dutch period, Amir lead a group of younger Marxists in establishing Gerindo ('Indonesian People's Movement'), a radical co-operating party opposed to international fascism as the first enemy. [Vickers (2005), page 226; Reid (1973), page 9] The Soviet Union’s Dmitrov doctrine had called for a common front against fascism which helped swell the numbers of Indonesians taking an approach cooperative the Dutch in an attempt to secure Indonesian independence. Gerindo was one of the more significant cooperative parties, which in the years before World War II who’s objectives included a full Indonesian legislature; modest goals in comparison to the Dutch-suppressed radical nationalists lead by the likes of Sukarno and Hatta, who Amir met before the War.Reid (1973), page 9] By 1940, Dutch intelligence suspected him of being involved with the Communist underground.

Watching the increased strength and influence of Imperial Japan, Amir was one of a number of Indonesian leaders who before the war, warned against the danger of fascism. Before the Netherlands' invasion by Japan's ally, Germany, the Netherlands Indies was a major exporter of raw materials to East Asia and to this end, Amir's groups had promoted boycotts against Japan. It is thought that his prominent roles in these campaigns that prompted the head of Dutch intelligence to provide Amir with 25,000 guilders in March 1942 to organise an underground resistance movement against Japan through his Marxist and nationalist connections. At this point, the Dutch administration was crumbling against the Japanese onslaught and the top Dutch military fled Indonesia for Australia. [B.R.O'G. Anderson, "Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-46" (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp.413-14; Bob Hering, "Soekarno: Founding Father of Indonesia 1901-1945" (Lieden: KITLV Press, 2002), pp.13, 223; Jacque Leclerc, 'Afterwood: the masked hero', in Anton Lucas (ed.), "Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java, 1942-1945" (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Papers on Southeast Asia No.13, 1986), pp.342-4. (all cited in Vickers (2005), page 86)]

Upon their occupation of Indonesia, the Japanese enforced total suppression of any opposition to their rule. Most Indonesian leaders obliged as either 'neutral observers' or actively cooperated. Amir, however, was the only prominent Indonesian politician to organise active resistance. The Japanese arrested Amir in 1943 and he only escaped execution following intervention from Sukarno whose popularity in Indonesia, and hence importance to the war effort, was recognised by the Japanese.Reid (1973), page 12]

Indonesian National Revolution

As a cabinet minister, and later prime minister, Amir aligned himself with the generally older group of political leaders who, in establishing Indonesian independence, emphasised the need for diplomacy and the formation of sound political structures. This group struggle contrasted with the alternative and generally younger alternative political leadership advocating struggle; the vying for influence between these two groups was a defining feature of the Indonesian National Revolution.

"Partai Sosialis"

In 1945, he was the most widely known and respected Republican politician to consider himself communist. Although Amir had been in contact with the 'illegal' Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), he had nothing but disdain for the 'unsophisticated' and unknown Marxists who re-established it in 1935.Reid (1973), page 83] His closest colleagues from the 'illegal PKI' underground or the pre-war Gerindo formed the "Partai Sosialis Indonesia" (PARSI) on 1 November 1945. The same month, Amir followers formed PESINDO ("Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia", "Indonesian Socialist Youth"). [Ricklefs (1991)]

At a two-party conference on 16-17 December it was announced that Amir's PARSI would merge with Sjahrir's political grouping, PARAS, forming the "Partai Sosialis" (PS). The "Partai Sosialis" quickly became the strongest pro-government party, especially in Yogyakarta and East Java. The party accepted the argument of Amir and its other leaders that the time was not ripe to implement socialism, rather that international support necessary for independence be sought, and that unruly constituents had to be opposed. The party's westernised leaders showed more faith in Netherlands left-wing forces, than in the revolutionary fervour of the Indonesian people, which became a source of discontent among the party's opponents.

Cabinet minister

;Information MinisterFollowing the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945 and the proclamation of Indonesian independence two days later, the Republic announced its first ministry on 4 September. The seventeen-member cabinet was comprised mostly of 'collaborating' nationalists; [Most Indonesian nationalist leaders saw the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia as an opportunity to take advantage of in their pursuit of independence. Their consequent cooperation with the Japanese saw the returning Dutch brand them 'collaborators', and thus illegitimate leaders, in an attempt to undermine support for the newly-proclaimed Republic.] Amir, appointed as Information Minister, was however, still imprisoned by the Japanese following his 1942-43 anti-Japanese underground activities.Reid (1973), page 32] Early in the Revolution, Amir worked closely with first Prime Minster and Sukarno rival, Sutan Sjahrir; the two played the major role in shaping the arrangements linking the new government of Indonesia with its people remarkably effectively.Reid (1973), page 69]

On 30 October Amir, along with Sukarno and Hatta, was flown into the East Java city of Surabaya by the desperate British caretaker administration. The three were seen as the only Indonesian leaders likely able to quell fighting between Republican and British Indian forces in which the British Brigade were hopelessly outnumbered and facing annihilation. A peace fire was immediately adhered to, but fighting soon recommenced after confused communications and mistrust between the two sides, leading to the famed Battle of Surabaya.Reid (1973), page 52]

;Minister for DefenceOn 16 October 1945, Sjahrir and Amir engineered a takeover within the KNIP. [Ricklefs (1991)] and following the 11 November transition to parliamentary government, Amir is appointed to a new cabinet with Sjahrir as Prime Minister. [President Sukarno accepted a proposal for cabinet to answer to the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) acting as Parliament rather than to the President. This watershed event ushered in the so-called 'liberal' or parliamentary form of government, which prevailed against the Sukarnoist-proposed constitution for twelve years. Leadership was thus handed to a 'modernizing' Western-minded intellectual, who at the time were thought to be the coming leaders of Asia and more palatable to Western ideas of government. When considered against previous forms of government—indigenous Indonesian, Dutch, Japanese and even the first brief Republican government—this was the most revolutionary political change at a national level during the 1945-50 Revolution. (Reid (1973), page 17)] Described as 'a man even his political adversaries found difficult to hate', [ B.R.O'G. Anderson, "Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-46" (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.206, cited in Vickers (2005), page 106] he played a key role as Minister of Defence. His position, however, was a source of friction with the TKR and its new commander, Sudirman, who had nominated their own candidate, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengkubuwono IX. (The Sultan, however, was not eager to contest the position). Amir was a central figure in the government's 'anti-fascist' programme with the army a key target, which caused further frictions. PETA-trained army officers Sjahrir's attacks on the 'traitors', 'fascists', and 'running dogs' who had cooperated with the Japanese. Amir promoted the Red Army as a model of a citizens' army loyal to the government and holding socialist ideals. On 19 February 1946, Amir inaugurated a socialist and Masyumi politician-dominated 'education staff' for the army. The body appointed fifty-five 'political officers' at the end of May without consulting the army command. These new officers were to educate each TRI unit in the goals of the revolution. [Reid (1973), pages 93-94] He was not, however, able to effectively impose such ideals on unit commanders, particularly as Sudirman and other PETA-trained resented the 'fascist' slur cast on them. [Reid (1973), page 79] The Marxist's overtones of Amir's new military academies conflicted with the popular army view of being above politics and the need to play a unifying role in the national struggle; the army leadership consequently rejected attempts to introduce partisan ideology and alignments. [Reid (1973), page 79]

This antagonism between the government and PETA-trained officers, forced Amir to find an armed support base elsewhere He aligned himself with sympathetic Dutch-educated officers in certain divisions, such as the West Java 'Siliwangi' Division the command of which had been assumed by KNIL Lieutenant A.H. Nasution in May 1946. [Reid (1973), page 79] Another source of support for the new cabinet was the more educated armed "pemuda" sympathetic to the cabinet's 'anti-fascist' approach. With an engaging personality and persuasive oratory skills, Amir had more time and aptitude than Sjahrir for party building, and he played the main part in wooing these "pemuda". [Reid (1973), page 79]

Prime Ministership

A split between Amir's and Prime Minister Sjahrir's supporters rapidly deepened in 1947. There had long been mutual suspicion between Sjahrir and the communists who had returned from the Netherlands in 1946; the fading of the 'anti-fascist' cause made these suspicions more obvious. Sjahrir's preoccupation with "diplomasi", his physical isolation in Jakarta from revolution-infused Central Java, and is dislike of mass rallies allowed the more Moscow-inclined Marxists to assume more control in both the PS and "Sayap Kiri". By June 1946, Sjahrir's increasing isolation from the coalition encouraged the opposing factions to depose him. This group put their support behind Amir, the alternative PS leader. On 26 June 1947, Amir, along with two other Moscow-inclined Ministers—Abdulmadjid (PS) and Wikana (PESINDO)— backed by a majority of "Sayap Kiri" withdrew their support for Sjahrir. Their argument was that Sjahrir had compromised the Republic in his pursuit of "diplomasi"—the same charge that deposed every revolutionary government—and that in the face of Dutch belligerence, such conciliation seemed futile.

Amir courted a broad coalition but hostility from Muslim Masyumi prevented its leader, Dr Sukiman, and pro-Sjahrir 'religious socialists' from previous cabinets from joining the new cabinet. In July, Amir was appointed Prime Minister of the Republic. [Ricklefs (1991)] Other influential Masyumi factions, such as that of Wondoamiseno, provided support. Although Amir's communist allies controlled about 10% of the thirty-four with Amir's Defence Ministry their sole key one, this cabinet was the highest point of orthodox communist influence in the Revolution. [Reid (1973), page 100] Amir succeeded Sutan Sjahrir as Prime MinisterVickers (2005), page 226]

Following a backlash over the Renville Agreement, a disaster for the Republic for which Amir received much of the blame, PNI and Masyumi cabinet members resigned in early January 1947. On the 23rd January, with his support base disappearing, Amir resigns from the prime ministership. President Sukarno subsequently appoints Hatta to head an emergency 'presidential cabinet' directly responsible to the President and not the KNIP. The new cabinet consisted mainly of PNI, Masyumi and non-party members; Amir and the "Left Wing" are subsequently in opposition. [Ricklefs (1991)]

"Front Demokrasi Rakyat" and the Madiun Affair

The "Left Wing" coalition renames itself the "People's Democratic Front" ("Front Demokrasi Rakyat") and denounces the "Renville Agreement", which Amir's government had itself negotiated. [Ricklefs (1991)] In August 1947, Musso, the 1920s leader of the PKI, arrived in Yogyakarta from the Soviet Union. Amir and the leadership of the People’s Democratic Front immediately accept his authority, and Amir admitted membership of the underground PKI since 1935. Adhering to Musso's Stalinist thinking of a single party of the working class, the major leftist parties in the Front dissolve themselves into the PKI. [Ricklefs (1991)]

Following industrial action, demonstrations, and subsequent open warfare between PKI and pro-government forces in the Central Java city of Surakarta, on 18 September a group of PKI supporters took over strategic points in the Madiun area. They killed pro-government officers, and announced over radio the formation of a new "National Front" government. Caught off guard by the premature coup attempt, Musso, Amir and other PKI leaders travel to Madiun to take charge. [Ricklefs (1991)] The following day, about 200 pro-PKI and other leftist leaders remaining in Yogyakarta were arrested. Sukarno denounced the Madiun rebels over radio, and called upon Indonesians to rally to himself and Hatta rather than to Musso and his plans for a Soviet-style government. Musso replied on radio that he will fight to the finish, while, the People's Democratic Front in Banten and Sumatra announced they had nothing to do with the rebellion. [Ricklefs (1991)]

In the following weeks, pro-government forces, led by the Siliwangi Division, march on Madiun where there was an estimated 5,000-10,000 pro-PKI soldiers. As the rebels retreated they killed Masyumi and PNI leaders and officials, and in the villages killings took place along "santri"-"abangan" lines. On 30 September, the rebels abandoned Madiun town, and were pursued by pro-government troops through the countryside. Musso is killed on the 31 October trying to escape custody. [Ricklefs (1991)]

Amir and 300 rebel soldiers were captured by Siliwangi troops on 1 December. Some 35,000 people were later arrested. It is thought perhaps 8,000 people were killed in the affair. As part of a second major military offensive against the Republic, on 19 December Dutch troops occupied Yogyakarta city and the Republican government was captured, including Sukarno, Hatta, Agus Salim, and Sjahrir. Republican forces withdraw to the countryside beginning full-scale guerrilla war on either side of the van Mook line. Rather than risk their release, the army killed Amir and fifty other leftist prisoners as it withdrew from Yogyakarta that evening. [Ricklefs (1991)]

References

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* Ricklefs, M.C. 1991. "A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1300. 2nd Edition", Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-333-57690-X;Notes