CIA activities in Croatia

CIA activities in Croatia

According to an intelligence memorandum, prepared by the Office of National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence, in 1972 Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito believed his actions in Croatia prevented civil war and, in particular, unwanted Soviet intervention. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suggested that while his public statements might have been exaggerated, he truly saw the situation as a crisis. [1]

The crisis began in November 1971, with a strike of students at the University of Zagreb, protesting that Croatia was not getting its fair share of foreign exchange revenues. Tito, the report suggested, treated this as a resurgence of Croatian nationalism. This strike, as well as other protests, was endorsed by the liberal wing of the Croatian Communist Party.

In late November, having seen Croatian unrest developing since autumn, Tito returned early from a visit to Romania, and called a meeting of Croatian leaders, at his hunting lodge in Karadjordjevo, to discuss their concerns. While he found about two-thirds in agreement with his policy, he discovered a nucleus of defiance around Croatian Party President Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and a Croatian representative on the Yugoslav Party Executive Bureau.

On 12 December, he made his observations public, saying the Croatian party "had ample warning of the protests" but did not act to prevent actions by "counterrevolutionary forces". In part, he charged the Soviets of contacting people in Croatia and fomenting unrest, which the CIA believed was true. While he was concerned about separatism throughout Yugoslavia, he intended to act only with respect to Croatia. Dabcevic-Kucar and several close associates resigned, 14 student leaders were arrested, and the Chief of Staff of the Zagreb Military District was suspended. A wave of resignations, mostly in protest, followed.

Tito apparently judged public opinion and support correctly by focusing action on the student leaders, and generally clamping down on university protest. There was no widespread public indignation about his actions against the students. He raised alarm about Soviet involvement, and spoke to the need for Yugoslav unity.

CIA found that the key factor in Tito's management of the crisis is that with the exception of the one suspended generals, he enjoyed complete military endorsement of his actions. The new Croatian government approved by Tito still has to deal with liberal sentiment. Tito wanted his federated system to continue, and believed Croatian liberals often had supported him.

One result is that he asserted control of the Party, which he had previously tried to guide rather than command. He is now juggling the centralized national Party,and the military, against significant local parties. CIA saw this as inherently conflicted.

The CIA, however, estimated the chances as "better than even" that a single Yugoslavian state would continue after Tito's death.

References

  1. ^ Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (5 January 1972), Memorandum: The Crisis in Croatia, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/yugoslavia/Pub25_Memo_5-Jan-1972.pdf 

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