- Alvin E. Roth
Infobox Person
name = Alvin E. Roth
caption =
birth_date = December 19, 1951
birth_place =
death_date =
death_place =
other_names =
known_for = Mechanism Design, Market Design
occupation =Economist
nationality = AmericanAlvin E. "Al" Roth (born
Dec 19 ,1951 ) is an Americaneconomist currently serving as theGeorge Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration atHarvard Business School . Roth has made significant contributions to the fields ofgame theory , market design andexperimental economics .Biography
Al Roth graduated from
Columbia University in1971 with a degree inOperations research . He then moved toStanford University , receiving both his masters and PhD in Operations research there in1973 and1974 respectively.After leaving Stanford, Roth went on to teach at the
University of Illinois and theUniversity of Pittsburgh before joining the faculty of Harvard as a full professor in1998 . He has taught there ever since. [http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=bio&facEmId=aroth Alvin E. Roth Biography] Faculty and Research. Accessed on June 6, 2008]Roth is an Alfred P. Sloan fellow, a Guggenheim Fellow, and a fellow of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences . [" [http://www.gf.org/rfellow.html John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation R Fellows Page] ". John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. Accessed on July 6, 2008] [" [http://www.amacad.org/pdfs/alpha_list.pdf Members of the Academy of Arts & Sciences] " (October 2007). American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Accessed on July 6, 2008] [http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=bio&facEmId=aroth Alvin E. Roth Biography] Faculty and Research. Accessdate = 2008-06-18.] ] He is also a member of theNational Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and theEconometric Society . [" [http://www.econometricsociety.org/fellows.asp Fellows of the Econometric Society] " (March 2008). Econometric Society. Accessed on July 6, 2008] [" [http://www.nber.org/people/alvin_roth Alvin E. Roth] ". National Bureau of Economic Research. Accessed on July 6, 2008]Work
Roth made significantly to the fields of game theory, market design and experimental economics. In particular, he helped redesign mechanisms for selecting medical residents, New York City high schools and Boston primary schools.
Case Study in Game theory
Roth's 1984 paper on the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) highlighted the system designed by John Stalknaker and F. J. Mullen in 1952. The system was built on theoretical foundations independently introduced by
David Gale andLloyd Shapley in 1962. [D. Gale and L. S. Shapley: "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage", "American Mathematical Monthly " 69, 9-14, 1962.] Roth proved that the NRMP was both stable and strategy-proof for unmarried residents but deferred to future study the question of how to match married couples efficiently. [Alvin E. Roth (1984). [http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/papers/evolut.pdf "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory"] . In: "Journal of Political Economy" 92: 991-1016. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]In 1999 Roth redesigned the matching program to ensure stable matches even with married couples. [Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Special Issue in Honor of David Gale on his 85th birthday, 36, March, 2008, 537-569.] [Sara Robinson. [http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E6DB143EF937A1575BC0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print "Tweaking the Math to Make Happier Medical Marriages"] . in: "New York Times". August 24, 2004. ]
New York City public school system
Roth later helped design the market to match New York City public school students to high schools as incoming freshmen. Previously, the school district had students mail in a list of their five preferred schools in rank order, then mailed a photocopy of that list to each of the five schools. As a result, schools could tell whether or not students had listed them as their first choice. This meant that some students "really" had a choice of one school, rather than five. It also meant that students had an incentive to hide their true preferences. Roth and his colleagues designed an incentive-compatible mechanism and presented it to the school board in 2003. The school board accepted the measure as the method of selection for New York City public school students. [Alvin E. Roth (2005). [http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/papers/nycAEAPP.pdf "The New York City High School Match"] . With Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag A. Pathak. in: "American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 95." (2): 364-367.] [
cite news
last = Herszenhornh
first = David M.
coauthors =
title = Revised Admission for High Schools
work =New York Times
pages = New York/Region
language =
publisher =
date = 2003-10-03
url = http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/03/nyregion/03ENRO.html?ei=5007&en=2d9e14a1f57d2894&ex=1381204800&partner=USERLAND&pagewanted=all&position=
accessdate = 2008-06-27]
Boston's public school system
Working with
Tayfun Sonmez , Roth presented a similar measure to Boston's public school system in 2004. Here the Boston system gave so much preference to an applicant's first choice that were a student to not receive her first or second choice it was likely that she would not be matched with any school on her list and be administratively assigned to schools which had vacancies. Some Boston parents had informally recognized this feature of the system and developed detailed lists in order to avoid having their children administratively assigned. [Alvin E. Roth. (2007). [http://www.bu.edu/econ/workshops/rosenthal/lecture2007.html "Robert Rosenthal Memorial Lecture 2007: What Have we Learned from Market Design?"] Flash, Web Video. Boston: Boston University.] [Roth noted that the [http://groups.yahoo.com/group/westzoneparents/ West Zone Parents Group] at Yahoo Groups among others devoted considerable time and effort to estimating capacity for schools in the area and disseminated recommendations on the basis of those estimates.] Boston held public hearings on the school selection system and finally settled on a modified version of the algorithm used to match New York City students. [Gareth Cook (2003). [http://www2.bc.edu/~sonmezt/Bostonglobestoryonschoolchoice.htm "School assignment flaws detailed: Two economists study problem, offer relief"] In: "Boston Globe" 2003-9-12.]New England Program for Kidney Exchange
Roth is also a founder of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange [
cite news
last = Dubner
first = Stephen
coauthors = Levitt, Steven
title = Flesh Trade
work = New York Times Magazine
pages =
language =
publisher =
date = 2006-07-09
url = http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/magazine/09wwln_freak.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ei=5070&en=f8a5f1868b51672d&ex=1153022400&emc=eta1
accessdate = 2008-07-05] , a registry and matching program that pairs compatible kidney donors and recipients. [cite news
last = Wessel
first = David
coauthors =
title = Renal Donors Swap Recipients If Blood Types Don't Match; Cheating on Priority Lists
work =Wall Street Journal
pages =
language =
publisher =
date = 2004-06-17
url = http://www2.bc.edu/~sonmezt/WSJCapital-June17-2004.htm
accessdate = 2008-06-23]
The program was designed to operate primarily through the use of two pairs of incompatible donors. Each donor was incompatible with her partner but could be compatible with another donor who was likewise incompatible with his partner. Francis Delmonico, a transplant surgeon at
Harvard Medical School , describes a typical situation,cite web
last =
first =
authorlink =
coauthors =
title = Kidney Exchange: A Life-Saving Application of Matching Theory
work = Discoveries
publisher = National Science Foundation
date =
url = http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=104404&org=NSF
format =
doi =
accessdate = 2008-07-05]Because the National Organ Transplant Act forbids the creation of binding contracts for organ transplant, steps in the procedure had to be performed roughly simultaneously. Two pairs of patients means four operating rooms and four surgical teams acting in concert with each other. Hospitals and professionals in the transplant community felt that the practical burden of three pairwise exchanges would be too large. [
cite journal
last = Roth
first = Alvin E.
authorlink = Alvin E. Roth
coauthors = Sönmez, Tayfun Ünver, Unku
title = Pairwise kidney exchange
journal = Journal of Economic Theory
volume = 125
issue =
pages = 153
publisher =
location =
date = 2005
url = http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/papers/ajt.letter.2007.pdf
doi =
id =
accessdate = 2008-07-05] While the original theoretical work discovered that an "efficient frontier" would be reached with exchanges between three pairs of otherwise incompatible donors, it was determined that the goals of the program would not be sacrificed by limiting exchanges to pairs of incompatible donors. Recently, however, a six party (three pairs) kidney exchange was performed in April 2008. [
cite news
last =
first =
coauthors =
title = 'Six-way' kidney transplant first
work =BBC News
pages =
language =
publisher =
date = 2008-04-09
url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7338437.stm
accessdate = 2008-06-01] [
cite web
last = Harford
first = Tim
authorlink = Tim Harford
coauthors =
title = 6-way kidney exchange: Al Roth should be proud
work = The Undercover Economist blog
publisher =Financial Times
date = 2008-04-10
url = http://blogs.ft.com/undercover/2008/04/6-way-kidney-exchange-al-roth-should-be-proud/
format =
doi =
accessdate = 2008-06-18]
Books
Roth is the author of numerous scholarly articles, books and other publications. A selection:
* 1979. [http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/Axiomatic_Models_of_Bargaining.pdf "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems"] . Springer Verlag.
* 1985. "Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, (editor)Cambridge University Press, 1985.
* 1987. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View". (editor) Cambridge University Press. (Chinese translation, 2008)
* 1988. "The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley". (editor) Cambridge University Press.
* 1990. "Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis". With M. Sotomayor. Cambridge University Press.
* 1995. "Handbook of Experimental Economics". Edited with J.H. Kagel. Princeton University Press.
* 2001. "Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson". Edited with Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom.Journal articles
Roth has published over 70 articles in peer reviewed journals. According to
Scopus , the most widely cited have been
* Erev, I., Roth, A.E. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria" (1998) American Economic Review, 88 (4), pp. 848-881. Cited 285 times.
*Roth, A.E., Ockenfels, A. "Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the internet" (2002) American Economic Review, 92 (4), pp. 1093-1103. Cited 124 times.
*Slonim, R., Roth, A.E. "Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the Slovak Republic" (1998) Econometrica, 66 (3), pp. 569-596. Cited 81 times.
* Roth, A.E., Peranson, E. "The redesign of the matching market for american physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design" (1999) American Economic Review, 89 (4), pp. 748-780. Cited 61 times.
* Roth, A.E. "A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom." (1991) American Economic Review, 81 (3), pp. 415-440. Cited 58 times.
* Roth, A.E. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem" (1985) Journal of Economic Theory, 36 (2), pp. 277-288. Cited 43 times.
* Roth, A.E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M.U. "Kidney exchange" (2004) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2), pp. 457-488. Cited 37 times.References
External links
* [http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=bio&facEmId=aroth Alvin E. Roth] at Harvard Business School
* [http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html Compilation of research and press coverage] at Al Roth's game theory, experimental economics, and market design page.
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