Commitment device

Dubner and Levitt define a commitment device as "a means with which to lock yourself into a course of action that you might not otherwise choose but that produces a desired result" (Dubner and Levitt 2007). Put differently, a commitment device is "[a] way to change one’s own incentives to make an otherwise empty promise credible" (Reeves 2010).

The term "commitment device" is used in both economics and game theory. In particular, the concept is relevant to the fields of economics and especially the study of decision making (Brocas, et al.). "Commitment devices are a way to overcome the discrepancy between an individual’s short-term and long-term preferences- in other words, they are a way for self-aware people to modify their incentives or set of possible choices in order to overcome impatience or other irrational behavior. You know the story of Ulysses tying himself to the mast so that he couldn’t be lured in by the song of the Sirens? You can think of that as the quintessential commitment device" (Beggs 2009).

Examples of commitment devices abound. Dubner and Levitt give the example of Han Xin, a general in ancient China, who positioned his soldiers with their backs to a river, making it impossible for them to flee, and thereby leaving them no choice but to attack the enemy head-on. They also present various commitment devices related to weight-loss (2007). In addition, some game theorists have argued that human emotions and sense of honor are forms of commitment device (Arslan 2011 & Ross and Dumouchel 2004). Other examples include announcing commitments publicly and Mutually assured destruction (Straker 2011), as well as software programs which block internet access for a predetermined period of time.

SEE ALSO: Precommitment

Sources:

Arslan, Ruben. "Evolution of cooperation: Emotion as a commitment device," Evolutionary Theory across the Life Sciences, 2000-2011. http://itb.biologie.hu-berlin.de/blogs/evoblog/contrib/evolution-of-cooperation-emotion-as-a-commitment-device-1

Beggs, Jodi. "Be Careful With Those Commitment Devices…," June 17, 2009. Online at http://www.economistsdoitwithmodels.com/2009/06/17/be-careful-with-those-commitment-devices/

Brocas et al., Isabelle, Juan D. Carrillo, and Mathias Dewatripont. "Commitment Devices under Self-Control Problems: An Overview," Online at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~juandc/PDFpapers/book2-ch04.pdf

Dubner and Levitt, Stephen J. and Steven D. "The Stomach-Surgery Conundrum," New York Times, November 18, 2007. Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/magazine/18wwln-freakonomics-t.html?_r=1

Reeves, Daniel. "How To Do What You Want: Akrasia and Self-Binding," Messy Matters, November 15, 2010. Online at http://messymatters.com/2010/11/15/akrasia/

Ross and Dumouchel, Don and Paul. "Emotions as Strategic Signals," Rationality and Society August 2004 vol. 16 no. 3 251-286. Online at http://rss.sagepub.com/content/16/3/251.abstract

Straker, Dave. "Commitment Devices," Changing Minds, 2002-2011. Online at http://changingminds.org/techniques/general/more_methods/commitment_devices.htm